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With the remarkable progress in microelectronics and low-power semiconductor tech-
nologies, Radio Frequency IDentification technology (RFID) has moved from obscurity
into mainstream applications, which essentially provides an indispensable foundation to
realize ubiquitous computing and machine perception. However, the catching and exclu-
sive characteristics of RFID systems introduce growing security and privacy concerns. To
address these issues are particularly challenging for low-cost RFID systems, where tags
are extremely constrained in resources, power and cost. The primary reasons are: (1)
the security requirements of low-cost RFID systems are even more rigorous due to large
operation range and mass deployment; and (2) the passive tags’ modest capabilities and
the necessity to keep their prices low present a novel problem that goes beyond the well-
studied problems of traditional cryptography. This thesis presents our research results on
the design and the analysis of security schemes for low-cost RFID systems.
Motivated by the recent attention on exploiting physical layer resources in the design
of security schemes, we investigate how to solve the eavesdropping, modification and one
particular type of relay attacks toward the tag-to-reader communication in passive RFID
systems without requiring lightweight ciphers. To this end, we propose a novel physical
layer scheme, called Backscatter modulation- and Uncoordinated frequency hopping-assisted
Physical Layer Enhancement (BUPLE). The idea behind it is to use the amplitude of the
carrier to transmit messages as normal, while to utilize its periodically varied frequency
to hide the transmission from the eavesdropper/relayer and to exploit a random sequence
modulated to the carrier’s phase to defeat malicious modifications. We further improve its
eavesdropping resistance through the coding in the physical layer, since BUPLE ensures
that the tag-to-eavesdropper channel is strictly noisier than the tag-to-reader channel.
Three practical Wiretap Channel Codes (WCCs) for passive tags are then proposed: two
of them are constructed from linear error correcting codes, and the other one is constructed
from a resilient vector Boolean function. The security and usability of BUPLE in conjunc-
tion with WCCs are further confirmed by our proof-of-concept implementation and testing.
Eavesdropping the communication between a legitimate reader and a victim tag to
obtain raw data is a basic tool for the adversary. However, given the fundamentality of
eavesdropping attacks, there are limited prior work investigating its intension and extension
for passive RFID systems. To this end, we firstly identified a brand-new attack, working
at physical layer, against backscattered RFID communications, called unidirectional active
eavesdropping, which defeats the customary impression that eavesdropping is a “passive”
attack. To launch this attack, the adversary transmits an un-modulated carrier (called
blank carrier) at a certain frequency fE while a valid reader and a tag interacts at another
v
frequency channel f, f 6= fE . Once the tag modulates the amplitude of reader’s signal,
it causes fluctuations on the blank carrier as well. By carefully examining the amplitude
of the backscattered versions of the blank carrier and the reader’s carrier, the adversary
could intercept the ongoing reader-tag communication with either significantly lower bit
error rate or from a significantly greater distance away. Our concept is demonstrated and
empirically analyzed towards a popular low-cost RFID system, i.e., EPC Gen2. Although
active eavesdropping in general is not trivial to be prohibited, for a particular type of active
eavesdropper, namely a greedy proactive eavesdropper, we propose a simple countermeasure
without introducing extra cost to current RFID systems.
The needs of cryptographic primitives on constraint devices keep increasing with the
growing pervasiveness of these devices. One recent design of the lightweight block cipher is
Hummingbird-2. We study its cryptographic strength under a novel technique we developed,
called Differential Sequence Attack (DSA), and present the first cryptanalytic result on this
cipher. In particular, our full attack can be divided into two phases: preparation phase and
key recovery phase. During the key recovery phase, we exploit the fact that the differential
sequence for the last round of Hummingbird-2 can be retrieved by querying the full cipher,
due to which, the search space of the secret key can be significantly reduced. Thus, by
attacking the encryption (decryption resp.) of Hummingbird-2, our algorithm recovers
36-bit (another 28-bit resp.) out of 128-bit key with 268 (260 resp.) time complexity if
particular differential conditions of the internal states and of the keys at one round can
be imposed. Additionally, the rest 64-bit of the key can be exhaustively searched and the
overall time complexity is dominated by 268. During the preparation phase, by investing
281 effort in time, the adversary is able to create the differential conditions required in the
key recovery phase with at least 0.5 probability.
As an additional effort, we examine the cryptanalytic strength of another lightweight
candidate known as A2U2, which is the most lightweight cryptographic primitive proposed
so far for low-cost tags. Our chosen-plaintext-attack fully breaks this cipher by recovering
its secret key with only querying the encryption twice on the victim tag and solving 32
sparse systems of linear equations (where each system has 56 unknowns and around 28
unknowns can be directly obtained without computation) in the worst case, which takes
around 0.16 second on a Thinkpad T410 laptop.
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With the remarkable progress in microelectronics and low-power semiconductor technolo-
gies, Radio Frequency IDentification technology (RFID) has moved from obscurity into
mainstream applications. Unlike earlier bar-code technology, RFID technology enables au-
tomatic identification from a distance without requiring a line of sight and can incorporate
additional context data such as manufacturer, product type, and even environmental fac-
tors. In a broad sense, RFID technology is believed to be an indispensable foundation to
realize ubiquitous computing and machine perception as long as RFID principle is more
thoroughly understood, cheap components are more available, and RFID security and pri-
vacy are guaranteed. Unfortunately, security and privacy risks associated are not easy to
address for low-cost RFID systems, e.g., threats such as tracking, counterfeiting and denial
of service are instant doom for some people.
This thesis is concerned with the design and analysis of security and privacy solutions
for low-cost RFID systems, ranging from developing and implementing schemes in light
of the physical layer of RFID communication to analyzing the cryptographic primitives
proposed for the constrained devices. This chapter starts with an introduction to basic
principles, applications and active standards of passive RFID systems in Section 1.1. In
Section 1.2, we highlight the security and privacy threats towards passive RFID systems,
followed by presenting the security requirements and goals. Our research motivation and
methodology are given in Section 1.3. Finally, the outline of this thesis and a summary of
our research contributions are displayed in Section 1.4.
1
1.1 RFID – Principle, Applications and Standards
1.1.1 The Start of Something Big
Basic Gradients: An RFID system usually consists of considerable transponders or tags,
couples of readers or interrogators, and one backend database. A general view of an RFID





Figure 1.1: A General View of an RFID System
• Transponders or Tags : Each tag contains an IC chip with certain computation and
storage capabilities, and an antenna coil for communication. The computation and
2
storage capabilities entirely depend on the type of the tag, i.e., active, passive and
semi-passive.
– A passive tag does not have an internal source of power. Instead, it harvests
power from the electromagnetic field created by the readers nearby. Tags fall
into this category are either weak in computation but can be operated in a large
range, or, capable of performing intensive computation just in near proximity,
because the number of operations can be performed rests on the amount of
power available, which diminishes at the second order of the distance between
the tag and the reader.
– An active tag is more a conventional wireless communication device in terms of
its processing and storage capabilities, e.g., cell phone or wireless sensor node,
which possesses a power source, e.g., battery, that is used to support on-tag
computation as well as signal transmitting and receiving.
– A semi-passive tag is a hybrid of the above two, which uses battery to run the
chip’s circuitry but communicates by harvesting power from the reader signal.
• Readers or Interrogators : An RFID reader is a transmitter and receiver that work
together to communicate with the tag. There are two types of readers, namely
portable readers and regular readers. A portable reader, e.g., handheld PDA, smart
phone, may still have some limitations in its processing and storage capabilities,
while a regular reader could be as powerful as today’s computer. Both types of
the readers connect to backend databases through a wireless/wired link, which is
generally secured by SSL/TLS, and is usually not considered in the context of RFID
security and privacy.
• Backend database: To reduce the cost per tag and to manage data in a more reliable
and secure way, the information carried by the tag is an index to a backend database,
e.g., pointers, IDs, cursors, etc.. The information stored for each tag can be further
classified as: (1) public information such as tags’ IDs; (2) private information such
as tags’ secret keys; and (3) context information such as physical properties of ob-
jects/items associated with tags, which can be either public or private, depending on
the concrete applications. It is worth to mention that, albeit the backend database is
logically unique in one RFID system, it could be geometrically distributed to provide
extra reliability.
At a higher level, an RFID infrastructure considers not only ownership transferring
of physical objects, but also enriching, e.g., by filtering and aggregating, raw RFID-data,
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marketing the data and exchanging with other vendors. In this thesis, we focus more on
the interaction between readers and tags regardless of the upper layer structures.
Reader-Tag Interaction:
One of the main purposes of the reader-tag interaction is for the reader to “wake up” a
passive tag by providing it with enough impinging energy. There are two various methods
for transferring energy wirelessly to a passive tag:
• Radiation-based energy transfer: The reader transmits a continuous RF signal. When
a tag appears in the area, it receives the signal and converts it to direct current by
a rectifier circuit and stores the energy by charging a capacitor.
• Induction-based energy transfer: By exploiting inductive coupling, the reader’s an-
tenna uses current to generate a magnetic field, which produces a current flow in the
tag’s antenna that powers the tag’s IC chip.
After power harvesting, the tag starts to parse the command issued by the reader usually
by amplitude-demodulating the reader’s carrier wave and decoding the baseband signal. To
respond, the tag encodes the target message to a longer binary sequence and switches the
impedance load of its antenna according to the data stream, causing modulation of either:
(1) the amplitude of the signal which is later reflected (in radiation-based energy transfer);
or (2) magnetic field joining the reader and tag (in induction-based energy transfer).
The coding scheme used by RFID tags is usually Manchester-like codes, where the
encoding of each data bit has at least one transition and occupies the same time, e.g.,
1 7→ 10 and 0 7→ 01. One benefit of using the Manchester code or its variants is that if two
tags responds approximately at the same time, a collided bit would lost the transition, e.g.,
10 + 01 = 11, which turns to be an illegal codeword. Therefore, this abnormal codeword
informs the reader of the occurrence of the collision. In fact, anti-collision mechanism is
an important research topic for the RFID community and the most popular solution is
based on the time division multiple access, where a time interval is split into slots, in one
of which, the reader interacts with only one tag.
After establishing an error-free physical layer and an error-free data link layer, at the
logic layer, the reader interacts with the tag in a question-and-answer manner, e.g., the
reader issues a command to a tag, and the tag, according to its knowledge, computes an
answer, responds with the answer and puts itself into the next state. Next, if the reader
already obtains the information desired, the current session is suspended and the tag resets
its state; otherwise, the reader continues to ask and the tag continues to answer and transit
its state. Note that a protocol is often used to describe this interaction in an abstract way.
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1.1.2 RFID Applications
RFID technology is one of the most discussed auto-identification and data capture tech-
nologies nowadays, and the range of the applications is broadening rapidly. Some of the
applications are shown in Figure 1.2: an RFID-enabled smart poster promoting the concert
of a popular singer – fans may get details about the event and book the ticket by reading
the poster using their iPhones; a healthcare tag widely used in hospital scenarios helps
doctors to locate a patient and access the medical history of the patient in real time; an
Oyster card is deployed in London for using the public transportation facilities; a reusable
smart coffee mug embeds an RFID chip and enables people fill the mugs and walk out of
the shop without caring about the paying; a person is able to enter others’ social networks
by touching their pokens – an RFID-enabled social networking card; Wal-Mart is trying to
keep better track of its inventory by adding RFID tags to individual items in its stores;
Google Wallet allows its users to store credit cards, loyalty cards, and gift cards among





Transportation Pass Smart Mug
Physical Social Network
Figure 1.2: Novel Applications of RFID Technology
Generally speaking, the applications of RFID technology can roughly fall into the fol-
lowing categories.
• Enterprise Supply Chain Management and Asset Management: such as logistics man-
agement, inventory control/audit, item tracking/management and retail check-out.
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For instance, IBM developed an RFID-based solution for chemical and petroleum
manufacturing, which tracks production processes and monitor feedstock, raw mate-
rials, finished products, logistics and transportation, as well as fixed assets throughout
the supply chain.
• Contactless Payment: These applications are especially widely deployed in the trans-
portation systems as a convenient way for payments, e.g., SpeedPass from Mobil Oil
Corporation, Electronic Road Pricing systems in Toronto and oyster cards in Lon-
don as mentioned. High-value payment, in conjunction with RFID-enabled smart
phones, began to receive attention. Pioneering applications are Google Wallet, Erply
and Square in United States, SWIFT in Sweden, iBOXpay in China.
• Access Control: RFID technologies naturally allow: (1) users to enjoy complete hands
free access control; and (2) electronically produced records to be easily audited. For
example, keyless entry permitting or denying access to premises or automobiles is
broadly deployed; theft control systems, mostly known as electronic article surveil-
lance systems, are widely accepted by the public and are applied to protect assets in
libraries and super markets. In a broad sense, as RFID bridges the physical society
with the digital world, the concept of intrusion detection is also extended to detect
anomalous behavior of physical objects.
• Identification and Tracking: By making the digital ID of a tag unique and unalterable,
RFID potentially offers solutions for human/animal/device identification/authenti-
cation as well as tracking. Given an example, Agility Healthcare is used to track
mobile medical equipment in Virginia hospitals. Most recent, smart soccer ball is
proposed to be used in the World Cup, which is a system placing up to 12 interroga-
tors around a stadium that can detect an RFID tag inside a ball and track its exact
position in real time to help the references make more accurate decisions.
• Others: Some of the innovative applications go beyond the conventional use of R-
FID by integrating other technologies, e.g., environmental monitoring by employing
sensor-enabled tags that can detect rainfall, water level and weather conditions; R-
FID positioning such as Photosensing RFID for Location Aware Services developed
by MITSUBISH engineers; and EpixMix that tracks states of the skier via the lift
ticket that is RFID-equipped, such that the skier would be able to marks off the
done runs and be socially connected to nearby skiers or friends on the Facebook and
Twitter.
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Table 1.1: A Quick Reference of RFID Standards
Name Frequency Content Targeted Application
ISO11784/5 125/134.2kHz full duplex and half
duplex protocols be-
tween tags and readers
are defined
animal identification



















860-960 MHz air interface product-tracking in
the supply chain





a simple extension of
the ISO/IEC14443
ISO/IEC18047 All air interface test methods for
conformance with
ISO/IEC18000
1.1.3 State Of The Art RFID Standards
The term, “RFID”, in its broadest sense, can refer not just to next-generation barcodes,
but to a compact class of wireless communication/computing devices that are standards-
compliant. To clarify the context of this thesis, we summarize in Table 1.1 the state-
of-the-art RFID standards promulgated by International Organization for Standardization
(ISO). These standards typically describe the physical and data link layers, covering aspects
such as the air interface, anti-collision mechanisms and communication protocols, whereas
security functions are rarely mentioned.
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In the pool of various RFID standards, the most promising two are ISO14443 A/B,
mostly known as NFC, and ISO18000-6C, mostly known as EPCglobal UHF Class-1 Gen-
2 (EPC Gen2) [78], the former of which is capable of conducting intensive computations
in a near field of the reader and is thus widely used in applications such as biometric
passports, electronic ticketing, paypass credit cards, while the latter of which is capable to
be operated through a long distance with lightweight operations as mentioned. We provide
an interesting comparison between these two different types of RFID tags in Table 1.2,
which discloses the fact that NFC tags are powerful enough such that research outcomes
from sensor network security and even computer security can be applied.
Table 1.2: Comparison Between EPC Gen2 Tags and NFC Tags
EPC Gen2 Tag ISO14443 A/B Tag
Has energy source no no
Reading range up to ≈ 10m less than ≈ 5cm
Frequency 902− 928MHz in North America 13.15MHz worldwide
Chip area 1mm2 15− 20mm2
Price several cents several dollars
Security functions none (at least now) crypto coprocessors to perform
3DES, AES, RSA and ECC
1.2 Risks and Threats in RFID Systems
Like many technologies, while yielding great productivity gains, RFID systems may create
new threats to the security and privacy of individuals or organizations. In what follows,
we consider a computation-bounded adversary A attacking an RFID system composing
of a reader R and bunch of tags Ti, i = 1, 2, 3, .... As mentioned earlier, the interaction
between the readers and the database is usually performed on a TLS/SSL-secured link,
thus is not considered here. In what follows, we classify the identified risks and threats
into two classes, namely privacy concerns and security concerns.
Privacy Concerns:
• Inventorying or Rogue Scanning: A wishes to learn the contents of the tag Ti
without the owner’s knowledge or consent by placing a compliant reader, denoted as
R̂, at a certain location which identifies RFID-labeled items passing by. A succeeds
8
if any on-tag content is learnt. This threat becomes extraordinary dangerous when
a tag’s ID is combined with personal information, e.g., a credit card contains not
only the serial number but also the holder’s name, date of birth, and so on. The
consequence of this attack is privacy invasion.
• Tracing or Tracking: Utilizing the linkability between the tag Ti and the bearer,
A correlates data collected by multiple malicious readers placed at different locations
to track the bearer if fixed or predictable patterns exist in the protocol used by Ti
and the legitimate reader R. For instance, a person carrying an RFID tag effec-
tively broadcasts a fixed serial number to nearby readers provides a striking sign for
clandestine stalkers. The consequence of this attack is privacy invasion.
• Backward/Forward Tracing or Tracking: Tracing or tracking can be further
extended if A is able to compromise the tag before tracing or tracking: (1) backward
tracing – given all the secret credentials of a target tag at time t, A is able to identify
target tag interactions that occurred at time before t; (2) forward tracing – given
all the secret credentials of a target tag at time t, A is able to identify target tag
interactions that occurred at time after t.
Security Concerns:
• Replay Attack: A eavesdrops the communication between R and Ti for several
sessions and A, with the forged reader R̂, interrogates Ti for another several sessions,
A then writes the recorded flow(s) to a fake tag, denoted as T̂i, and utilizes T̂i to cheat
R. A succeeds if R believes that T̂i is Ti during the authentication. The consequence
of this attack is tag impersonation, meaning that an illegitimate electric device is
able to pretend to be the legitimate tag.
• Tag Counterfeiting or Cloning: A eavesdrops the communication between R and
Ti for several sessions and A, with R̂, interrogates Ti for another several sessions. A
then tries to recover the tags’ secrets by breaking the underline cryptographic func-
tions or protocols. At last, A creates a fake tag T̂i based on the learnt information.
A succeeds if R believes that T̂i is Ti during the authentication. The consequence of
this attack is tag impersonation.
• Relay Attack: To pass identification and/or authentication without the fully con-
trol of a valid tag, A relays messages exchanged between R and Ti without modi-
fication. No matter how well-designed cryptographic protocols are and how strong
the cryptographic primitives are, this attack is unavoidable [125] since the attacker
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in the middle essentially plays the role of a communication medium or channel. The
relay attack has serious security implications as the attacker is able to bypass any
application layer (cryptographically sound) security protocols, and the consequence
of this attack is tag impersonation in the current setting. A recent instance of such
an attack is to use two NFC-enable mobile phones to relay a contactless transactions
between a reader and a credit card, as demonstrated in [87, 88], i.e.,
card reader
NFC Channel←−−−−−−−→ phone A WiFi Channel←−−−−−−−→ phone B NFC Channel←−−−−−−−→ credit card,
which breaks the assumption made to almost every credit card payment system
that the legitimate card holder is always in the close physical proximity of where
the transaction happens (thus is aware of and agrees the transaction). A possible
countermeasure of this attack is distance bounding technology as described in Chapter
2.
• Man-In-The-Middle Attack: This is a variant of the relay attack. A is not merely
interested in passing identification and/or authentication but also keen on recover-
ing the tag’s secret credentials, A may modify the relayed messages and analyze
responses. The consequence of this attack is tag impersonation.
• Denial of Service: A tries to insert/block/modify messages transmitted between R
and Ti to cause de-synchronization or misunderstanding between the communicating
entities. For example, R might update its shared secrets after a session, while Ti does
not. As a result, they would no longer be able to authenticate each other.
• Reverse Engineer of Tags: A obtains a sample of the victim tag and reverse engi-
neers it to reveal all its secret credentials, private design of protocols and algorithms.
After that, A tries to mount the above attacks to another similar tag. The fact that
tags for low-cost RFID systems are generally easy-accessible makes this attack quite
a practical threat, e.g., [106].
Clearly, an ideal scheme for RFID security and privacy is able to resist to all the threats
listed above. However, given the constraint that a possible scheme should be efficient
and lightweight enough to be implemented, a silver-bullet solution for RFID security and
privacy does unlikely exist. Therefore, we expect a security scheme to achieve resistance to
some of the attacks listed, which are application-dependent. For example, the fundamental
goal and requirement of an authentication protocol is the resistance to inventorying or rogue
scanning, tracing or tracking, replay attack and tag counterfeiting or cloning.
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1.3 Motivation
As discussed, the spread of RFID technology gives rise to significant user privacy and
security issues. To secure the upper layer interactions, an confidentiality-, integrity- and
availability-preserving channel is expected to be constructed between the reader and the
tag. There are two various ways to realize this goal.
• Cryptographic Approach (more conventional): One could employ encryptions, in con-
junction with message authentication codes (MACs) and error correcting codes, to
reach the goal, if and only if robust and lightweight cryptographic primitives are
available for RFID tags.
• Physical Layer Approach (less conventional): In a conventional communication sys-
tem, the physical layer is solely responsible for transmission, reception and error
correction, whereas data security has been taken care of at the upper layers of the
protocol stack. As opposed to this tradition, there has been a considerable recent
attention on exploiting physical layer resources, i.e., channel noise, multi-path prop-
agation, space diversity, etc., in the design of security schemes, which result in more
compact implementations and/or stronger security in terms of confidentiality, integri-
ty and availability.
For the purpose of this thesis, we follow these two approaches. We start with investi-
gating the design and analysis of the physical layer schemes as we believe: (1) low layer
designs are more costless; (2) the asymmetry between the reader and the tag provides
interesting characteristics (which do not exist in other communication systems), some of
which can be exploited for security purpose. On the other hand, we study the lightweight
cryptographic algorithms and primitives as well, with the cross-layer optimization in our
mind.
Unless otherwise stated, we exclusively target the security and privacy for low-cost,
passive RFID systems in this thesis. The reasons are: (1) low-cost and passive RFID
systems will most likely have the biggest impact on consumer security and privacy, due to
their potentially large numbers, pervasive deployment and large operating range; (2) unlike
ISO 14443-compliant tags, e.g., [170], which are able to perform standard cryptographic
functions like AES, DES and even RSA and ECC, low-cost and passive tags, e.g., EPC
Gen2, are designed to strike a balance between cost and functionality, with less attention
paid to security. Henceforth, the designing of security mechanisms and cryptographic
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functions is quite challenging under this resources-limited (i.e., 200-4000 gates), power-
limited (i.e., harvest power from the electromagnetic field) and cost-limited (i.e., ≤ 5
cents) platform.
1.4 Outline and Main Contributions
The outline and the main contributions of this thesis are the following:
• Chapter 1 provides a general description of RFID systems, including the basic
concepts, underlying principles, applications and active standards. In addition, the
security and privacy issues are closely examined. The motivation and the context of
this thesis are also clarified.
• Chapter 2 describes the related work as well as a couple of research topics on which
this thesis will focus. We begin with the design and analysis of the lightweight cryp-
tographic symmetric ciphers, e.g., PRESENT, PRINTCipher, GOST, WG-7 and etc..
We then categorize and summarize the recent progress on the design of lightweight
authentication protocols, which are expected to provide not only authenticity and
computation/storage efficiency but also anonymity, untraceability and other prop-
erties desired in the current setting. Moreover, solutions leveraging the electronic
characteristics of the physical devices and the randomness in the channels between
the communicating devices are scrutinized as well, including: distance bounding pro-
tocols, channel impairment for good, fingerprinting technologies, physical unclonable
functions. Finally, solutions along a nontechnical way are briefly reviewed.
• Chapter 3 investigates how to solve the eavesdropping, modification and one partic-
ular type of relay attacks toward the tag-to-reader communication in passive RFID
systems without requiring lightweight ciphers or secret credentials shared by legit-
imate parties using a physical layer approach. To this end, we propose a novel
physical layer scheme, called Backscatter modulation- and Uncoordinated frequen-
cy hopping-assisted Physical Layer Enhancement (BUPLE). We further improve its
eavesdropping resistance through the coding in the physical layer as BUPLE en-
sures that the tag-to-eavesdropper channel is strictly noisier than the tag-to-reader
channel. Three practical Wiretap Channel Codes (WCCs) for passive tags are then
proposed: two of them are constructed from linear error correcting codes, and the
other one is constructed from a resilient vector Boolean function. The security and
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usability of BUPLE in conjunction with WCCs are further confirmed by our proof-
of-concept implementation and testing on the software-defined radio platform with a
programmable WISP tag.
• Chapter 4 identifies a brand-new and quite powerful family of attacks, called uni-
directional active eavesdropping, which defeats the customary impression that eaves-
dropping is a “passive” attack. Besides the formalization and the theoretic analysis
of this attack, we set out to fill the literature’s gap by demonstrating and empirically
evaluation of this new attack towards an EPC Gen2-compliant passive RFID system,
using software-defined radio devices working at 860-960MHz and a programmable
passive tag, i.e. WISP v4.1. Our experimental results show that the active eaves-
dropping achieves a significant improvement in the bit error rate of the intercepted
communication. Finally, although active eavesdropping in general is not trivial to be
prohibited, for a particular type of active eavesdropper, namely a greedy proactive
eavesdropper, we propose a simple countermeasure without introducing any compu-
tation/storage overhead to the current system.
• Chapter 5 presents a novel attack called Differential Sequence Attack (DSA), in con-
junction with guessing and determining the internal states, to attack the Hummingbird-
2 lightweight block cipher, as we discover that the differential sequences for the last
round can be computed by the full cipher and the search space of the key can be
reduced due to the property of the differential sequences. Using those observations,
our full attack can be divided into two phases: preparation phase and key recovery
phase. In the key recovery phase, by attacking the encryption (decryption resp.) of
HB-2, our algorithm recovers 36-bit (another 28-bit resp.) out of 128-bit key with 268
(260 resp.) time complexity if particular differentials of the internal states and of the
keys at one round can be maintained to the next round of encryption/decryption.
Furthermore, the rest 64-bit of the key can be exhaustively searched and the overall
time complexity is dominated by 268. During the preparation phase, our second al-
gorithm creates the conditions required by the key recovery phase with at least 0.5
probability and 281 effort in time.
• Chapter 6 reports an ultra-efficient key recovery attack under the chosen-plaintext-
attack model against the stream cipher A2U2, which is the most lightweight cryp-
tographic primitive proposed so far. Our attack can fully recover the secret key of
the A2U2 cipher by only querying the A2U2 encryption twice on the victim tag and
solving 32 sparse systems of linear equations in the worst case, which takes around
0.16 second on a laptop. Our cryptanalysis implies that A2U2 has been completely
broken and is not eligible to provide confidentiality and authenticity.
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Proposed Solutions for Securing
RFID Technology in the Literature
In this chapter, we introduce various design and analysis of security solutions proposed
in the literature, with a particular focus on their practicality for low-cost RFID systems.
We start with the recent process in the lightweight cryptographic primitives in Section
2.1. Based on the given primitives, design of lightweight protocols targeting privacy-
preserving authentication are summarized in Section 2.2. Besides, in Section 2.3, low-cost
solutions leveraging the electronic characteristics of the physical devices or the randomness
in the channels between communicating devices are examined and surveyed. Finally, non-
technical and less-technical solutions are treated in Section 2.4.
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2.1 Design and Cryptanalysis of Lightweight Ciphers
The intensive studies toward design, implementation and analysis of lightweight crypto-
graphic primitives for low-cost passive tags lead to the born of a new sub-field of cryp-
tography – lightweight cryptography, which is considered as the intersection of electrical
engineering, computer science and mathematics. The major tasks of lightweight cryptog-
raphy are as follows.
• Design of new cryptographic primitives and protocols, e.g., stream cipher, block
cipher, hash function, identification/authentication methods, etc.. To be specific,
research toward this topic can be divided into the three categories:
– Optimizing implementations for standardized and trusted algorithms/protocols
on low-cost or constrained devices, e.g., compact ASIC encryption cores for
128-bit AES [85, 89].
– Tailoring well-investigated and trusted algorithms/protocols to made them more
hardware-efficient, e.g., DESXL [154], a lightweight DES variant, in which the
eight original S-boxes in DES is replaced by a single new one.
– Designing brand new algorithms/protocols taking advantage of characteristics
of the low-cost hardware, e.g., PRINTCipher achieves a quite small chip area
by embedding the key-dependent part in their design, which origins from the
observation that, with an IC printer, there is essentially no cost in changing the
circuit that is printed at each run.
• Analysis of the primitives and protocols proposed to ensure their cryptanalytic strength,
which is even a more active topic. This is because, in the ongoing competition to
design the most efficient primitives, aggressive designs are used for hardware/power
efficiency, e.g., (1) innovative techniques are less well-understood and may potentially
introduce vulnerabilities; (2) the security margins that cryptographic primitives are
traditionally equipped with are reduced a lot in order to optimize the performance.
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Table 2.1: Recent Design/Implementation of Lightweight Ciphers
Key size Block size Area Throughput Logic Process
[bits] [bits] [GE] [Kb/s] [µm]
Stream Ciphers
Trivum [163] 80 N/A 749 100 0.35
Grain [93] 80 N/A 1, 294 100 0.13
KASUMI [80] 128 N/A 9, 000 850× 103 90× 10−3
ZUC [82] 128 N/A 10, 000 1.5× 106 65× 10−3
SNOW 3G [81] 128 N/A 34, 000 1.9× 106 90× 10−3
Block Ciphers
PRINTCipher-48 [137] 80 48 402 6.25 0.18
PRINTCipher-48 [137] 80 48 503 100 0.18
PRINTCipher-96 [137] 160 96 726 3.13 0.18
PRINTCipher-96 [137] 160 96 967 100 0.18
KTANTAN-32 [64] 80 32 462 12.5 0.13
KTANTAN-48 [64] 80 48 571 9.4 0.13
KTANTAN-64 [64] 80 64 684 8.4 0.13
GOST [183] 256 64 651 24.24 0.18
LED-64 [99] 64 64 688 5.1 0.18
LED-128 [99] 128 64 700 3.4 0.18
Piccolo-80 [194] 80 64 683 14.8 0.13
Piccolo-128 [194] 128 64 758 12.1 0.13
KATAN-32 [64] 80 32 802 12.5 0.13
KATAN-48 [64] 80 48 916 9.4 0.13
KATAN-64 [64] 80 64 1, 027 8.4 0.13
PRESENT-80 [188] 80 64 1, 075 11.4 0.18
KLEIN-64 [97] 64 64 1, 981 N/A 0.18
KLEIN-80 [97] 80 64 2, 097 N/A 0.18
KLEIN-96 [97] 96 64 2, 213 N/A 0.18
DESXL [158] 184 64 2, 168 44.4 0.18
mCrypton-128 [154] 128 64 2, 500 492.3 0.13
CLEFIA-128 [5] 128 128 2, 678 73 0.13
HIGHT [121] 128 64 3, 048 150.6 0.25
XTEA [129] 128 64 3, 490 57.1 0.13
AES [89] 128 128 3, 400 12.4 0.35
HummingBird-2 [84] 128 16 2, 159 N/A 0.13
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We summarize the lightweight ciphers recently proposed in Table 2.1, where GE is
the acronym of Gate Equivalent. As can be seen, although, compared with block cipher-
s, stream ciphers inherits lower hardware complexity and typically operate at a higher
speed, the majority candidates proposed are actually block ciphers. In particular, the
competitive candidates in the family of lightweight stream cipher, except WG-7, are ac-
tually Trivium [60] designed in 2006 and Grain [115] designed in 2007, which are not
specifically targeted low-cost devices such as passive tags. This phenomenon may imply
that, to be secure enough, the current linear feedback shift register (LFSR)-based design
of stream ciphers is hard to be further tailored/optimized. In parallel to this, the nonlinear
linear feedback shift register (NFSR)-based design, although has a great potentiality due
to the high linear complexity and long period of NFSR sequences, e.g., a recent design
of lightweight pseudorandom number generator [162] achieves 1, 242 GE, remain in the
infancy and are yet to be fully understood.
Additionally, the structures of the proposed lightweight block ciphers follow the same
structure as a general block cipher design, i.e., they can be categorized into: Substitution
Permutation Network (SPN) structure, e.g., PRESENT, PRINTCipher, and Feistel-type
structure, e.g., GOST, HIGHT, Piccolo. SPN is widely accepted due to its success appli-
cation to AES, while Feistel-type structures, besides its successful application to DES,
generally require a larger number of rounds than an SPN-based construction because of
its slow diffusion. However, a nice property of Feistel-type structures, as pointed out in
[193, 194], is that it can support a decryption function without much implementation cost.
2.1.1 PRINTCipher
PRINTCipher [137] is a novel lightweight block cipher proposed by Knudsen, Leander,
Poschmann and Robshaw in CHES’10, which is the first design that takes the IC printing
into consideration. The authors observed that: (1) a key is unlikely to be changed in a
tag’s life cycle; (2) IC printing does not require all versions of the cipher to be identical
and a specific tag can be personalized with a unique key without extra cost.
PRINTCipher-48 (PRINTCipher-96 resp.) is a block cipher with n = 48-bit (96-bit resp.)
block size and a key length of l = 80-bit (160-bit resp.), which adopts SPN structure with
r = 48 (r = 96 resp.) rounds. One round of PRINTCipher-48 is shown in Figure 2.1, where
S represents a 3-bit S-box and P represents a 3-bit permutation. Specifically, let the input
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of one P block be (c2, c1, c0), the output can be described as
(c2, c1, c0) if (a1, a0) = 0
(c1, c2, c0) if (a1, a0) = 1
(c2, c0, c1) if (a1, a0) = 2
(c0, c1, c2) if (a1, a0) = 3
where (a1, a0) are two key bits embedded to each P block during printing.
A Cryptanalysis of PRINTcipher: The Invariant Subspace Attack 209
i.e. the round function maps the affine subspace U + d onto itself. If all round
keys are in k ∈ U + (c + d) (in particular if a constant round key is used),
then this property is iterative over an arbitrary number of rounds. This yields
a very efficient distinguisher for a fraction of the keys. U should be as large as
possible to increase this fraction. We call this new attack technique an invariant
subspace attack. In the next section we show an example of how to apply it to
the light-weight block cipher PRINTcipher.
2.2 Attack against PRINTcipher
Description of PRINTcipher. PRINTcipher is a block cipher proposed by
Knudsen et al. at CHES 2010 [15]. It is a class of two SP-networks with a block
size of n = 48 (resp. n = 96) bits, a key size of l = 80 (resp. l = 160) bit, and 48



































Fig. 1. One round of PRINTcipher-48 illustrating the bit-mapping between the 16
3-bit S-boxes from one round to the next. sk1 denotes the xor key, p the permutation
key, and RCi the round counter.
PRINTcipher uses the same key for all rounds. It is split into two parts:
The first n bits are used as an xor key, the remaining l − n bits control the
permutations p. In order to introduce differences between the rounds, a round
counter RCi is used which is generated by an LFSR (for details, see [15]). The
other elements of the round function are defined as follows.
The linear layer consists of a bit permutation, where bit i of the current
state is moved to bit position P (i) where
P (i) =
{
3i mod n − 1 for 0 ≤ i ≤ n − 2,
n − 1 for i = n − 1,
where n ∈ {48, 96} is the block size.
Then the state bits are arranged in 16 (resp. 32) blocks of 3 bits each, which
are permuted individually in the permutation layer. Out of 6 possible permu-
tations on 3 bits, only four are valid permutations for PRINTcipher. Specifically,
Figure 2.1: One Round of PRINTCipher-48.
The key is split into two parts: the first n bits are used as the whitening key for each
round, the remaining l − n bits, as mentioned before, are embedded into the permutation
blocks. A round count RCi is used which is generated by an LFSR to avoid self- imilarity.
Cryptanalytic Results: Although the designers of PRINTCipher claimed its security
with respect to the main cryptanalytic methods, the first attack, discovered by Abdelra-
heem, Leander and Zenner in [7], appeared very soon. T is attack, exploiting the fact
that the diff rential characteri tics are key-d pendent, successfully breaks 22 rounds of
PRINTcipher-48 requiring the full code book and about 248 computational steps. Their
attack begins with noticing that, in S, all occurring differences are equally probable, e.g.,
with probability 1/4, and that for every 1-bit input difference, there exists exactly one
1-bit output difference. From this, it follows that starting with a 1-bit input difference,
a 1-bit differential trail through r rounds of th cipher curs with probability (1/4)r.
Additionally, if the 1-bit differential occurs, the S-box does not permute the active bit on
a differential trail, which is only influenced by the fixed round permutation and the key-
dependent permutation P . Therefore, knowing the best differential, one is able to deduce
the key.
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In CRPYTO’11, Leander, Abdelraheem, AlKhzaimi and Zenner presented a so-called
invariant subspace attack [150] that breaks the full cipher for a significant fraction of its
keys, e.g., 252 keys out of 280 for PRINTCipher-48 and 2102 keys out of 2160 for PRINTCipher-
96. The general idea of the invariant subspace is that the round function, including an
SP-layer and a key addition layer, maps the affine subspace (out of the entire key space)
onto itself. This property is preserved for an arbitrary number of rounds as long as all the
round keys are in this subspace, which results in an efficient distinguisher for this fraction
of the keys. Note that the invariant subspace attack displays interesting relationships to
other well-established attack techniques, e.g., truncated differential cryptanalysis [130],
statistical saturation attack [57, 147, 58], conditional differential cryptanalysis [138, 139],
dynamic cube attack [75].
2.1.2 KATAN-32/48/64 and KTANTAN-32/48/64
KATAN/KTANTAN [64] is a family of hardware oriented lightweight block ciphers proposed
by Canniere, Dunkelman and Knezevic. Both KATAN and KTANTAN have three variants
each, of 32-bit, 48-bit, or 64-bit block size. All ciphers share the same key length of 80
bits, where the only difference between KATAN and KTANTAN is the key schedule. Here
we provide a brief description of KATAN-32/KTANTAN-32 as an example.
Cipher |L1| |L2| x1 x2 x3 x4 x5
KATAN32/KTANTAN32 13 19 12 7 8 5 3
KATAN48/KTANTAN48 19 29 18 12 15 7 6
KATAN64/KTANTAN64 25 39 24 15 20 11 9
Cipher y1 y2 y3 y4 y5 y6
KATAN32/KTANTAN32 18 7 12 10 8 3
KATAN48/KTANTAN48 28 19 21 13 15 6
KATAN64/KTANTAN64 38 25 33 21 14 9




















Fig. 1. The Outline of a round of the KATAN/KTANTAN ciphers
feedback polynomial x8 +x7 +x5 +x3 +1. Then, the encryption process starts, and ends
after 254 additional clocks when the LFSR returns to the all 1’s state. As mentioned
earlier, we use the most significant bit of the LFSR to control the irregular update (i.e.,
as the IR signal). For sake of completeness, in Table 3 in the Appendix we give the
sequence of irregular rounds.
We note that due to the way the irregular update rule is chosen, there are no sequences
of more than 7 rounds that share the pattern of the regular/irregular updates, this ensures
that any self-similarity attack cannot utilize more than 7 rounds of the same function
(even if the attacker chooses keys that suggest the same subkeys). Thus, it is easy to see
that such attacks are expected to fail when applied to the KATAN family.
We implemented KATAN32 using Synopsys Design Compiler version Y-2006.06 and
the fsc0l d sc tc 0.13µm CMOS library. Our implementation requires 802 GE, of which
742 are used for the sequential logic, and 60 GE are used for the combinational logic.
The power consumption at 100 KHz, and throughput of 12.5 Kbps is only 381 nW. This
is a gate level power estimation obtained using Synopsys Design Compiler3.
For KATAN48 the implementation size is 927 GE (of which 842 are for the sequential
logic) and the total power consumption is estimated to 439 nW. For the 64-bit variant,
KATAN64, the total area is 1054 GE (of which 935 are for the sequential logic) and the
power consumption 555 nW.
Here we would like to note that the further area reduction for KATAN48 and KATAN64
is possible by utilizing a clock gating technique. As explained above, the only difference
3 Although the gate level power estimation gives a rough estimate, it is useful for comparison
with related work reported in the literature.
7
Figure 2.2: Round Function of KATAN-32 (note that, in each clocking, one shift is made
and two key bits are added to the state. IR is a round constant which decides whether or
not the 9th state of S is used in the state update)
As shown in Figure 2.2, the plaintext is loaded into two NFSRs denoted as L1 and L2
(of lengths of 13-bit and 19-bit), where the least significant bit of the plaintext is loaded to
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the 0th stage of L2, and the most significant bit of the plaintext is loaded to 12th stage of
L1. Each round, out of the 254 rounds, L1 and L2 are shifted to the left by one position,
where the new bits produced are loaded in the least significant bits of L1 and L2. Let us
denote the states of L1 and L2 as (s0, ..., s266) and (l0, ..., l272) through the whole encryption
process. Thus, the nonlinear recursive relations can be written as
s13+i = li + l6+i · l8+i + l11+i + l10+i · l15+i +Ksi
l19+i = si + s5+i + s4+i · s7+i + IRi · s9+i +K li
where IR = (IR0, ..., IR253) is an m-sequence of period 255 (generated by an 8-stage LFSR
in F2) with the initial state “11111111”, and K li and Ksi are the two subkey bits generated
by the key schedule with the secret key K.
The key schedule of KATAN family is actually an LFSR of 80 stages defined over F2.
Let the key be K, then the subkey of round i is K li ||Ksi = k2·i||k2·i+1, where
ki =
{
Ki, i = 0, ..., 79
ki−80 + ki−61 + ki−50 + ki−13, otherwise.
The key schedule of KTANTAN family is designed under the consideration that the key is
burnt (i.e., fixed) to the device. Therefore, it utilizes MUX, AND gate and XOR gate that
go with the ASIC to schedule the key bits in a nonlinear and low-cost way. Details can be
found in [64].
Cryptanalytic Results: In SAC’11, Bogdanov et al. in [37] found a vulnerability in the
key scheduling of KTANTAN: as tabulated in Table 2.2, some key bits are not used until very
late in the cipher, while some others are never used after some surprisingly small number
of rounds, which results in a 3-subset meet-in-the-middle attack. This reported attack is of
time complexity 275.170 on the full KTANTAN-32, 275.044 on the full KTANTAN-48 and 275.584
on the full KTANTAN-64. Compared to the 80-bit security KTANTAN targets, it is only
slightly better than the exhaustive search, and, it is not extendable to KATAN, which has a
more robust key schedule. Recently, in [2], this vulnerability is further exploited to mount
a related-key attack towards KTANTAN. However, related-key attack is not universally
accepted as a valid attack model, especially for KTANTAN, where the key is burnt into the
device and fixed for its life time. Most recent, Zhu and Gong presented in [223] a novel
extension – guessing the intermediate state of KTANTAN before launching the meet-in-
the-middle attack, and obtained the best cryptanalytic results on KTANTAN so far, e.g.,
KTANTAN32/48/64 can be broken with the time complexities of 268.06, 270.92 and 273.09.
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Table 2.2: Vulnerability in KTANTAN’s Key Schedule [37, 2]
Key variable First used in round Key variable Last used in round
k13 109 k38 164
k27 110 k46 158
k59 110 k15 157
k39 111 k20 131
k66 123 k74 130
k75 127 k41 122
k44 136 k3 106
k61 140 k47 80
k32 218 k63 79
In Indocrypt’10, Bard et al. [21] presented some experimental results on AIDA/cube, al-
gebraic and side channel attacks on the reduced rounds of the KATAN family, i.e., 60/40/30
rounds of KATAN-32/48/64. However, these attacks are marginal as they are effective to-
ward a small number of rounds in KATAN. Knellwolf et al. proposed to use conditional
differential cryptanalysis to attack KATAN/KTANTAN in [138] and extended this idea later
in [139]. Unlike the conventional differential cryptanalysis that the input pairs are selected
uniformly at random, conditional differential cryptanalysis asks for particular pairs of in-
puts which satisfy some conditions. In fact, the imposed conditions control the propagation
of the difference up to a certain round, and therefore may be potentially better to distin-
guish the cipher from an ideal primitive. Since the round function of KATAN/KTANTAN
has the slow diffusion, this method work for a small number of rounds, e.g., the best results
given in [138, 139] are the recovery of the 4 bits of the key of 78 rounds of KATAN-32 under
a single-key scenario and recovery of 10 bits of the key of 120 rounds of KATAN-32 under
a related-key scenario. As can be seen, this method produces some marginal results and
does not have practical impact on the security of KATAN family. Note that there is no
published attack toward full round KATAN-32/48/64 to the best of our knowledge.
2.1.3 GOST
To be away from other dedicated designs/implementations of symmetric ciphers targeting
lightweightness, GOST was developed in the Soviet Union during 1970’s as an alternative
to the DES developed by US and revisited recently by Poschmann et al. in [183] as
a competitive candidate for low-cost passive RFID-tags due to its highly efficient ASIC
implementation, e.g., 651 GE.
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GOST has a block size of 64 bits and a keysize of 256 bits (to offer an extra margin of
security). The overall structure, similar to that of DES, is a two branch Feistel network
with 32 rounds as shown in Figure 2.3, in which the right half of the block Ri is processed,
XORed to the left half Li, and swapped with the left half, i.e., for i = 1, 2, ..., 32,
Li+1 = Ri
Ri+1 = Li ⊕ (S((Ki +Ri) mod 232)≪ 11)
Note that S represents a set of eight S-boxes, which could be selected at the user’s will.
For example, to minimize the hardware footprint, one S-box is used eight times in parallel
in [183]. In addition, GOST has a simple key schedule: the 256-bit key is divided into eight
32-bit words, i.e., K1, K2, ..., K8. Each round, GOST uses one of them according to the
array given below, e.g., K1 is used in rounds 1, 9, 17 and 31,
K0, K1, K2, K3, K4, K5, K6, K7, K0, K1, K2, K3, K4, K5, K6, K7,
K0, K1, K2, K3, K4, K5, K6, K7, K7, K6, K5, K4, K3, K2, K1, K0.
Full GOST has 32 rounds, and its key schedule is xtremely simple: the 256-
bit key is divided into eight 32-bit words (K1,K2,K3,K4,K5,K6,K7,K8). Each
round of GOST uses one of these words as a round key in the following order:
in the first 24 rounds, the keys are used in their cyclic order (i.e. K1 in rounds
1,9,17, K2 in rounds 2,10,18, and so forth). In the final 8 rounds (25–32), the

















Fig. 1. One round of GOST
A major difference between the design philosophies of DES and GOST was
that the publicly available DES was intentionally chosen with marginal parame-
ters (16 rounds, 56 bit keys), whereas the secretive GOST used larger parameters
(32 rounds, 256 bit keys) which seemed to offer an extra margin of security. As a
result, DES was broken theoretically (by using differential and linear techniques)
and practically (by using special purpose hardware) about 20 years ago, whereas
all the single key attacks [1, 7, 13] published before 2011 were only applicable to
reduced-round versions of the cipher. 1
The first single key attack on the full 32-round version of GOST was published
by Takanori Isobe at FSE’11 [6]. It exploited a surprising reflection property
which was first pointed out by Kara [7] in 2008: Whenever the left and right
halves of the state after 24 rounds are equal (which happens with probability
2−32), the last 16 rounds become the identity mapping, and thus the effective
number of rounds is reduced from 32 to 16. Isobe developed a new key-extraction
algorithm for the remaining 16 rounds of GOST which required 2192 time and 264
memory, and used it 232 times for different plaintext/ciphertext pairs in order
to get the full 256 bit key using a total of 232 data, 264 memory, and 2224 time.
1 Attacks on full GOST in the stronger related-key model are known for about a
decade, see [5, 8, 9, 12, 13].
Figure 2.3: Round Function of GOST
Cryptanalytic Results: Although in the past 20 year, GOST has been intensively studied
and several related-key attacks and signal-key attacks targeting round-reduced version of
GOST have been published, the first single key attack on the full 32-round version of GOST
was published recently by Takanori Isobe in [122], which leverages the known property that,
providing R24 = L24 (which in fact happens with probabi ity 2
−32), he last 16 rounds
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become an identity mapping, and thus the effective number of rounds of GOST is reduced
to 16. Based on this property, Isobe combined the 3-subset meet-in-the-middle attack as
mentioned to extract the entire secret key with 232 plaintext/ciphertext pairs, 2224 time and
264 memory. This idea is further extended by Dinur, Dunkelman and Shamir in [65] such
that given the same amount of known plaintext/ciphertext pairs, the memory complexity
can be further reduced to 236. To achieve this improvement, the number of effective rounds
is further reduced to 8 by first applying the aforementioned reflection property followed
by a guessing of the internal state at the start of 9th round. After that, the basic meet-
in-the-middle technology or the so-called 2 dimensional meet-in-the-middle technology is
used. Although the recent progress in analyzing this cipher shows the attacks much faster
than exhaustive search, neither the time complexity nor the memory complexity are even
close to being practical. Without exaggeration, GOST, as a classical design, is the most
promising candidate in the family of lightweight cryptography, which integrates durable
security and compactness in an elegant way.
2.1.4 Piccolo
In CHES’11, Shibutani et al. proposed in [194] a new 64-bit block cipher, called Piccolo,
optimized for passive RFID tags. Piccolo has an iterative structure which is a variant of
the Feistel network and supports 64-bit block with 80 or 128-bit keys, which are referred as
Piccolo-80 and Piccolo-128, respectively. The differences between Piccolo-80 and Piccolo-128
are the number of rounds for encryption/decryption and the key scheduling.
As shown in Figure 2.4, the encryption/decryption of Piccolo, consisting of r rounds
(e.g., r = 25 for Piccolo-80 and r = 31 for Piccolo-128) , takes X = (X0, X1, X2, X3) ∈ F642 ,
four whitening keys wki ∈ F162 , i = 0, 1, 2, 3, and 2r round keys rki ∈ F162 , 0 ≤ i < 2r, as
the inputs, and outputs Y ∈ F642 . In each of the r rounds, following is performed
X1 = X1 + F (X0) + rk2i
X3 = X3 + F (X2) + rk2i+1
(X0, X1, X2, X3) = RP (X0, X1, X2, X3).
The whitening keys are XORed to X0 and X2 before applying F during the first and the
last round. Moreover, F : F162 7→ F162 consists of four parallel 4-bit S-boxes, whose canonical
representatives is E4B238091A7F6C5D, followed by multiplying, over F42 defined by an
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irreducible polynomial x4 + x+ 1, with a diffusion matrix


2 3 1 1
1 2 3 1
1 1 2 3
3 1 1 2

 .
The round permutationRP : F642 7→ F642 transforms (x0, x1, x2, x3, x4, x5, x6, x7) to (x2, x7, x4,
x1, x6, x3, x0, x5), where xi ∈ F82 for i = 0, ..., 7.
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Fig. 2. Round permutation RP
comparative results regarding the hardware efficiency for lightweight blockci-
phers whose key size is more than 80 bits are summarized in Table 1. Note that,
in our implementations, a key input is assumed to hold its value during the
block process. Thus, Piccolo achieves both high security and extremely com-
pact implementation unlike the other Feistel-type structure based lightweight
blockciphers.
This paper is organized as follows. The specification of Piccolo is given in
Section 2. Section 3 describes the design rationale. Sections 4 and 5 provide
results on security and hardware implementation, respectively. Finally, we con-
clude in Section 6.
2 Specification
This section provides the specification of Piccolo. Piccolo is a 64-bit blockcipher
supporting 80 and 128-bit keys. The 80 and the 128-bit key mode are referred
as Piccolo-80 and Piccolo-128, respectively. Both ciphers consist of a data pro-
cessing part and a key scheduling part. The differences between two key modes
lie in the number of rounds for the data processing part and the key scheduling
part. We first give notations used throughout this paper, then define each part.
2.1 Notations
a(b) : b denotes the bit length of a.
a|b or (a|b) : Concatenation.
a← b : Updating a value of a by a value of b.
ta : Transposition of a vector or a matrix a.
{a}b : Representation in base b.
Figure 2.4: Encryption in Piccolo (left) and Round Permutation RP (right)
The key schedule of Piccolo is designed to achieve: (1) hardware efficiency as the
registers for storing keys are not required and it leads the almost same gate requirement
for each key size; (2) enough immunity against attacks exploiting weakness of the key
schedule such as related-key differential and MITM attacks. The key scheduling function
for Piccolo-80, divides an 80-bit key K into five 16-bit subkeys ki ∈ F162 , i = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, and
produces round keys rkj ∈ F 162 , j = 0, 1, ..., 2r − 1 as shown in Table 2.3, where the hex
values are the public round constants.
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Table 2.3: Key Schedule of Piccolo-80
Rd. Rd. key Rd. Rd. key
0 ( 0x0071c293d, 0x01f1a253e ) ⊕(k2, k3) 1 ( 0x01718213f , 0x02f163d38 )⊕(k0, k1)
2 ( 0x027143939, 0x03f12353a ) ⊕(k2, k3) 3 ( 0x03710313b, 0x04f0e0d34 )⊕(k4, k4)
4 ( 0x0470c0935, 0x05f0a0536 ) ⊕(k0, k1) 5 ( 0x057080137, 0x06f061d30 )⊕(k2, k3)
6 ( 0x067041931, 0x07f021532 ) ⊕(k0, k1) 7 ( 0x077001133, 0x08f3e6d2c ) ⊕(k2, k3)
8 ( 0x0873c692d, 0x09f3a652e ) ⊕(k4, k4) 9 ( 0x09738612f , 0x0af367d28 )⊕(k0, k1)
10 ( 0x0a7347929, 0x0bf32752a ) ⊕(k2, k3) 11 ( 0x0b730712b, 0x0cf2e4d24 ) ⊕(k0, k1)
12 ( 0x0c72c4925, 0x0df2a4526 ) ⊕(k2, k3) 13 ( 0x0d7284127, 0x0ef265d20 )⊕(k4, k4)
14 ( 0x0e7245921, 0x0ff225522 )⊕(k0, k1) 15 ( 0x0f7205123, 0x10f5ead1c ) ⊕(k2, k3)
16 ( 0x1075ca91d, 0x11f5aa51e ) ⊕(k0, k1) 17 ( 0x11758a11f , 0x12f56bd18 ) ⊕(k2, k3)
18 ( 0x12754b919, 0x13f52b51a ) ⊕(k4, k4) 19 ( 0x13750b11b, 0x14f4e8d14 )⊕(k0, k1)
20 ( 0x1474c8915, 0x15f4a8516 ) ⊕(k2, k3) 21 ( 0x157488117, 0x16f469d10 )⊕(k0, k1)
22 ( 0x167449911, 0x17f429512 ) ⊕(k2, k3) 23 ( 0x177409113, 0x18f7eed0c ) ⊕(k4, k4)
24 ( 0x1877ce90d, 0x19f7ae50e ) ⊕(k0, k1)





















where kL and kR are left and right half 8 bits of k, respectively. The key schedule for
Piccolo-128 is similar and can be found in [194].
Cryptanalytic Results: There is no published cryptanalytic results on this new primitive
besides its designers’ self-evaluations – Piccolo has enough immunity against differential-
type, linear attacks, related-key attacks, MITM/slide/saturation attacks.
2.1.5 WG-7
Observing the phenomenon that only a tiny amount of data, e.g., 16 bits, needs to be
processed and transmitted each pass between the reader and tags, where the use of block
ciphers (which usually have the block size of 64-bit or 128-bit) seems to be overkill, Luo,
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Chai, Gong and Lai designed a lightweight stream cipher WG-7 [152] for passive RFID tags,
which is a variant of the WG stream cipher [172] as submitted to the eSTREAM project.
WG-7 includes a 23-stage LFSR with each stage over the finite field F72 and a nonlinear
filtering function which is realized by Welch-Gong (WG) transformation [105]. The key of
WG-7 is of size 80-bit, while the IV is of size 81-bit. The microcontroller implementation
[152] and FPGA implementation [149] demonstrated that the performance of WG-7 beats
Trivium and Grain.
Keystream Generation: The keystream generation is shown in Figure 2.5, where the
23-stage LFSR is defined by a primitive polynomial f(x) = x23+x11+β over F72 (defined by
g(x) = x7 +x+ 1) and β is a root of g(x). The nonlinear WG transformation WG : F27 →
F2, is applied to generate the keystream from the LFSR, which is the cubic decimation
of the original WG transform for better security (while preserving the ideal two-level
autocorrelation property as the original WG transform), i.e.,





Figure 2.5: Keystream Generation of WG-7
Resynchronizatio/Initialization: Like any other stream cipher, WG-7 is initialized be-
fore outputting the keystream. Let the states of the LFSR be represented as S0, S1, . . . , S22,
Si ∈ F72, the key bits be K0,...,80 and the IV bits be IV0,...,81. The key and the IV are loaded
into the LFSR according to the following rules, i.e., for 0 ≤ i ≤ 10,
S2i = (K7i,7i+1,7i+2,7i+3, IV7i,7i+1,7i+2)
S2i+1 = (K7i+4,7i+5,7i+6, IV7i+3,7i+4,7i+5,7i+6)
S22 = (K77,78,79, IV77,78,79,80).
After that, it runs for 46 clock cycles with a nonlinear permutation feedback called
WP : F72 7→ F72, which is defined as
WP (x) = t3 + t58 + t99 + t117 + t123 + 1, where t = x+ 1, x ∈ F72.
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Cryptanalytic Results: It is claimed in the same paper that WG-7 provides the ideal
two-level autocorrelation because of the underlying filtering function. Besides, the authors
also show that WG-7 is secure against time/memory/data trade off attack, differential
attack, algebraic attack, correlation attack and discrete fourier transform (DFT) attack as
described in [91]. On the other hand, the attacks against the original WG stream cipher
(11-stage LFSR defined over F292 ), e.g., [217], seems un-transplantable to WG-7 as the
number of rounds in resynchronization/initilization has been increased to avoid predictable
differentials when IV can be freely chosen by the attacker.
2.1.6 Other Lightweight Primitives
Besides the ones summarized in Table 2.1, there are many other lightweight design/analysis
of cryptographic primitives.
Message Authentication Code: Shamir in [191] proposed SQUASH, which, although
based on the Rabin public-key cryptosystem, performs very well on benchmarks. By
denoting tag’s response, tag’s secret key, reader’s challenge, and truncation function as
R, K, C, and T respectively, SQUASH can be simply represented as





where the fi’s are the nonlinear mixing functions realized by one NFSR. Note that N is a
composite Mersenne number, e.g., N = 21277 − 1, which is not only easy to store (since its
binary representation is a sequence of 1277 ones), but also makes the modular computation
particularly simple. Khaled and Serge later in [179] analyzed and attacked an early version
of SQUASH, which uses an LFSR as the mixing function expanding the XOR of the key
and the challenge. However, the security of SQUASH in general remains open.
Hash Function: As early as in 2003, Weis in his thesis [215] discussed using NFSRs to
build a low-cost hash function. However, this idea has not been elaborated so far. Rather
recently, lightweight hash functions began to receive attention. Bogdanov et al. in [32]
firstly described ways of using the PRESENT block cipher in hashing modes of operation
and which achieves 64-bit collision resistance with 1600 GE. Badel et al. in [24] presented
a lightweight hash-function family ARMADILLO, which has recently been attacked in [35].
Aumasson et al. in [6] designed a dedicated lightweight hash function Quark (1379 GE for
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64-bit collision resistance) using sponge functions as domain extension algorithm and an
internal permutation inspired from the GRAIN and the KATAN; Guo et al. in [98] proposed
a family of lightweight hash functions uses a sponge-like construction as domain extension
algorithm and an AES-like primitive as internal unkeyed permutation and achieves 1120
GE for 64-bit collision resistance. The latest proposal is SPONGENT in [30], which has the
smallest footprint among all hash functions published so far at all security levels it attains.
Public-key Schemes: Lightweight public-key schemes represent another promising av-
enue of research, even though its implementation remains too heavyweight at the current
stage: WIPR in [175] is a full-fledged public key identification scheme following the idea of
randomized Rabin function [190], which is secure, e.g., 1024-bit, yet highly efficient, e.g.,
5705 GE. The security of reduced WIPR is investigated in [218], where, as an addition-
al contribution, two variants are proposed to improve its security and to further reduce
its hardware cost; Pendl, Pelnar and Hutter in [184], presented their results of an imple-
mentation of elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) running on the Wireless Identification and
Sensing Platform (WISP), which is operated by a low-resource microcontroller MSP430
[205] from Texas Instrument. Their best implementation performs a scalar multiplication
using the Montgomery powering ladder within 1.6 seconds at a frequency of 6.7MHz, which
cannot meet the practical requirements.
2.2 Lightweight Authentication Protocols
One fundamental function of RFID systems is identification and authentication because
RFID technology has its roots in the “identify friend or foe” (IFF) for fighter planes in the
Second World War. In this section, we survey the design and analysis of the lightweight
authentication protocols for RFID systems.
2.2.1 Security Requirements
Albeit RFID systems are principally simple at first glance, design of the identification/au-
thentication protocols is quite challenging, e.g., such a protocol should ensure both the
anonymity and the untraceability of a legitimate tag during execution1. Generally speak-
ing, security requirements of such a protocol can be characterized from security, privacy
1A classical solution to handle such a problem is zero knowledge proofs, which prevent any leakage of
the secret information of the prover. However, zero knowledge proofs is not applicable due to the tight
budget on the on-tag computation/storage.
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and performance, which are detailed below. Note that theoretic models, which try to
generalize and unify these requirements, are studied in literature, e.g., [128, 173, 212, 71].
• Fundamental Requirements:
– Authenticity (security): After execution of the protocol, the reader can iden-
tify a legitimate tag with certainty, e.g., an adversary cannot impersonate any
legitimate tag (or reader) at the reader (or tag).
– Anonymity (privacy): A protocol between the reader and tag does not leak
any fixed or predictable patterns related to a tag’s ID or pseudo-ID.
– Untraceability (privacy): The adversary is not able to tell whether a transac-
tion after time t+δ, δ > 0 involves the tag, after eavesdropping on the reader-tag
communication before t for a sufficient number of rounds.
• Additional Requirements (or Bonus):
– DoS Resistance (security): Blocking of arbitrary number of sessions of the
reader-tag communication before time t does not affect the success probability
of the execution of the protocol after t.
– Backward Untraceability (privacy): If the adversary reveals the internal
state, e.g., the secret key, of a tag at time t, the adversary is not able to tell
whether a transaction before time t involves the tag (note that this property is
always obtained by updating the internal state of the tag).
– Forward Untraceability (privacy): If the adversary reveals the internal state
of a tag at time t, the adversary is not able to tell whether a transaction after
time t+δ, δ > 0, involves the tag, provided that the adversary does not eavesdrop
on the reader-tag communication continuously after time t.
• Practicality:
– Computational/Storage Efficiency (performance): A tag has very limited
resources in computation and storage as mentioned before. Hence, a suitable
protocol must be efficient at least on the tag side.
– Scalability (performance): A protocol must be scalable to allow the reader
to deal with such a large tag population. Performing an exhaustive search to
identify/authenticate individual tags is difficult when the number of tags is large.
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Roughly speaking, a “high quality” protocol should have: (1) all of the fundamental
requirements satisfied; (2) as many as possible additional requirements satisfied according
to its use; (3) feasibility to be implemented and deployed to real-world low-cost RFID
systems. Another observation one may obtain from the list above are the inherit contra-
dictions in several pairs of these requirements, which is the root cause that the design of
such a protocol is quite challenging. To name few,
• Security v.s. Performance: This is the most obvious contradiction as shown also
in the previous section – efficiency is always obtained at the cost of losing certain
security margin.
• Privacy v.s. Scalability: A tag must encrypt its identity with a secret key so that
only authorized readers can extract the identity, while authorized readers, in order
to authenticate the tag, need to know the identity of the tag to determine the key
associated with it. Unsurprisingly, the reader has to try every key in its database
until the valid key is found. This is characterized as the key search problem in [125]
and remains unsolved if the underlying cryptographic primitives are symmetric.
• Privacy v.s. Scalability v.s. Computational-efficiency: The above problem can be
perfectly solved by introducing public-key primitives to the tags. For instance, the
tag could use a valid public-key and a nonce to encrypt its identity and responses.
However, the requirement of computational/storage-efficiency makes this solution
invalid at least at the current stage.
In what follows, we summarize the recent progress in this topic. Although protocol-
s based on public-key primitives shows interesting properties, e.g., [151], we constrained
ourselves to the symmetric-key-based protocols, as practicality and implementation cost
are more concerned in this thesis. For the large body of literature focusing on the design
and analysis of RFID protocols, we roughly classify related works according to the charac-
teristics that they achieve best. Note that the classes we present is not mutual exclusive,
e.g., [28] can be seen as a scalability-oriented protocol as well as a performance-oriented
protocol.
2.2.2 Scalability-oriented Protocols
Molnar and Wagner [169], by extending Weis’s early work in [215], proposed a tree-based
scheme for library RFID applications. Similar as the Merkle tree, they consider N tags
as leaves in a binary tree and each edge in the tree is associated with a secret. Each tag
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stores the logN secrets corresponding to the path from the root to the tag. During the
authentication, the reader starts at the root and uses the secret to check whether the tag
uses the “left” secret or the “right” secret. If the reader successfully authenticates the tag
using one of these two secrets, both of them continue to the next level of the tree. If the
reader passes all secrets in the path, the tag accepts the reader. Although this protocol is
scalable, it needs O(logN) rounds of interaction and O(logN) storage on the tag. Also,
the more tags an adversary tampers with, the more secrets in the tree are exposed.
Burmester et al. in [23] described an authentication scheme with constant key-lookup,
which is, to the best of our knowledge, one of the most scalable solutions that preserve
privacy as claimed. However, a subtle flaw is found in [156], exploiting the fact that
an attacker can launch a three-run interleaving attack to trace and identify a tag. An
improved version of this protocol is also presented. Moreover, Cheon et al. in [51] exhibits
an interesting idea: use the meet-in-the-middle strategy (usually used to attack symmetric
ciphers with poor key schedules) to reduce the reader computation to O(
√
N logN).
2.2.3 Backward Untraceability-oriented Protocols
Ohkubo, Suzki and Kinoshita in [178] proposed an one-way authentication protocol, known
as the OSK protocol, to realize the backward traceability. To be specific, their protocol
works as below:
1. Reader: query to wake up the tag.
2. Tag: respond M = g(s) and update s to be h(s), where s is the secret shared by the
reader and the tag, g and h are hash functions.
3. Reader: compute g(hj(s)) for s of each tag in the database until it finds a match with
the received value M , where hj is the jth composition of h, e.g., h2(s) = h((h(s)).
Although it is obvious that this protocol is subject to replay attacks, e.g., an eavesdropper
can impersonate a tag without knowing the tag’s secret, and poor scalability, e.g., the
reader needs to perform O(n) work to identity a tag amongst a population of n tags,
it introduced an innovative concept, i.e., refreshing the state of the tag each time it is
queried by a reader, which inspires considerable following works. In [11], Avoine and
Oechslin reduced the reader’s search complexity by using a specific time-memory trade-off.
Besides, Avoine and Oechslin in [11] as well as Vaudenay in [212] noticed that when the
two hash functions are modeled as random oracles, the security of this scheme against a
strong model of attackers can be proven.
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YA-TRAP [206] is designed to achieve untraceability even when the tag is compromised.
In this scheme: a tag pre-shares a time interval [Tt, Tmax], where Tt denotes the last time
it was interrogated, and a secret key with the reader. The reader challenges the tag by
sending the current time Tr; if Tr is within the interval (Tt, Tmax], the tag responds with
a keyed hash value of Tr which can be verified by the reader, and updates Tt with Tr;
otherwise, the tag outputs a random number that an adversary is unable to distinguish.
However, YA-TRAP is vulnerable to both database-side DoS attack and tag-side DoS
attack. For the former, an adversary can incapacitate a tag by sending a wildly inaccurate
“current times”. To solve this, O-TRAP [39], a hash-chain-like scheme, is introduced with
a resynchronization mechanism. However, the resynchronization causes O(l × n) search
burdens to the backend database, where n is the number of tags and l is the steps required to
ensure synchronization across the hash chain (the adversary could make l a huge number).
Hence, it is not practical. Aiming at the same goal, RIPP-FS [56] claims to offer more
security properties than its predecessors. However, a complicated tracking technique is
later found in [177].
As one may expect, all previous protocols offering backward untraceability requires
on-tag hash functions, which are prohibitively expensive for RFID tags and have an un-
necessary security property, namely, the collision resistance. In FSE’10, Billet, Etrog and
Gilbert proposed a privacy-preserving mutual authentication protocol using a stream ci-
pher [25] (a minor revision from their previous work [15]) and proved that this protocol
achieves security, efficiency and a strong privacy close to the backward untraceability. The
detail of this protocol is listed below:
1. Reader: query the tag with a nonce nr.
2. Tag: respond (nt, Gt), where nt is a nonce contributed by the tag, Gt||Gr||Gs =
G(nt||nr, K) is a sequence produced by the stream cipher G with IV = nt||nr and
the key K (note that, in order to avoid any de-synchronization attack, the backend
database keeps one of the current key and one of the most recent used-key for each
tag).
3. Reader: search a potential K such that the produced Gt matches the received one;
if so, respond with Gr and update the key to be Gs.
4. Tag: if the received Gr matches the Gr produced locally, update the key to be Gs.
In all, every protocol in this category demands a stateful tag, or, implicitly requires
the tag has the nonvolatile memory and has enough power to write to or read from this
memory, which may result in an increasing in the tag’s cost.
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2.2.4 Forward-untraceability-oriented Protocols
Lim and Kwon in [155] described a complicated authentication scheme satisfying both
forward and backward untraceability, where two hash key chains are used: a forward key
chain for updating of tag’s secret, and a backward key chain for validating of the server. In
addition, if an authentication completes successfully, the tag and the reader both update
their secrets using exchanged random numbers. If an authentication fails, the tag updates
its secrets using a deterministic algorithm. The protocol provides forward untraceability
from the moment that an adversary misses one successful authentication session after time
t. It is also shown in [155] that this protocol is secure against server impersonation and
DoS attacks. However, it is not scalable, since the reader needs to perform significant
computations to update tags’ secrets in each session, and two key chains of each tag data
required to be stored. Furthermore, [192] presented an attack that breaks its untraceability
and backward untraceability.
Song and Mitchell in [196] demonstrated an improved version of this protocol, a sim-
plified description of which is listed below:
1. Manufacture: before the start of this protocol, assign the reader a pair (u ∈ Fl2, t =
h(u)) and assign the tag a value t = h(u), where h is a hash function and l is a
positive integer.
2. Reader: query the tag with a nonce nr ∈ Fl2.
3. Tag: respond (M1,M2), where M1 = t + nt, M2 = ft(nr + nt) and nt ∈ Fl2 is the
nonce contributed by the tag.
4. Reader: search for a potential t such that nt = M1 + t and M2 = ft(nr + nt) and
generate and respond with M3 = u+(nt≫ l/2), where≫ denotes the right circular
shift.
5. Tag: compute u = M3 + (nt ≫ l/2) and update t with h((u ≪ l/4) + (t ≫
l/4) + nt + nr) if h(u) equals t, where ≪ denotes the left circular shift.
6. Reader: update u with ((u≪ l/4) + (t≫ l/4) + nt + nr) and t with h(u).
This protocol is forward-untraceable because as long as the adversary misses M3, he
cannot have u and the corresponding new secret t. Besides, this protocol is secure against
tag/reader impersonation, replay, DoS attacks (in their full description, the previous pair of
(u, t) is actually stored by the reader for the purpose of re-synchronization) and backward
untraceability. The scalability is the only remaining problem for this design. Another
example protocol that supports forward and backward untraceability is [33].
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2.2.5 Performance-oriented Protocols
HB Family: An interesting avenue of research was initiated by Juels and Weis’ HB+ pro-
tocol [127] (inherited from Hopper and Blum’s early work in [112]), which is a probabilistic
algorithm that can be used to authenticate a tag to a reader while hiding the tag’s identity
from an eavesdropper using extremely simple algebraic operations. The security is reduced
to the difficulty of the Learning Parity with Noise (LPN) problem, which has been proven
to be NP-hard in [34]. In this protocol, the tag and the reader share a secret vector (x,y).
In each round,
1. Reader: wake up the tag.
2. Tag: respond with a blinding-factor vector b, which is randomly generated.
3. Reader: randomly select a as the response.
4. Tag: generate a noise bit u which takes “1” with probability η, i.e., Prob[u = 1] = η,
compute and respond with z = (a · xT ) + (b · yT ) + u.
5. Reader: independently compute z′ = (a·xT )+(b·yT ), and validate the tag’s response
if z = z′.
After n rounds, the authentication succeeds if and only if there is no more than dηne
mismatched responses. Assuming the intractability of LPN problem, the HB+ protocol
is provably secure against passive eavesdroppers. In EUROCRYPT’06, Katz and Shin
in [142] extended the security proof of the HB+ protocol, i.e., it remains secure under
arbitrary concurrent interactions of the adversary with the honest prover/tag, and, as a
consequence, the iterations of the HB+ protocol can be parallelized.
However, an active adversary can easily break this protocol. Gilbert, Robshaw, and
Sibert [103] showed a simple-and-effective man-in-the-middle attack, known as the GRS
attack. The attacker first modifies one bit of a to be a + α for the second pass of every
round of HB+ and observes the authentication result, e.g., acceptance or rejection, to learn
α · x. By repeating this simply process sufficient number of times, the attack is able to
learn x. The same GRS manipulation can be applied to blinding vectors b to recover y.
To thwart the GRS attack, a variety of protocols built upon HB+, such as HB++ [20],
HB∗ [69], etc., have been designed. However, Gilbert, Robshaw and Sibert in [101] showed
again that these variants are vulnerable to GRS-like attacks as well.
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In EUROCRYPT’08, Gilbert, Robshaw and Seurin [102] presented another two inter-
esting variants, known as Random-HB# and HB#, which are proved to be resistant to the
GRS attack in the sense that the adversary is only allowed to manipulate the challenges
from the reader to the tag. The core idea is to use two secret matrices x and y to replace
the secret row vectors in HB+. The difference between these two versions lies in the struc-
ture of the secret matrices: while in Random-HB# these two are completely random, e.g.,
x ∈ Fp×m2 , y ∈ Fq×m2 , thus (p+ q)m bits of storage is needed, HB# reduces this amount to
p+q+2m−2 by using Toeplitz matrices. At AsiaCrypt’08, Ouafi, Overbeck, and Vaudenay
presented a general man-in-the-middle attack, known as OOV attack, in [176], where the
adversary is given the ability to modify all messages, against all HB-like protocols, espe-
cially it recovers the shared secret in 225 or 220 authentication rounds for HB# and 234 or
228 for Random-HB#, depending on the parameter set. The crucial observation exploited
by the OOV attack is that, providing an adversary modifies the messages going in both
directions in a smart way, he can compute the hamming weight of the vector āx + b̄y + z̄,
where ā, b̄, z̄ are the modifications applied to a,b, z in the victim protocol. Additionally,
there is a recent trend to replace the linear encoding operation or vector/matrix multipli-
cation in HB-like protocols by nonlinear operations, e.g., [167], which is expected to have
a higher security margin. However, the security of this nonlinear variant remains doubtful
[1]. Most recent, Li, Gong and Qin in [148] produced a novel derivative named LCMQ
protocol (standing for the combination of learning parity with noise, circulant matrix,
and multivariate quadratic), which uses a lightweight and secure (against ciphertext-only
attack) encryption/decryption based on the circulant matrix multiplication/inversion to
replace the underlying linear encoding in HB+. The security of this protocol is also proved
under a generalized man-in-the-middle model in [148].
In all, HB+ is still the most elegant design in this family, given its lightweightness and
proved security under the passive attacks, which seems to be suffice for low-cost RFID
systems. Its variants, although provide extra security under active attacking models, are
unnecessarily complicated and away from the original design goal. It is worth to mention, as
a conventional challenge and response protocol, HB family still has the scalability problem
as the reader has to go through every possible key to identity thus authenticate the current
tag. Besides, a public denunciation of protocols in this family is that the success of the
authentication is only guaranteed within a certain probability less than one.
EPC Gen2 Family: EPC Gen2 tag is designed to strike the balance between cost and
functionality, with little attention paid to security. To address this problem, particular
protocols, e.g., [48, 59, 202], are proposed exclusively for this standard.
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The protocols designed by Chen et al. [48] and Qing et al. [59] are expected to provide
mutual authentication. However, two design flaws make them vulnerable to tracking and
replay attack: (1) the reader contributes the randomness to the protocol only; and (2)
Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC) is inappropriately treated as a hash function. In fact,
CRC inherits strong linearity and is designed to support error detection particularly with
respect to burst errors, not security. For any CRC and for any input a, b, c, d ∈ Fl2,
CRC(a ‖ b) + CRC(c ‖ d) = CRC((a+ c) ‖ (b+ d)) always hold.
In Gen2+ [202], instead of transmitting identity, PIN etc., the tag responds with two
7-bit random numbers, say a and b, which serve as an index of a random l-word string k,
denoting the key pool, which is shared with the database, as well as creating a so-called
check c by XORing the two least significant bit (lsb) of ath word and bth word. The
database first removes tuples of tag which do not satisfy c and next computes ck′ which is
the majority vote of the CRC for the interval [a, b] of the remaining tags. Let us denote the
substring of k from ath word to bth word as k[a : b]. The tag then makes use of its local
k to compute ck := CRC(k[a : b]) and compares ck with ck′. The tag does not respond if
the Hamming distance between ck and ck′ is greater than some threshold. Otherwise, the
tag sends the locally stored EPC. This protocol is clearly subject to replay attacks because
only the tag contributes to the randomness of protocol flows. Besides, it is possible for
an adversary to gradually build up sufficient information about the CRC of k and then
recover the tag’s keypool k. As can be concluded, to design a secure protocol targeting
even only fundamental requirements without using cryptographic primitives is unlikely to
be success.
After the recognition of this fact, Blass et al. in [28] proposed Ff -family of protocols
which is a cross-layer design of cryptographic primitive, e.g., an HMAC-like function Ff ,
as well as the protocol that relies on it. The benefit of this design philosophy is that the
cryptographic function can be customized to achieve minimalism [124]. Besides, the “key
search” is faster because the protocol works in a different way: (1) the tag provides the
reader with series of one-way results computed over its key; and (2) the reader compares
these one-way results with the entries of its database using the key included in each entry,
the reader identifies the entry in its database, whose series of one-way results matches all
the one-way results received. However, [26] found the connections between the Ff protocol
and the LPN problem, and showed a key-recovery attack with time complexity of about
238 against the instance has a 512-bit secret key.
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2.2.6 Others
Yoking proof allows a verifier or a reader to collect the proof of the simultaneous presence
of two tags in a specified communication range, e.g., a product and its safety cap must
be stayed together. Two-party yoking proof is introduced by Juels in [123]. Saito and
Sakurai in [201] found a replay attack on this protocol and improved it by using time
stamps. Furthermore, they generalized the yoking protocol to be used for a group of
tags. Piramuthu in [181] found another replay attacks on Saito and Sakurai’s protocol and
proposed an modified yoking protocol.
In [4], an interesting time-released-based pairing protocol for passive RFID systems is
proposed, which exploited an advantage shared by the legitimate tag and the legitimate
reader – the amount of uninterrupted time spent by the two legitimate devices in the
proximity of each-other. This idea, originating from the timed-release cryptography [161],
exhibits a great resource of secret credentials for identification and authentication and
deserves future research.
In some applications, the bearer of a tag might change. An ownership transfer protocol
allows transferring the ownership over a tag from the current owner to the new owner in a
secure and private way. Here “ownership” means having authorization to identity/authen-
ticate a tag and read/write all of the related information. Typical designs can be found in
[166, 141, 197].
2.3 Physical Layer Approaches
In a conventional sense, security and privacy is viewed as an independent feature addressed
above the physical layer, and all cryptographic protocols as mentioned are designed and
implemented with the assumption that the physical layer has already been established and
provides an error-free link. Motivated by Wyner’s early work [216, 180] and advances in the
communication technologies, there has been a considerable recent attention on studying the
fundamental ability of the physical layer to provide security for upper layers. Compared
to the prevalent cryptographic approaches, the physical layer approach presents embedded
security properties by utilizing random processes from physical world. In this section, we
survey the previous designs leverage the physical characteristics to provide security and
privacy for RFID applications.
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2.3.1 Distance Bounding Protocols
Desmedt et al. presented at CRYPTO’87 a new method, known as the mafia fraud [61], to
defeat any cryptographic authentication protocol. Based on the chess grandmaster problem
[43], this attack allows the adversary to successfully pass the authentication by relaying
the messages between a verifier and a legitimate prover. As one of the countermeasures,
the distance bounding protocol was proposed in [14, 22], which leveraging the facts: (1)
nothing travels faster than light [45]; (2) any relaying operation takes time, which may
cause observable delays and thus informs the verifier that the responses received might be
illegible, even they are algorithmically correct.
A distance bounding implicitly accomplishes, as pointed out by [3], authentication and
distance checking. Authentication, in its conventional sense, is a process whereby one party
is assured of the identity of another party involved, while distance checking in fact refers
to a process whereby one party is assured, through acquisition of corroborative evidence,
that a given property on its distance to another party involved is satisfied. It is intuitive
that any authentication protocol is able to provide authenticity but may not be suitable
for distance checking. This is because the distance between two parties is measured by
the round trip time (RTT) of a message. As a consequence, any authentication protocol
that works for distance checking must enable at least for one party, e.g., the resource-
constrained prover, a quick way to respond, or stated in another way, should guarantee the
operations performed by at least one party is ultra-lightweight. The existed designs follow
this principle.
Although the distance bounding protocol was created to fight with the mafia fraud, its
uses are not limited to this, e.g., besides the mafia fraud, it also deals with the following:
• Distance Fraud: The prover is fraudulent and tries to convince the verifier that he is
closer than is actually the case.
• Terrorist Attack: The prover collaborates with an attacker, who wants to convince
the verifier that the real prover is in the neighboring.
Note that, in most cases, the distance bounding protocols aim to prevent mafia fraud and
distance fraud.
Hancke and Kuhn’s Protocol: Brands and Chaum [17] designed the first distance
bounding protocol, which is published in EUROCRYPT’93. This protocol works as follows:
• Slow Phase: Both the verifier and the prover generate random binary sequence C =
c1, c2, ..., cn) and R = (r1, r2, ..., rn), respectively.
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• Fast Phase: The verifier transmits one challenge bit ci at the ith time slot, i = 1, ..., n,
to which the prover responds immediately with ri. The verifier times the delay
between sending ci and receiving ri.
• Slow Phase: After all n bits have been exchanged, the prover completes the protocol
by transmitting a message authentication code or digital signature for the two binary
sequences of C and R.
Hancke and Kuhn’s observed in [117] that the last phase of Brands and Chaum’s pro-
tocol can be removed, thus proposed the first distance bounding protocol for RFID appli-
cations, which is shown pictorially in Figure 2.6. Note that in the scenarios of RFID, the
prover is always the tag while the verifier is always the reader. In USENIX’07, Drimer
and Murdoch in [72] implemented this protocol on the Chip & PIN payment system in
compliance with EMV standard [79] as a practical solution for the relay attacks identified
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Figure 2.6: Hancke and Kuhns Protocol
Multistate Enhancement of Hancke and Kuhn’s Protocol: A potential vulnerability
in this protocol, as expected by sharp readers, is that after eavesdropping the slow phase,
the attacker could start to query the victim tag in prior to the start of the fast phase.
In this interaction with the tag, the attacker randomly selects a ĉi (and unsurprisingly he
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has 0.5 chance to get ĉi = ci) and stores the tag’s corresponding response. On the other
hand, to interact with the reader in the fast phase, he responds using the tag’s answer
if ĉi = ci; responds using a random bit otherwise. Therefore, he is expected to fool the
reader with (3/4)n chance, after n bits of ci are committed. Munilla, Ortiz and Peinado
[164, 165] modified the Hancke and Kuhn’s protocol by introducing another states, called
void challenges, in order to reduce the success probability of the adversary. However, their
protocol structured differently in the sense that it performs an additional slow phase in
which the tag signs the exchanged bits. As stated in [13], if the last phase is interrupted,
the whole authentication process is lost. Therefore, protocols without this final slow phase
are usually more appealing. Avoine, Floerkemeier and Martin further extended this 3-
state approach (state 0, state 1, state void) in [8], by showing that the number of rounds of
[164, 165] can be reduced while maintaining the same security level, as well as generalizing
this approach to be multistate that improves all existing distance bounding protocols.
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Figure 2.7: Avoine, Floerkemeier and Martin’s Protocol
Kim and Avoine’s Protocol: In CANS’09, Kim and Avoine introduced an enhanced
version in [132] of Hancke and Kuhn’s protocol, as shown in Figure 2.8, based on binary
mixed challenges, that converges toward the expected and optimal (1/2)n bound in case
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Figure 2.8: Kim and Avoines Protocol
Implementation Issues of Distance Bounding Protocols: The theoretic aspects of
distance bounding protocols seem mature enough and the attention began to shift to the
practical implementations of this technology, which is, counter-intuitively, even more chal-
lenging. As pointed out in [52, 116], the security of such time-of-flight protocols depends
not only on the cryptographic protocol itself, but also on the signal design at the physical
layer, e.g., short bit duration, signal formats that enable the recipient’s instantly reaction
on the reception, a communication medium with a propagation speed that approaches
the physical limit, and a low-cost transceiver that is able to receive, process and transmit
signals in negligible time, are generally needed.
To be specific, at the physical layer, if an attacker could start a response within the
allowable time window but still change the value at a later stage, once he knows the correct
response, the protocol’s security would be compromised. For example, if the reader’s
receiver integrates the signal amplitude over an entire bit period for demodulation, the
attacker could send no energy for the initial (m − 1)/m of the time interval and then
send an m-times stronger-than-normal signal during the final 1/m of the time interval
reserved for the bit. By this method, known as deferred bit signaling in [116], the attacker
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can delay committing to a bit’s value by (m − 1)/m of the bit period. To mitigate this,
an UWB (ultra-wideband) transceiver is designed and analyzed in [117, 143]. Hancke
presented another UWB-based physical layer design for a near-field, bit-exchange channel
that allowing for a resource-constrained prover in [110]. However, the UWB transmission
occupies a large portion of the radio spectrum and effective, e.g., resilient to noise and
multi-path effects, in a short-range.
On the other hand, Rasmussen and Capkun further investigated the design of the
transceiver under such a scenario in [186], where a prototype prover, that is able to receive,
process and transmit signals in less than 1ns is built. Their implementation leverages a
quite interesting point – the time needed for signal conversion and demodulation can be
saved if the protocol is designed in a proper way.
Others: Trujillo-Rasua, Martin and Avoine in [208] proposed an instance of the graph-
based protocol that resists to both mafia and distance frauds without sacrificing memory.
Capkun, Defrawy and Tsudik exhibited in [49] another direction of development of the
distance bounding technologies by considering a brand new scenario that a set of provers
interact with a set of verifiers, which is motivated by applications such as group device
pairing and location-based access control. Their key idea is to let the passive verifier
obtains a distance bound, when the active verifier executes distance bounding with the
prover. Avoin et al. gave an unified framework for analyzing RFID distance bounding
protocols in [3]. Rasmussen and Capkun in [185] analyzed location privacy problem in
the distance bounding protocols by showing location and distance between communicating
partners can be leaked to even passive attackers. Peris-Lopez et al. in [182] scrutinized
the combined use of cryptographic puzzles and distance-bounding protocols. A mutual
distance bounding protocol is proposed in [221], which uses an additional binary sequence
to determine, for the two participants, who plays the role of prover/verifier.
2.3.2 Channel Impairment for Good
There has been a considerable recent attention on investigating the security implications of
the physical layer, known as wireless physical layer security. The breakthrough concept be-
hind is to exploit the characteristics of the wireless channel, such as fading or noise, which
are traditionally considered as impairments. Following the original ideas [216, 180, 53]
proposed in 1970s, the theorists intend to create a clear and clean framework by evaluating
secret capacity for different channel models, e.g., [145, 96, 55, 159], and constructing alge-
braic codes to achieve this optimum goal, e.g., [207, 168], while the practitioners tries to
apply this idea to the following topics, which are conventionally covered by cryptography:
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• Key generation/extraction using channel reciprocity, e.g., [38, 10, 12]. Note that an
implicit requirement for key generation/extraction is that the participants are equally
powerful.
• Confidentiality- or integrity- or availability-preserving channel construction under
eavesdropping, modification, jamming attacks: e.g., [47, 220, 9].
The broadcast nature of an RFID communication implies that some ideas of the physical
layer security are applicable to the RFID scenarios as well. However, the potentiality of
the physical layer approach has been far away from been fully explored and there is very
limited schemes following this direction.
To construct an unidirectional confidentiality-preserving channel from the tag to the
reader, cooperative-jamming methods are introduced in [126, 44]. To protect the unwanted
scanning of tags, Jules in [126] proposed a conceptual scheme that the common tag and
the blocker tag (both worn by the customer) transmit two identifiers at the same time,
where the latter could simulate the full set of all possible k-bit identifiers of tags, which
are arranged in a binary tree of depth k. This tree is then traversed by the reader,
who queries tags in a bit-by-bit manner. Once the blocker tag is functional, when the
reader queries the bit that lies in the “privacy zone” of the binary tree, the blocker tag
simultaneously broadcasts both a ‘0’ bit and a ‘1’ bit (no matter what the response is
from the real tag). The net effect is that the blocker tag “blocks” the reading of wanted
tags. It is worth mentioning that the blocker tag could be recognized as a source of
artificial noise. However, bitwise synchronization and pre-shared secrets required between
the reader and the friendly jammer may be problematic in real-world applications. Melanie
et al. proposed a battery powered device, the RFID Guardian, in [187], which not only
produces a randomly modulated jamming signal, but also allows the user to upload access
control lists indicating which party can perform what operation on which population of
tags.
Later in [44], this cooperative-jamming method has been generalized and refined for the
key distribution, where the noisy tag (different names, but behaves similarly as the blocker
tag) is owned by the RFID system instead. By assuming that all tags reply simultaneously,
there is another observation: if both the noisy tag and the conventional tag transmit a
“1” (“0” resp.), the reader as well as the eavesdropper get symbol S11 (resp. S00). If both
of them transmit a different bit, then S01 or S10 will be received. Assuming the channel
is additive, the binary sequence of S0, S1 becomes a ternary sequence of S00, S01, S10,
S11 by superimposing, where S01 and S10 are indistinguishable to the attacker. Next, the
reader discards S00 and S11, and collects only S01 and S10, referred to as protected bit.
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Based on this straightforward principle, in a protocol proposed in the same paper, the
tag tries to send back a pseudo random sequence and the noisy tag emits another pseudo
random sequence (shared with the reader in advance) to jam it. From the mixed signal,
the reader chooses some of the protected bits as the secret key for the future encrypted
communication. As one can see, this cooperative jamming method provides a good solution
towards eavesdropping. However, the jamming signal, though makes the reader’s channel
far better than the attacker’s channel, causes bad Signal to Noise Ratio (SNR) at the
RF frontend of its neighboring readers, which may reduce the reliability and efficiency of
the whole RFID system. In addition, Bringer and Chabanne in [18] observed that the
proposed schemes can be envisioned as an application of the wiretap channel model [216].
Bringer et al. in [19] improved [44] by encoding the messages exchanged in the protocol
using the Integrity-code as proposed in [47]. Therefore, the resultant channel is not only
confidentiality-preserving but also integrity-preserving under active attacks.
In CHES’07, Savry et al. in [200, 50] constructed a noisy reader by exploiting the fact
that a passive tag is able to modulate a noisy carrier generated by a reader during its
reply. Similar idea also appears in [108, 107]. Note that noise is in the same bandwidth
as the message, by which both the amplitude and phase of the reflected signal are blurred.
Meanwhile, the reader, by knowing the noise that it sent, is able to subtract this noise
and to retrieve the tag’s answer, while the eavesdropper presumably cannot. However, this
approach may be illegal at least if the broadcast power is too high and it could cause severe
disruption of all nearby RFID systems as well. Additionally, the idea proposed in [220] to
solve the jamming problem in the wireless sensor network seems transferrable to the case
of RFID communication to create an availability-preserving channel.
Recently, UWB’s implications on the physical layer security began to receive attention
as it can “hide” the signal in the time-domain, e.g., [119, 133]. Considering the fact that
the passive UWB tag and the corresponding reader are commercially available, e.g., [204],
UWB-driven physical layer security for RFID communication deserves future research.
2.3.3 On the Fingerprinting of RFID Tags
The proliferation of wireless technologies has triggered a number of research initiatives to
detect illegally operated radio transmitters and identify wireless devices by using physical
characteristics of the transmitted signals, e.g., [209, 219]. These characteristics are usually
introduced by imperfections of transceivers caused by manufacturing deviations.
In 2003, Weis already noted in [215] that non-unique IDs can uniquely identify a tag
by observing the particular signal constellation they carries. Danev et al. in [67] officially
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introduced this concept to the cases of identifying ISO14443 RFID tags in a controlled
environment, by exploiting the modulation shape and burst and sweep spectral features
of the signals emitted by tag. Their experiments show that a set of 50 tags of the same
manufacturer and type can be identified with an error rate of around 4% based on stable
fingerprints in a measurement environment that requires close proximity and fixed posi-
tioning of the tag with respect to the acquisition antennas. In WiSec’10, the same group
of researchers further investigated this idea and experimentally verified a potential imper-
sonation attack in [70], such that the modulation-based identification, e.g., the proposal
in [67], can be impersonated with an accuracy close to 100% by simply replaying the used
features, while the transient-based features, e.g., the schemes in [209], are much harder to
be reproduced since these features can be channel- and antenna-dependent. By “transient-
based features”, we mean that extracting unique features from the radio signal transient
shape at the start of each new packet transmission.
Similar as [67], the physical layer identification of UHF RFID tags in compliance with
the EPC Gen2 standard is studied in [222] by primarily leveraging the time interval error,
i.e., how far each active edge of the clock varies from its ideal position, and the average
baseband power, i.e., the average power of an acquired RN16 preamble. The gained entropy
is enough to uniquely identify at most of 26 tags independently of the population size.
Every blade has two edges – although this result seems positive in prevention of de-
vice cloning, e.g., fake ePassports, counterfeit products, it causes serious privacy issues as
pointed out in [225]. To be specific, although the tag’s digital identify is usually invisible
to the rogue scanners thanks to the privacy-preserving protocols as mentioned, unique and
fixed physical identities leak the bearer’s location information. Zanetti et al. in [225] built
a fingerprint for clandestine people tracking in a shopping mall, using which the mobility
traces of people wearing EPC Gen2 tags can be reconstructed with a high accuracy. Re-
moving or reducing the effect of the random hardware impairments in the analog circuitry
components is the only solution besides killing/blocking the tag. However, there seems no
interest for the manufacturers to produce tags that producing the same radio fingerprint.
There are other ways to construct the physical fingerprints. For instance, the scheme
proposed in [113, 114] harvests static identity from existing volatile CMOS memory with-
out requiring any dedicated circuitry. However, as noticed in [203], RAM is subject to
data remanence, which means that after a portion of memory has been used for entropy
collection once, it will require a relatively extended period of time without power before it
can be reused. In [68], NFC tags are created from a collection of randomly bent, thin con-
ductive wires with lengths within 3-7cm to serve the role of certificates (a particular kind
of fingerprint) to provide authenticity. The underlying idea is that the random distribut-
ed wires within the tag manifest special dielectric and/or conductive properties, which is
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further sampled and digitized as the tag’s fingerprint.
2.3.4 Physical Unclonable Function
A Physical(ly) Unclonable Functions (PUF) is a function that is embodied in a physical
structure, which is easy to evaluate with low-power consumption, but hard to characterize
and duplicate. Generally speaking, PUF is not (or should not be) a purely mathematical
function, but the use of PUF can be understood mathematically, i.e., the whole process
can be seen as a hash function or pseudo random function R = f(C,K), where C is a
physical stimulus, R is the reaction or response from the PUF f and K can be understood
as the secret key embedded into the device when it is manufactured. Note that here K,
inherited from manufacture deviations, cannot be simply measured or represented, which
is thus, as it name implies, unclonable – given an instance of a particular PUF, it is hard
to (physically) reproduce it such that the exact functionality f is preserved.
With this interpretation, PUF can be used obviously in three ways:
• By treating f(C,K) as an ID or a fingerprint of a device under a fixed stimulus C,
PUF can be used for identification, e.g., [113, 114].
• By treating K as a cryptographic key, PUF can be used to perform challenge-and-
response authentications, e.g., [120, 134, 118], ownership transferring, e.g., [144, 131].
• By treating K as a random seed, PUF can be used to produces randomness, i.e.,
PUF mixes and expends the C and K to a long sequence, e.g., [113, 114].
Considerable applications of PUFs are proposed based on the assumption that PUF,
as a primitive, is both efficient and secure. Unfortunately, this assumption may not be
true always since there is no unified framework or rigorous metric to evaluate and analysis
the cryptanalytic strength provided by each of the designs. Especially, the lesson people
learnt from LFSR, which provides optimum randomness according to [95] and is extremely
efficient in hardware, tells that such a function may have a cryptographically simple repre-
sentation. Therefore, the cryptanalysis of PUFs, as a missing part in the area, is expected
to be done in the future. In prior to that, each design of PUF should ship with a reasonable
number of input/output pairs as a preparation for cryptanalysts.
On the contrary, the actual constructions of PUFs can be very different based on their
setting, e.g., optical PUF, coating PUF, arbiter PUF, ring oscillator PUF, SRAM PUF,
butterfly PUF and flip-flop PUF. The most classic design is a silicon PUF in [94], which
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exploits the random variations in delays of wires and gates introduced during the circuit
fabrication process. Given an input challenge, a race condition is set up in the circuit, and
two transitions that propagate along different paths are compared to see which comes first.
An arbiter, typically implemented as a latch, produces a ‘1’ or a ‘0’, depending on which
transition comes first. The reader is refer to [160] for a full treatment of designs of PUF.
2.4 Non-technical and Less-technical Ways
Faraday Cage: Inspired by the characteristics of electromagnetic fields, Faraday Cage, an
enclosure formed by conducting material or by a mesh of such material, is used to prevent
the penetration of the exterior radio signals, thus protecting the cage’s interior, say RFID
tags. This idea has been commercialized, e.g., DIFRwear provides stylish clothing/wal-
let/accessories that block the reading of RFID. In fact, clever thieves are already known
to use foil-lined bags in retail shops to circumvent shoplifting detection mechanisms.
Disabling and Killing: Karjoth and Moskowitz [140] proposed to physically clip tags
at checkout, using perforated tear-off antennas. Tags remain functional, yet their range
is effectively reduced to few centimeters. However, the applicability of this technology is
limited to items with non-embedded tags. Another straightforward way for the protection
of holder’s privacy is to kill the tags before they are placed in the hands of consumers, which
is also a standard function of EPC Gen2 tags. Each EPC Gen2 tag has a unique 16-bit
password (obviously, it is too short to provide any resiliency against brute force attack),
which is programmed at the time of manufacture. On receiving the correct password, the
tag will deactivate itself forever. Moisture-Dependent Contact proposed in [104] is a special
tag, which operates normally prior to sale. At the point of sale, a ROM component or
wire of the tag is burnt by applying a large amount of power to the tag. Note that the
tag is not completely killed but its RF interface is disabled. As a consequence, the tag
cannot be skimmed in an uncontrolled environment as long as it stays dry, and can be
finally re-enabled when the washing machine pumps water onto it.
However, there are many scenarios, for which simply kill or disable tags are unworkable
or undesirable for privacy enforcement, such as effortless physical access control, theft-
protection of belongings, and wireless cash cards. In addition, the deactivation of tags not
only gives trouble to the shop-lifting of tagged items, but also destroys the item identifi-
cation for the after sales services which are appreciated.
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The Regulation: Garfinkel [90] proposed a voluntary framework for commercial deploy-
ment of RFID tags which may be helpful to improve the security and privacy of RFID
systems. This frame work includes: (1) the right of the consumer to know what items
possess RFID tags; (2) the right to have tags removed or deactivated upon purchase of
these items; (3) the right of the consumer to access the data associated with an RFID tag;
(4) the right to access of services without mandatory use of RFID tags; (5) the right to




Physical Layer Enhancement of
Passive RFID Communication
For a low-cost RFID system, a typical risk is the reader-tag communication via a radio
channel is susceptible to eavesdropping, modification and relay. To mitigate, our work in
this chapter presents a marked departure from the existing paradigm such as lightweight
cryptography as we focus on defeating eavesdropping, modification and one particular type
of relay attacks toward the tag-to-reader communication in passive RFID systems without
requiring on-tag ciphers or secret credentials to be shared by legitimate parties. Our
solution exploits the physical layer resources of passive RFID systems, i.e., backscatter
modulation, uncoordinated frequency hopping and the coding for the wiretap channel,
exhibiting a promising way to provide security functions while keeping the hardware cost
of the reader and the tag almost unchanged, as expected in many RFID applications. To
be specific, we present the following contributions:
1. We propose a novel physical layer scheme, called Backscatter modulation- and Un-
coordinated frequency hopping-assisted Physical Layer Enhancement (BUPLE), for
passive RF communication. The idea is to use the amplitude of the carrier wave to
transmit messages as normal, while utilizing its periodically varied frequency to hide
the transmission from the eavesdropper/relayer and exploiting a random sequence
modulated to the carrier’s phase to defeat malicious modifications. Our rigorous se-
curity analysis shows that BUPLE achieves desired security goals without affecting
the cost of the reader and the passive tag.
2. BUPLE ensures that A receives a noisier signal than that of the legitimate reader,
which presents a potential opportunity to further improve its eavesdropping resistance
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through the coding in the physical layer. Three Wiretap Channel Codes (WCCs)
with practical parameters for passive tags and with tradeoffs in the information rate
(the proportion of the data-stream that is non-redundant), the equivocation rate (the
degree to which the eavesdropper is confused) and the cost of implementation, are
given – two of them are constructed from linear error correcting codes, and the third
one is constructed from a resilient vector Boolean function.
3. BUPLE and the proposed WCCs are implemented on the software-defined radio
platform (served as an RFID reader) and a programmable WISP tag. Results from
our experimental data well support our theoretic hypothesis and security analy-
sis. Additionally, performance comparison of the proposed WCC encoders with four
lightweight ciphers from literature suggests that WCCs consume much less resource
and have much higher throughput.
This chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.1 introduces adversary model, basic
concepts and definitions. In Section 3.2, we present BUPLE and its security analysis. In
Section 3.3, we give our constructions of the wiretap channel codes for passive tags. A
prototype implementation and experimental results are shown in Section 3.4. We conclude
the chapter in Section 3.5.
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3.1 Preliminaries and Background
In this section, we briefly introduce the adversary model we rest on throughout of this
chapter, gradients of passive RFID communication such as the backscatter modulation,
uncoordinated frequency hopping. At last, we roughly introduce Wyner’s wiretap channel.
3.1.1 Problem Statement and Security Model
Assuming that a powerful RFID reader shares a common RF channel with a passive tag
which is computation- and storage-constrained, no secrets or authentication materials are
shared by these two entities. We address the following problem: how could confidentiality,
authenticity and integrity of the tag-to-reader communication be preserved in the presence
of a budget-limited adversary A? Here, by “confidentiality”, we mean that given an eaves-
dropped version of the raw signal, to A, the entropy of the message from the tag does not
decrease. By “authenticity”, we mean that the reader should be clear about who the sender
of the message is. By “integrity”, we mean that malicious modifications to the message
can be detected by the reader. By “budget-limited”, we mean that A’s RF devices are
effective in a narrow frequency band.
We assume that the two communicating entities are legitimate and are not compro-
mised; otherwise, little can be done from the physical layer (issues caused by a malicious
reader or an impersonated tag are beyond the scope of this chapter). We adopt a Dolev-
Yao-alike model that A controls the communication which allows him to conduct the
following actions:
• Eavesdropping: A intercepts tag-to-reader signals, demodulates and decodes to get
communicated messages.
• Modification: A either adds to the channel a signal, which converts bit “0” into
“1” (called bit flipping [47]), or adds to the channel a signal representing a bit string
different from the one sent by the tag with a significantly higher power than that
of the original signal (called signal overshadowing [47]). However, A is unable to
eliminate energy from any channel.
• Active Relay: A places an active radio device in between a valid reader and a victim
tag, e.g., [87], which generates new signals in a narrow frequency band to answer the
valid reader according to the format of backscatter modulation after querying the
victim tag.
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Remark 1 Note that, besides the category of active relay attack that A is able to
cope with, there is another category of relay attack in the scenario of passive RFID
systems, i.e., passive relay attack, such that a malicious passive tag wired with a
malicious reader is placed in between the valid reader and the victim tag to relay the
communication. Technically, this attack can be considered as a particular kind of tag
impersonation, which violates our assumptions made to physical layer schemes thus
is not considered here.
3.1.2 Backscattering for Passive RF Communication
Radar principles tell us that the amount of energy reflected by an object is proportional
to the reflective area of the object. A passive RFID system is principally a radar system
in which the reader provides an RF signal for communication in both directions, i.e., from
the reader to the tag and the tag to the reader. To be specific, we consider a passive tag
composed of an antenna with impedance Za and a load with impedance Zl. The impedance
is often a complex quantity, where the real part is the resistance (i.e., Ra, Rl), and the
imaginary part is the reactance (i.e., Xa, Xl). According to the maximum power theorem
in RLC circuit theory [62], if the antenna’s impedance is matched to that of the load (i.e.,
Ra = Rl), no reflection occurs at the interface. On the contrary, if the load is shorted, total
reflection occurs and the power is re-radiated by the antenna. Thus by switching between
the two states, a backscattered signal is in fact modulated by the Amplitude Shift Keying
(ASK).
3.1.3 Availability of Uncoordinated Frequency Hopping in Pas-
sive RFID Systems
Frequency Hopping (FH) communication [199], in which the carrier frequency of a trans-
mitted signal constantly changes according to a pre-shared pseudorandom sequence, was
developed to defeat unintended listeners. Uncoordinated Frequency Hopping (UFH) indi-
cates that two entities establish FH communication without sharing any secret. Strasser
et al. in [195] considered applying UFH for fighting against a hostile jammer and proposed
a hash-chain based pre-authentication scheme. However, implementing this probabilistic
scheme is challenging, because: (1) the sender and receiver have less chance to “meet” in
a particular channel at a certain time especially when the hopping set is large; (2) syn-
chronization of the sender and the receiver is non-trivial when the hop rate is high, e.g.,
synchronization signals are vulnerable to jamming.
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Nevertheless, we observed that UFH can be practically realized in passive RFID systems
due to the following property: the reader changes the carrier frequency, while the tag only
has to modulate responses on the carrier and reflect it without concerning which carrier
frequency it uses. The reader is then able to center at the right frequency to capture the
backscattered signal. Besides, the imperfect time synchronization, which is the main issue
in a FH system, can be trivially solved, since the returned signal from the tag is strictly
∆t second later than the emitted signal, where ∆t is the sum of the tag’s processing time
and the signal’s propagation delay in a small distance (< 10m). Finally, FH mechanism is
standardized in EPC Gen2 as an optional strategy to eliminate interference in dense reader
scenarios and implemented in commercial products. In the light of UFH, our scheme brings
confidentiality, authenticity and integrity to the tag-to-reader communication for free.
3.1.4 Wiretap Channel
The wiretap channel model, as shown in Figure 3.1, is introduced by Wyner [216] and
extended in [180, 53]. In this model, when the main channel is better than the wiretap
channel, i.e., p0 < pw, where p0 and pw are the error probabilities of the main channel and
the wiretap channel respectively, it is possible through a particular coding to establish an























Figure 3.1: Wiretap Channel Model [216, 53]
As shown in Figure 3.1, to send an m-bit message s = (s1, ..., sm) ∈ Fm2 , the sender first
encodes it into an n-bit codeword x, which is then propagated through the main channel
and wiretap channel simultaneously. The legitimate receiver, e.g., RFID reader, received
a corrupted version y ∈ Fn2 of x while the eavesdropper receives an even more strongly
corrupted binary stream z ∈ Fn2 . After decoding, all information of s is expected to be
leant by the legitimate receiver at a code rate as high as possible, while no information
about s is leaked to the eavesdropper. Stated in another way, a wiretap channel has an
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achievable secrecy (R,L), 0 ≤ R,L ≤ 1, if there is an encoder-decoder pair such that the
following is true, for any η > 0,
1
m
Prob[s 6= s′′] ≤ η, m
n
≥ R− η, ∆ = H(s|z)
m
≥ L− η, (3.1)
where ∆ is the equivocation rate and H(s|z) is the conditional entropy of s given z. Wyner
exhibited the set of achievable (R,L) pairs always forms a region {(R,L) : 0 ≤ R,L ≤
1, R×L ≤ h(pw)−h(po)}, where h(p) = −p log2 p− (1−p) log2(1−p) is the binary entropy
function of p, and, h(pw)− h(po) is the secrecy capacity meaning the maximum product of
the rate and equivocation rate of a code under which perfect secrecy can be achieved.
Although this model offers a potential opportunity to achieve Shannon’s perfect secrecy
(i.e., ∆ = 1) without a pre-shared key, two strong assumptions make it less appealing to
practitioners: (1) two channels are distinct such that the main channel should be apparently
better or less-noisy. This is difficult to realize in reality; (2) given po and pw, there must exist
a code satisfying Eq. (3.1) (we call such a code Wiretap Channel Code or (n,m)-WCC
hereafter). Note that general constructions of WCCs, especially those with satisfactory
information rate, equivocation rate and finite codeword length, remain an open problem
[207].
As shown in Section 3.4 and Section 3.5, our work firstly closes the gap between this
theoretic model and practice as: (1) UFH is exploited to significantly degrade the tag-to-
eavesdropper channel by increasing pw; and (2) three WCCs with small codeword length,
targeting practical security, are given which can be implemented in tags with modest
computation/storage capabilities.
3.2 BUPLE and Its Security
For the rest of the chapter, we keep the following notations.
• {f1, ..., fM} represents a hop set with M possible frequencies.
• W = max({f1, ..., fM})−min({f1, ..., fM}) is the hopping band.
• In one hop, th is the signal duration, called hop duration, (we ignore the transien-
t switching time here for simplicity) and Wh is the bandwidth for each frequency
channel.
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• vT is the tag’s data rate, while v, v  vT , is the rate of a random binary sequence
generated by the reader, and vcmd is the data rate of reader’s commands.
• τ0 is the power-up time in second for a tag.
3.2.1 BUPLE Scheme
The BUPLE scheme works as follows:
1. During the time interval [ith, (i + 1)th), i = 1, ..., n, the reader emits a carrier wave











where fi ∈ {f1, ..., fM} is randomly selected by the reader,
√
2EbvT is a positive
constant indicating the carrier’s amplitude, and bi,j ∈ {+1,−1}, j = 1, ..., bthvc, is
randomly selected by the reader at the information rate v.
2. On this MSK-modulated carrier, the reader further amplitude-modulates its com-
mands at rate vcmd if necessary, e.g., QUERY as specified in EPC C1G2.
3. Once the tag powers up, it starts to amplitude-demodulate the double-modulated
carrier to get the commands issued by the reader if there is any. The tag next
computes a K-bit response (r1, ..., rK) and backscatters “10” if rj = 1 and “01”
otherwise, at rate vT , for j = 1, .., K.
4. The reader, with the receiver centered at fi, receives the backscattered signal, which
is denoted as ĈW i. By amplitude-demodulation of ĈW i and further decoding “10”
(“01” resp.) to “1” (“0” resp.), rj is transmitted.
5. Above steps are repeated until the completion of the communication.
To exemplify our scheme, we present a toy instance in Figure 3.2 with τ0 = 2/v, v = 3vT
and v = 4vcmd, during the ith time slot. As shown, a random sequence “10101111...1101”
is MSK-modulated to the carrier wave centered at fi. Next, the reader’s command “101” is
amplitude-modulated on the carrier wave (thus on the random sequence). After receiving
1MSK is chosen because of its spectrum efficiency – power spectrum drops as the fourth power of
frequency – and it provides constant energy to the tag.
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the signal from the reader, the tag takes τ0 second to power up and to process the reader’s
command. To respond with “10”, the tag encodes “10” to “1001” and backscatters it.
Note that the tag-to-reader message, i.e., “10”, is now protected by BUPLE.
1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1
1 0Reader's CMD:        (ASK mod.)
Random sequence: (MSK mod.)
Tag's reponsonse:   (Backscatter mod.)
1
1 100





Figure 3.2: An Example of BUPLE with τ0 = 2/v, v = 3vT and v = 4vcmd (note that the
message sent from the tag is actually “10”)
Choose of Parameters: Choosing appropriate parameters for our scheme is crucial to
realize the expected security properties. One typical configuration of BUPLE satisfying
Part 15 of Title 47 of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) regarding the spread
spectrum system is:
• Total bandwidth W = 100MHz.
• Size of hop set M = 200.
• Bandwidth for each frequency channel Wh = 500kHz.
• Hop duration th = 20µs.
BUPLE-S vs. BUPLE-W: As a result of spreading the power of the signal to hide the
transmission, a technical challenge arises: FH signals are usually unable to power up a
passive tag – providing the power of FH signals is strong enough to power up a tag, it is
also detectable by A’s envelope detector (even A is unaware of the carrier’s frequency).
To address this problem, BUPLE takes different values of Eb, which leads to the following
two sub-schemes.
• BUPLE-S (“S” for strong): Eb is a great positive float to the extent that CWi provides




2EbvTdt > Vin, where Vin is the
tag’s minimum operating voltage, e.g., Vin = 1.8v for WISP v4.1 tags.
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• BUPLE-W (“W” for weak): Eb has small numerical values such that CWi is not
detectable by the eavesdropper.
These two sub-schemes differ in several aspects as listed in Table 3.1: BUPLE-S pro-
vides more functionalities while BUPLE-W offers more security properties. For example,
although BUPLE-W can neither power up tags nor issue commands, it has full resistance
to eavesdropping in tag-to-reader communication when executed right after BUPLE-S. As
confirmed by our experiments, few rounds of BUPLE-W could be executed immediately
following one round execution of BUPLE-S. This is because the passive tag’s capacitor
stores constraint energy, which supplies the tag’s circuit for a short while even without
(enough) power supply from the reader. Depending on the design of upper protocols,
BUPLE-S can be used independently, or with BUPLE-W alternatively.
Table 3.1: Functionalities v.s. Security Properties of BUPLE-S and BUPLE-W
power-up tags issue cmd anti-modification anti-eavesdropping anti-relay
BUPLE-S X X X limited X
BUPLE-Wa × × X X X
awhen BUPLE-W is executed right after BUPLE-S.
3.2.2 Security Analysis
Using the adversary model introduced, we have the following analytical results. Note that,
while we utilize the bit error rate as the main metric to evaluate the attacker’s performance
in the analysis of the eavesdropping resistance of BUPLE-S, we adopt a computation-aided
justification, as used in [111], in the analysis of the eavesdropping resistance of BUPLE-W.
This is because it would be more meaningful, in the latter case, to investigate the possibility
of eavesdropping for the attacker (in terms of its required SNR) as the BER becomes very
close to 0.5 due to the low probability of interception of the signals in BUPLE-W.
Eavesdropping BUPLE-W: Generally speaking, the detection of FH signals is hard
and all existed detectors exploit the known structure of signals [111], e.g., the hopping
sequence is repeated after a short while. With the specified parameters, here we estimate
the required Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR) to detect the presence of signals in BUPLE-W
in terms of different types of FH detectors. Following the calculations in [199], given the
probability of detection PD = 0.7 and the probability of false alarm PFA = 10
−6, we have:
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(1) for a wideband radiometer, the required SNR at A’s receiver is SNRreq ≈ 132dB; (2) for
a partial-band filter bank combiner (PB-FBC) with 50 branches, the required SNR for each
channel SNRreq,I ≈ 128dB; and (3) for an optimum detector with exact M branches, e.g.,
the legitimate reader, SNRreq ≈ 123dB. This data suggests that A’s wideband radiometer
(PB-FBC resp.) has 9dB (4dB resp.) disadvantage relative to the optimum receiver owned
by a legitimate reader. Thus, given the noise power spectrum in a specific environment, if
Eb is carefully chosen, only the intended reader is able to receive messages backscattered
by tags. Note that to enable a tractable computation, we actually assume: (1) the tag-to-
eavesdropper channel is Additive White Gaussian Noise (AWGN); (2) {f1, f2, ..., fM}, W ,
tmsg, M , th and Wh are public; and (3) A has exact knowledge of both the time at which
a transmission originates and stops; otherwise, A has 1dB extra disadvantage [199].
Eavesdropping BUPLE-S: Although BUPLE-S offers a poor eavesdropping resistance,
it does differentiate the tag-to-reader channel and the tag-to-eavesdropper channel in the
sense that the error probability of the latter is enlarged. Let a backscattered signal be
ĈW i =
√
2Eb,kVt cos(2πfit), if k = 0 or 1 is sent by the tag (ignore the MSK-modulated
sequence for the time being). According to the minimum distance detection, the bit error









where Q is one minus the Gaussian cumulative distribution function.
Providing the eavesdropper listens at a wrong frequency, the received signal is passed
through a band-pass filter, which leads a degradation, denoted as δ in dB, δ ≤ 0, to both






δ/10Eb,1. Thus the bit error probability for











which is greater than po as Q is a decreasing function. Given an numerical example, let
Eb,0 = 4, Eb,1 = 25, δ = −20 and No = 1, we have po = 0.0013 for the intended receiver
while pw = 0.3821 for the eavesdropper.
Message Modification: First of all, the signal overshadowing is prevented: to inject
a high amplitude signal to the channel, A has to know at which frequency the reader’s
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receiver is working at; otherwise, the inserted signal will be filtered. In BUPLE, the
attacker has 1
M
chance to hit the right frequency. Transmitting the same message N times
in different hops further decreases this probability to 1
MN
, which is negligible when N is
large2. Secondly, the bit flipping could be eliminated: in order to change “rj = 1” to
“rj = 0”, A needs to modify “10” to “01” in the channel (note that “00” or “11” are illegal
codewords that help the reader to detect modification). To change the first bit in “10”,
A has to predict the shape of its carrier and sends the inverted signal to cancel it out.
However, this is impossible since, besides the carrier frequency is unknown, the phase of
the backscattered carrier is randomized by the MSK-modulated sequence and the channel
condition is unpredictable as analyzed in [47].
Relay: In this case, A produces a well-formatted signal centered at f ′i carrying the relayed
information to respond to the reader. The reader ignores this signal generated by the
relayer with probability 1 − 1
M
since the reader’s receiver always listens at fi and filters
out signals happening in other bands, where the probability, for A, to have f ′i = fi is 1M .




3.3 Enhanced BUPLE through Wiretap Channel Codes
As indicated by Eq. (3.2) and (3.3), if A’s receiver tunes to a wrong frequency, a portion
of energy of the backscattered signal is filtered and the demodulated and decoded bit
streams are apparently noisier than those received by the intended receiver. Therefore, the
wiretap channel model is realized by BUPLE. In this section, we further enhance BUPLE
by considering how could BUPLE-S achieve immunity to eavesdropping to the practical
maximum extent possible?
Our solution relies on the wiretap channel code. As shown in Figure 3.3, the tag’s
message is WCC-encoded before transmission and WCC-decoded by the reader launching
BUPLE. Considering the moderate processing/storage capability of passive tags, we require
a candidate WCC to have a equivocation rate close to 1 (rather than perfect secrecy), a
relatively high information rate and a small codeword length n. In what follows, we assume
both channels are Binary Symmetric Channel (BSC) with po = 0 and pw > 0 for simplicity,
2There is a confliction that repeated transmissions impair the eavesdropping resistance. In reality,
which security property is more important depends on upper layer protocols, e.g., modification resistance
is more imperative to protocols in HB+ family [176, 102].
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otherwise a suitable error correction code can be employed to make po = 0 while keeping
pw > 0 (remember pw > po). All “⊕”s are addition operations in F2 unless otherwise stated













Figure 3.3: Enhanced BUPLE through Wiretap Channel Codes
3.3.1 Parameterized WCCs from Linear Error Correcting Codes
The coset coding based on linear error correcting codes with infinite codeword length was
first used in Wyner’s proof [216] of the existence of a secrecy-capacity-achieving WCC.
Along this line, our first two constructions concentrate more on: (1) carefully selecting the
underlying linear code to maximize the desired security with small n; and (2) designing of
a storage efficient encoding algorithm, i.e., reducing the storage complex from O(22m) to
O(2m). We thus have the following constructions.
Construction I: (8, 1)-WCC The encoder works as follows: to transmit s ∈ {0, 1}, the
encoder outputs a random vector x = (x1, ..., x8) ∈ F82 satisfying x1 ⊕ x2 ⊕ ... ⊕ x8 = s.
The decoder at the receiver’s side evaluates x1 ⊕ x2 ⊕ ...⊕ x8 (or z1 ⊕ z2 ⊕ ...⊕ z8 for A)
to obtain s (or s ⊕ Σ8i=1ei resp.), where, as received by A, zi = xi ⊕ ei and ei is an error
bit introduced by the channel, i.e., Prob{ei = 1} = pw. Its rate, equivocation rate and
R×L for different pw are calculated and listed in Table 3.2. Similarly, we could construct
a (16, 1)-WCC.
Construction II: (8, 4)-WCC Let g(.) : {0, 1}4 7→ i, 0 ≤ i ≤ 15, be a public injective




1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0
0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0




Moreover, the cosets of C is denoted as Ci, 0 ≤ i ≤ 15.
To transmit a 4-bit message s, the encoder randomly selects a code c ∈ C and XOR it
with the coset leader a of Cg(s) to produce x. The decoder at the receiver’s side evaluates
HxT (or HzT = H(x ⊕ e)T for A) to obtain HaT = s (or H(a ⊕ e)T resp.). Here HaT
is called the syndrome of C. In terms of implementation, this tag needs to store: (1) g of
64-bit; (2) C of (8 × 16)-bit; (3) coset leaders of (8 × 16)-bit; and (4) the syndromes of
(16 × 4)-bit in the tag’s memory. That is 384 bits in all. Its rate, equivocation rate and
R× L for different pw are calculate and listed in Table 3.2.
Security Analysis: It is intuitive that after decoding the noise-corrupted codeword z =
(z1, ..., zn), where each zi can be seen as a random binary variable, A is ignorant of s =





”. This is achieved by the above WCCs because of the following
reasoning.
Let s = (s1, ..., sm) ∈ Fm2 be the message to be sent through a binary symmetric
channel and let codewords in the dual of a linear code C have minimum distance d and
let wt(Hi) be the hamming weight of the ith row of the parity check matrix H of C (thus
wt(Hi) ≥ d). By leveraging the fact that: when the channel makes even number of errors,
the adversary receives the correct parity check; when the channel makes odd number of
errors, the adversary receives the wrong parity check. We have the following derivations:

































(1− 2pw)d, i > 1










(1− 2pw)d, i > 1
Furthermore, since Prob{s|z} = Prob{s1|z} ×
∏m


























(1− 2pw)d) ≤ L ≤ 1.
3.3.2 WCCs Constructed from Resilient Boolean Functions
As we observed, the decoding process (e.g., H(x⊕ e)T : {0, 1}n 7→ {0, 1}m in Construction
II) can be generalized as passing the noise-corrupted codeword through a well-designed
S-box as shown below: when (x ⊕ e)T is not random as pw < 0.5, the output of the
S-box can be sufficiently random such that each output bit appears to be “0” and “1”
(almost) equally likely. The tool of design for such an S-box is the vector resilient Boolean
functions. A Boolean function with n-bit input, i.e., x = (x1, ...xn), and m-bit output is
said to be t-th order correlation immune if its output distribution does not change when
at most t coordinates of x are kept constant [40]. It is called t-resilient if it is balanced
and t-th order correlation-immune, that is the output distribution is uniform when at
most t coordinates xi of x are kept constant while others are chosen uniformly at random.
From the information theoretic point of view, the resiliency ensures that, given f(x), the
information obtained about the values of t coordinates arbitrarily chosen, e.g., xi1 , ..., xit ,
is zero, that is I(xi1 , ..., xit|f(x)) = 0, where I(X|Y ) is the mutual information between
random variables X and Y . Due the symmetry of mutual information, we also have
I(f(x)|xi1 , ..., xit) = 0.
Let us re-interpret the above equation in the context of the wiretap channel model: provid-
ing xi1 , ..., xit are error-free bits and xit+1 , ..., xim are uniformly selected due to the channel
noise, the eavesdropper is expected to learn nothing regarding f(x) given x.
S-box
x is an n-bit codeword
from the tag





is a special case of an S-box
Figure 3.4: Generalizing WCC Decoder as an S-box
In the following, we use Kerdock code studied in [198] as an example to construct a
WCC.
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Construction III: (16, 8)-WCC Let x = (x1, ..., x16) ∈ F162 , where f(x) = (f1(x),
..., f8(x)) =
(x9 ⊕ (x1 ⊕ x2 ⊕ x4 ⊕ x7 ⊕ x8 ⊕ (x1 ⊕ x5)(x2 ⊕ x3 ⊕ x4 ⊕ x6)⊕ (x2 ⊕ x3)(x4 ⊕ x6)),
x10 ⊕ (x2 ⊕ x3 ⊕ x5 ⊕ x1 ⊕ x8 ⊕ (x2 ⊕ x6)(x3 ⊕ x4 ⊕ x5 ⊕ x7)⊕ (x3 ⊕ x4)(x5 ⊕ x7)),
x11 ⊕ (x3 ⊕ x4 ⊕ x6 ⊕ x2 ⊕ x8 ⊕ (x3 ⊕ x7)(x4 ⊕ x5 ⊕ x6 ⊕ x1)⊕ (x4 ⊕ x5)(x6 ⊕ x1)),
x12 ⊕ (x4 ⊕ x5 ⊕ x7 ⊕ x3 ⊕ x8 ⊕ (x4 ⊕ x1)(x5 ⊕ x6 ⊕ x7 ⊕ x2)⊕ (x5 ⊕ x6)(x7 ⊕ x2)),
x13 ⊕ (x5 ⊕ x6 ⊕ x1 ⊕ x4 ⊕ x8 ⊕ (x5 ⊕ x2)(x6 ⊕ x7 ⊕ x1 ⊕ x3)⊕ (x6 ⊕ x7)(x1 ⊕ x3)),
x14 ⊕ (x6 ⊕ x7 ⊕ x2 ⊕ x5 ⊕ x8 ⊕ (x6 ⊕ x3)(x7 ⊕ x1 ⊕ x2 ⊕ x4)⊕ (x7 ⊕ x1)(x2 ⊕ x4)),
x15 ⊕ (x7 ⊕ x1 ⊕ x3 ⊕ x6 ⊕ x8 ⊕ (x7 ⊕ x4)(x1 ⊕ x2 ⊕ x3 ⊕ x5)⊕ (x1 ⊕ x2)(x3 ⊕ x5)),
Σ16i=1xi). (3.4)
Let the encoder be f−1(x) and the decoder be f(x). To transmit an 8-bit message s,
the encoder outputs a 16-bit random binary vector x such that f(x) = s. The decoder at
the receiver’s side simply evaluates f(x) (or f(x ⊕ e) for A) given x (or x ⊕ e resp.) is
received. This construction is optimum (among the three proposed WCCs) as its R×L is
closest to the secrecy capacity as shown in Table 3.2 (see Appendix A for the brute force
algorithm/program we developed as there is no known formula to compute the equivocation
rate for WCC constructed from the nonlinear code).
Generally, an (n,m, t)-resilient Boolean function f(.) can be used to construct an (n,m)-
WCCs by letting the encoder be f−1(.) and the decoder be f(.). However, due to the non-
linearity of the codes in the binary field, the method to derive the results for the achievable
secrecy of linear WCCs, may not be applicable. The exploration of the analytic represen-
tation of the equivocation rate of WCCs from nonlinear codes constitutes a challenging
work, which is part of our future research.
3.3.3 Visualize the Security of Proposed WCCs
We calculate the information rate, the exact equivocation rate and R × L of each WCC
with different pw, which are listed in Table 3.2. As seen, there is no one-size-fits-all WCC:
Construction I is an extreme case when confidentiality is to be taken care of, with an
imperative shortcoming in its lowest transmission rate; Construction II and Construction
III are rate-efficient codes at the cost of lower equivocation rates.
To observe the real-world effects of the proposed WCCs, with Simulink, we built a
digital communication system composing of a random message generator, a WCC en-
coder/decoder, an ASK modulator with 915MHz carrier, a BSC or AWGN channel and an
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Table 3.2: Comparison of Performances of Proposed WCCs.
(n,m) underlying code rate equivocation rate R× L
pw = 0.20, secrecy capacity = h(pw) = 0.721928094887
(8, 1) parity check 0.1250 0.99979649036 0.12497456129
(8, 4) ext. hamming 0.5000 0.96977096204 0.48488548102
(16, 8) Kerdock 0.5000 0.98711512719 0.49355756360
pw = 0.10, secrecy capacity = h(pw) = 0.468995593589
(8, 1) parity check 0.1250 0.97959953172 0.12244994146
(8, 4) ext. hamming 0.5000 0.78495689709 0.39247844855
(16, 8) Kerdock 0.5000 0.82311413681 0.41155706840
pw = 0.05, secrecy capacity = h(pw) = 0.286396957116
(8, 1) parity check 0.1250 0.86186434726 0.10773304341
(8, 4) ext. hamming 0.5000 0.53233802320 0.26616901160
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Figure 3.5: Simunlink Simulation for RFID Systems
envelope detector. The Symbol Error Rate (SER) is simulated and calculated to validate
that WCCs further improves the eavesdropping resistance. As shown in Figure 3.5, the
SER in BSC increases with pw if no coding is involved (the given plots use a logarithmic
scale for the y-axis). An interesting result is that the distance or resiliency of each WCC
can be visualized as its maximum geometric distance away from the solid line. Besides,
the plot of SER in AWGN on the right shows that the intended receiver has approximately
5dB advantage of SNR (relative to the eavesdropper) to achieve the same SER.
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Table 3.3: Actual Measures of Output Voltages at Port TX/RX of RFX900 w.r.t. Scale
Factor
scale factor output voltage scale factor output voltage
10 0.00mv 5000 2.124v
500 144mv 10000 2.880v
1000 396mv 25000 3.208v
2000 864mv 32767 3.312v
3.4 Proof-of-concept Implementation and Testing
In the following, we present our proof-of-concept implementation and testing of BUPLE
and proposed WCCs.
3.4.1 Experiment Setup
We built a physical-layer programmable reader using the Universal Software Radio Periph-
erals (USRP-1) [76] together with two RFX900 daughter boards (with the filters bypassed
to get a 500mW peak output power): we use one RFX900 with a VERT900 antenna [211]
to serve as the frontend of the transmitter (call them RFX900-Tx hereafter) and another
RFX900 with a circular polarity panel antenna [42] to be the frontend of a narrowband
receiver (call them RFX900-Rx hereafter). In the receiving path, RFX900-Rx samples raw
UHF signals by an ADC and then converts them to baseband signals by a digital down
converter (DDC). The baseband digital signals out of USRP are sent via USB 2.0 interface
to the Thinkpad T410 laptop running GNU Radio [92], a free software toolkit for signal
processing from the physical layer, under the 32-bit Ubuntu 10.04. The transmission path
is similar, but consists of digital up converters (DUC) and a DAC. In parallel to this, a
DPO7104 digital phosphor oscilloscope is used for measurements.
To observe behaviors of a passive tag, a WISP v4.1 tag [214], was employed. The reasons
for the selection are: (1) it is programmable due to its 16-bit general purpose MSP430F2132
microcontroller. Programs for MSP430F2132 are written in embedded C and compiled,
debugged and profiled with IAR Embedded Workbench 5.10.4, in conjunction with TI
FET430UIF debugger; (2) it simulates every aspect of a passive tag in terms of limited and
ephemeral energy storage and backscatter communication; (3) it implements a significant
portion of EPC Gen2 commands, e.g., QUERY and QUERYREP.
In what follows, we use an integer called scale factor in [−216 + 1, 216 − 1] to represent
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the amplitude of a signal without unit. The actual measures of the output voltages at port
TX/RX of RFX900 (without antenna) with respect to this scale factor is provided shown in
Table 3.3.
3.4.2 Our Implementation
In our implementation, BUPLE-W and BUPLE-S are executed alternatively. We first
developed a signal processing block for GNU Radio, in conjunction with our customized
FPGA firmware, to generate a two leveled carrier signal with period 0.5s, where the high
level of the amplitude 25000 represents BUPLE-S while the low level of the amplitude 3000
represents BUPLE-W (this amount, as we tested in an independent session, cannot drive
the tag). In addition, our block randomly tunes the frequency of both RFX900-Tx and
RFX900-Rx every 0.5s. Finally, we wrote a Python script to create and control signal flow
graphs, in which, the gain of the receiver’s antenna is set to 20dB, and the received signal is
decimated by USRP with a factor of 32; right before demodulation, the decimated signals
are again filtered by an 8th order low-pass filter with gain 2, cutoff frequency of 400KHz.
Therefore a narrowband receiver is realized. Note that the specified hop rate cannot be
implemented as there are many delays along the digitization path of USRP such as RF
frontend settling time, FPGA FIFO filling time, USB transferring time, etc..
Figure 3.6: Devices Employed in Our Implementation and Testing: one DPO7104 oscillo-
scope, one USRP (v1.0), two RFX900 daughterboards, one VERT900 antenna, one circular
polarity panel antenna, one WISP tag (v4.1) and one TI FET430UIF debugger
For the tag side, we slightly modified the firmware of the WISP tag to let it intermit-
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Figure 3.7: Time Domain Measurements when BUPLE Works with a WISP Tag
it has enough power, rather than implementing the command-based reader-tag interac-
tion. This is because our physical layer scheme is essentially independent from upper layer
protocols. By transmitting “1010101010101010”, we actually transmit a “1”, i.e., the tag
encodes “1” as “11111111” with the (8, 1)-WCC, and each “1” in “11111111” is mapped
to “10” as specified by BUPLE.
Figure 3.7 exhibits how our scheme works in a standard office setting with the tag placed
in between the transceiver and receiver – it is 9.8cm away from RFX900-Tx’s antenna and
131cm away from RFX900-Rx’s antenna. As we can see, the backscatter communication
carries out normally in BUPLE-S while it can only last for a while in BUPLE-W before
the tag uses up its power. As long as the execution time of BUPLE-W is reduced, it is
possible to keep the tag always alive.
Eavesdropping BUPLE Enhanced Communication: To further investigate the eaves-
dropper’s performance while BUPLE is running, we conducted the following tests in the
same physical environment: centering RFX900-Tx at 915MHz while centering RFX900-Rx at
frequencies ranging from 915MHz to 918MHz, we measured the amplitudes of the backscat-
tered signals on BUPLE-S and BUPLE-W respectively, which are expected to exhibit the
loss of communication reliability if the eavesdropper works at a wrong frequency.
We tabulated the results in Table 3.4. In both BUPLE-S and BUPLE-W, the carrier’s
amplitudes as well as those of the tag’s responses drop quickly if the eavesdropper’s receiver
is not centered at the right frequency. By “N/A”, we mean the signal is submerged in noise
and cannot be observed. The experimental evidences support the theoretic hypothesis that
to detect the presence of frequency hopped signals in BUPLE-W is non-trivial, let alone
demodulate and decode them. We conducted this experiment for reader/tag/eavesdropper
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Table 3.4: Amplitudes of Signals Captured by Eavesdropper Working at 915MHz to
918MHz
Rx’s Freq. BUPLE-S BUPLE-W
amp. of carrier amp. of tag’s response amp. of carrier amp. of tag’s response
915MHz 24700 564 2980 91
916MHz 6000 389 600 N/A
917MHz 4300 210 270 N/A
918MHz 300 N/A 200 N/A
with varying distances/angles and get the similar results. Note that, although, theoreti-
cally, the data in Table 3.4 should be able to fit onto the curve described by Eq. (3.3), it
is practically hard to show as the degrading factor, i.e., δ, is a function of many variables
and some of which are embedded in the hardware design of the USRP and the RFX900-Rx
that are unknown to us.
Implementing On-tag WCC Encoders: To evaluate the cost of WCC encoders, we
implemented them on the MSP430F2132 [205] of a WISP tag without WISP’s firmware
(since the firmware itself consumes a considerable portion of SRAM) and tested memory
consumption and throughput. We employ a 23-stage LFSR with each stage in F82 as the
random source for each WCC. To be mentioned, the encoding processes of (8, 1)-WCC
and (8, 4)-WCC are implemented using pre-computed lookup tables while that of (16, 8)-
WCCs is computed on-the-fly by the underlying Boolean calculations. This is because
when n = 16, the desired lookup table (of size 128KB) is far greater than the memory
provided. To generate the code with maximal speed, we set the optimization level to be
“high-speed” for the compiler. We then record the cycle counts through the FET debugger
by letting the encoders execute at 8MHz on MSP430F2132 for 1000 times with random
messages as inputs.
Table 3.5 summarizes the performance of WCC encoders, together with that of four
lightweight ciphers implemented on the same or similar microcontroller platforms. Thanks
to the simple operations, WCCs consume less resource and have higher throughput. The
(16, 8)-WCC encoder is resource-hungry because the pure embedded C code, as we used,
is inefficient to process Boolean functions such as Eq. (3.4). Appropriate mixing of inline
assembly code will allow the consumed resource be further decreased. Another noteworthy
merit is that WCCs are more survivable in a frequent-loss-of-power environment since (1)
they have the zero initialization time; and (2) they have a very small computation gran-
ularity, e.g., the only operation needed is a simple mapping from {0, 1}m to {0, 1}n. On
the contrary, an on-tag cipher, composing of many operations in series, is more likely to
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Table 3.5: Performance Comparison of Proposed WCC Encoders and Lightweight Ciphers
(note that PRESENT is implemented on a different-but-similar microcontroller platform –
Atmel AVR ATmega163)
SRAM [byte] Flash [byte] Initialization [cycle] Throughput [bits/sec]
(8, 1)-WCC 690 0 0 740,936
(8, 4)-WCC 732 0 0 621,346
(16, 8)-WCC 1,348 0 0 86,776
Hummingbird [83] 1, 064 0 9, 667 53, 024
AES [153] 13,448 92 1,745 199,377
KASUMI [153] 9,541 64 1,381 90,395
PRESENT [29] 2, 398 528 − 53, 361
be interrupted. In all, together with Table 3.2, we found that (8, 4)-WCC makes the infor-
mation rate, the security and the implementation cost well-balanced, which is a favorable
choice for practitioners.
3.5 Conclusion
Given the likely importance of RFID technology in practice, security and privacy problems
should be solved before worldwide deployment. In this chapter, we propose to enhance
the physical layer of the passive RFID communication. The security and usability are
further confirmed by our implementations and testing results. Through the BUPLE scheme
and proposed WCCs, a confidentiality-, authenticity- and integrity-preserving channel is
created for tag-to-reader communication. It is also worth emphasizing that our solutions
are designed for, but not limited to passive RFID systems, e.g., it is applicable to the




Active Eavesdropping Attacks and
Countermeasures
Passive RFID technology enables automatically and contactlessly identification of physical
objects around ten meters away without requiring line-of-sight. This catching and exclusive
characteristic not only satisfies the needs of considerable applications, e.g., logistic/asset
management, human/animal identification, but also gives birth to new forms of applications
such as RFID-based localization [224, 174]. Nevertheless, the large operation range of
passive RFID systems and the ubiquitous deployment of passive tags introduce growing
security and privacy concerns regarding the possible release of the bearer’s information.
Some of the attacks identified in [151, 125, 135] are tag skimming, tag tracking, tag cloning
and mafia-fraud to bypass tag authentication/anti-counterfeiting mechanisms. Thus far, to
launch these attacks, eavesdropping the communication between the legitimate reader and
the victim tag to obtain raw data is a basic tool for the adversary. As an example, to clone
an RFID passport, the adversary always: (1) eavesdrops several legitimate communication
sessions and interrogates the victim tag in another several sessions; (2) recovers the tag’s
secret credentials by breaking the underlying cryptographic protocol/encryption algorithm
if there is any; and, (3) burns the victim tag’s identities and the learnt secret credentials
to a counterfeited tag.
However, given the fundamentality of eavesdropping attacks, there are limited prior
work investigating its intension and extension for passive RFID systems. One possible
reason is that the stereotyped thinking patterns lead people to believe that eavesdropping
can be simply solved by encryption and decryption. However, while they are indeed sound
paradigms to protect majority wireless communication systems from eavesdroppers, they
may fail to work for passive RFID systems because of the following considerations:
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• Due to the modest computation/storage capabilities and the necessity to keep its
prices low, passive tags are unlikely to perform even symmetric encryptions, espe-
cially when they are distant away from the reader’s electromagnetic field. Although
dedicated designs of lightweight block/stream ciphers are under development, the
practical security they can offer is not very clear to date, e.g., [46, 100, 106, 171].
• Encrypting plaintext before transmission introduces the key management – key gener-
ation/distribution/storage/revoking/updating, which seems overkill for low-cost tags,
e.g., once a tag is disposed, the related key information is unnecessarily stored/main-
tained.
• Providing a tag responds a reader with symmetric-encrypted data, the reader has to
go through the entire key set to find a valid key for authentication and decryption,
which, known as key search problem [125], results in a poor scalability. Considering
the facts above, the de facto standard of passive RFID systems, EPC Gen2, does not
include encryption/decryption as a part.
Therefore, eavesdropping attack in this specific scenario seems like an animal with no natu-
ral enemies, and better understanding of how a smart eavesdropper works and how powerful
he could be is quite necessary.
In this chapter, we investigate eavesdropping attacks for passive RFID systems where
encryption/decryption is unavailable. We constrain ourselves to the tag-to-reader commu-
nication (or the backward channel), since a reader-to-tag communication (or the forward
channel) can be viewed as a conventional broadcast channel which is more well-understood.
To be specific,
1. We identified a brand-new and quite powerful family of attacks, called Unidirectional
Active Eavesdropping, which defeats the customary impression that eavesdropping is
a “passive” attack. During the active eavesdropping attack, the adversary transmits
an un-modulated carrier (call it blank carrier hereafter) at a certain frequency fE ,
while a valid reader and a tag are talking at another frequency channel f, f 6= fE .
When the tag modulates the amplitude of reader’s signal, it causes fluctuations on
the blank carrier as well. By carefully examining the amplitude of the backscattered
version of both blank carrier and reader’s carrier, the eavesdropper is able to recognize
tag’s responses more clearly, relative to that of a conventional passive eavesdropping
attack.
2. We set out to fill the literature’s gap by demonstrating and empirically evaluation of
the active eavesdropping towards an EPC Gen2-compliant system through software-
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defined radio working at 860-960MHz and a programmable passive tag. Our exper-
imental results show a significant improvement in the bit error rate (BER) of the
intercepted communication as long as active eavesdropping is utilized. As an ad-
ditional effort, we also present several strategies for the eavesdropper to make this
attack even more powerful and undetectable.
3. The active eavesdropping attack is not trivial to be prohibited as it arises from the
nature of backscatter communication. For a particular type of active eavesdropper,
namely a greedy proactive eavesdropper, we propose a simple countermeasure without
introducing any computation/storage overhead to the current system. The basic idea
is: during a normal interaction, the reader stops emitting the carrier for a short while,
and, if the tag always stays awake, the reader may suspect the existence of a greedy
proactive eavesdropper nearby. This simple scheme could be helpful in the sense
that, to avoid been detected, the adversary has to: (1) carefully control emitted
power to be weak enough; and/or (2) adopt other strategies in the time/frequency
domain; and/or (3) switch back to be passive eavesdropping, and lose all the gains
in the active eavesdropping. At last, we also empirically verified this scheme using
the same platform as presented.
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.1 introduces preliminaries
and background regarding passive RFID communication and briefly summarizes the related
work along this line. In Section 4.2, we formalize the active eavesdropping attack and
provide theoretic analysis. In Section 4.3, we exhibit the experimental verification of this
attack. A partial countermeasure is presented in Section 4.4. Section 4.5 concludes this
chapter.
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4.1 Preliminaries and Background
Before an in-depth discussion of the eavesdropping problem, we present the system model
and attacker model used throughout rest of this chapter, and introduce the backscattered
communication for passive RFID systems in more detail, which form the basis of the active
eavesdropping attack. At last, we review the related work.
4.1.1 System Model and Adversary Model
System Model: Our system encompasses three roles: a legitimate reader R, a victim tag
T and a computationally-bounded adversary E . The mutual distance between the tag and
the reader (adversary resp.) is DT ,R (DT ,E resp.). We assume that R and T with public
configuration parameters involved in the RF communication do trust each other and are
not compromised. In addition, R and T communicate over a frequency f choosing from
a set {f1, ..., fK}, e.g., 902MHz ≤ f1 < f2 < ... < fK ≤ 928MHz for EPC Gen2 in North
America. Since there is only a single tag in our system, the signal collision caused by
multiple and simultaneous responses from different tags are ignored.
Adversary Model: The goal of E is to acquire or intercept tag-to-reader communication,
i.e., E receives, demodulates and decodes analog RF signals backscattered by T by using
its RF receiver (call it RxE hereafter) working at a proper frequency. Additionally, E is free
to “actively” transmit any well-designed signals (if necessary) by using its RF transmitter
(call it TxE hereafter). Note that there could be more than one RxE and more than one
TxE , which are not necessary to situate in one physical location. That is saying, the
adversary deploys/distributes (a set of) RxE and (a set of) TxE at his will, while all of
these devices can be centrally coordinated.
However, unlike a Dolev-Yao attacker, E cannot control the communication channel
between R and T , i.e., E cannot insert and remove messages to/from the tag-to-reader
communication channel and E cannot relay the tag-to-reader communication. Moreover,
we assume that, E desires to keep the entire eavesdropping procedure undetected by both
T and R.
4.1.2 Backscattering Communication
As mentioned in the previous chapter, passive RFID system is principally a radar system
in which the reader provides the RF signal for communications in both directions. To be
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formal, the reader at first broadcasts an amplitude-modulated carrier, denoted as,
CW (t) = A(t) cos(2πft+ θ),
where f is the carrier frequency in {f1, ..., fK} and θ is a constant phase of the carrier.
A(t), constituting a high level and a low level, carries the binary command to be issued
to the tags, e.g., “1000001000000111110110” for the QUERY command as specified in [78].
Once a command is propagated, the reader keeps A(t) at the high level, e.g., “111....”,
expecting the responses from tags.
The tag, after receiving the operating energy from CW (t), uses an envelope detector
to obtain and decode the command in A(t) if there is any. To respond, the tag maps
the source message bits into baseband codewords using a Manchester-alike-code to enable
the collision detection on the reader’s side. For example, FM-0 code, as specified in [78],
uses two bits (0, 1) and (1, 0) alternatively to represent a “0” bit, and uses (0, 0) and
(1, 1) alternatively to represent an “1” bit. Instead, if Miller-4 code is employed, the tag
utilizes (0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1) and (1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0) alternatively for the transmission of “0”,
(1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1) and (0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0) alternatively for the transmission of “1”. It is
intuitive that the latter code provides better error-tolerance at the cost of lower code rate.
In order to backscatter the encoded response, the tag next switches the reflection coeffi-
cients by changing its antenna impedance within two states (∆0,∆1), 0.5 < ∆0 < ∆1 < 1,
at a given rate. The backscattered signal can be represented as:
BCW (t) = ∆i
√
2ET vT cos(2πft+ θ), i = 0, 1,
where ET is the energy per bit presented at the tag’s antenna when CW (t) with A(t)
at the high level is transmitted by the reader, vT is the tag’s data rate and ∆1 > ∆0
implying more power is backscattered when transmitting a “1” of the codeword (thus, less
is absorbed by the tag) and less is reflected otherwise. The reader, centering its receiver at
f , coherently detects the responses by correlating the amplitude of BCW (t) to potential
codewords and comparing the resulting correlations with a particular threshold, which
allows the establish of the backscatter communication.
4.1.3 Related Work
Related Attacks: Hancke in [109] experimentally confirmed that two NFC standards,
namely, ISO 14443A/B and ISO 15693, where the designed operational range is less than
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10cm, are eavesdroppable even the attacker is 3.5m away. Dobkin in [63] reported test-
ing results of intercepting an EPC Gen2 tag’s reply approximately 7m away in an office
environment, which indicates that, although it is more difficult to intercept and interpret
the tag’s backscattered signal as it is weaker than the reader’s signal, e.g., around 0 to
−20dBm, it is by no means impossible. Our work follows Dobkin’s preliminary research
and discloses more. Recently, Koscher et al. in [136] particularly examined the security,
under skimming attack, towards the United States Passport Card and Washington State
enhanced drivers license, both of which incorporate EPC Gen2 tags. In their demonstrated
attacks, the maximum distance a tag can be read by a rogue reader radiating 36dBm pow-
er is measured. However, skimming is different from eavesdropping in the sense that the
skimmer does provide energy to the tag through the carriers it propagates. Thus, testing
results on the skimming does not provide convincible results on the eavesdropping.
Related Countermeasures: In terms of cryptographic countermeasures, the passive
tags’ modest capabilities drive much research focused on the design and implementation-
s of lightweight ciphers as summarized in Chapter 2. To construct an unidirectional
confidentiality-preserving channel using a physical layer approach, cooperative-jamming
methods are proposed in [126, 44, 18, 200, 50, 19] as summarized in Chapter 2.3.2.
In addition, since an EPC Gen2 tag is crypto-free and only supports simple operations,
NIST recommends in [135] to use a simple mechanism, called cover coding, to hide the
bidirectional transmission by assuming that the tag-to-reader channel is always much better
than the tag-to-adversary channel. Cover coding works as follows: the tag generates a
random number serving as the “keystream” and returns it to the reader. Since the tag-
to-adversary channel is quite noisy, the adversary may be ignorant of this keystream;
the reader produces “ciphertext” by XORing the received keystream and the plaintext
to be sent. As can be seen, even the assumption is hold, the effectiveness of cover-coding
completely depends on the security of the tag’s PRNG, which is not prepared by EPC Gen2
tags; and this scheme, even it works for the conventional passive eavesdropping attack, can
be completely broken by our new technology, as the tag’s response can be amplified at the
attacker’s will.
It is worth to mention that our physical layer enhancement in Chapter 3 is designed
to fight against a passive eavesdropper, and, unsurprisingly, it is partially suffers from
this attack – the frequency hopping in BUPLE becomes less powerful since the active
eavesdropping works irrespective of the frequency that a tag and a reader rest on.
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4.2 Unidirectional Eavesdropping: from Passive to
Active
We introduce our novel concepts in eavesdropping by providing theoretic analysis of both
passive eavesdropping and active eavesdropping in this section. To produce meaningful
and quantitative results, we make use of BER as the main metric to evaluate the reliability
of the communication channel.
4.2.1 Passive Eavesdropping
Let us first consider the BER of an RF receiver in general. In the current setting, this RF
receiver is a passive eavesdropper. However, the results derived here are also applicable to
the case where the RF receiver is the legitimate RFID reader itself.
Assume the energy per bit at R’s antenna is ER, the backscattered signal received by

















where η is a constant proportional to the antenna gains of both parties and the square of
the wavelength. Unsurprisingly, the attacker could keep employing antennas with higher
gains to compensate for the loss of η because of the increase of DT ,E . However, we treat η
as a constant to simply the analysis.
Hence, according to the minimum distance detection method, the BER of the backscat-
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where Q is the one minus the cumulative distribution function of the standardized normal
random variable and No is the noise power density in the channel between the tag and
the eavesdropper’s receiver. As can be seen, as long as ∆0, ∆1, η, ET and No are giv-
en and fixed, the errors in the intercepted messages grows rapidly when DT ,E increases.
This observation suggests that the greater the distance between the tag and the passive
eavesdropper, the less reliable the intercepted communication is, which is quite nature.
4.2.2 Active Eavesdropping
To combat the loss of reliability, a strategic adversary may consider active eavesdropping,
which is effective towards the backscatter communication. Through the sequel, we formal-
ize this attack and demonstrate how the eavesdropper obtains a better BER performance
relative to the conventional eavesdropping, when the victim tag is far away.
BCWAE(t)
× Bandpass Filter at f




Figure 4.1: Designed Receiver for Active Eavesdropping
In addition to the aforementioned RF receiver, the eavesdropper, denoted as AE , has
an RF transmitter working at fE , fE 6= f 1, which produces a blank carrier while a valid





where EAE is a constant to make the amplitude of the blank carrier (presented at the tag’s
antenna), i.e.,
√
2E ′T vT , suitable. When the tag amplitude-modulates reader’s signal as
aforementioned, it causes fluctuations on the blank carrier as well, which can be written
1It is discussed in Section 4 that fE = f results in jamming of a legitimate reader-tag communication,
















where E ′T is the energy per bit at T ’s antenna resulted by the blank carrier. It is worth
to mention that η(fE) is no longer a constant as, even the eavesdropper could keep his
gain at a constant level (by switching to a proper antenna), the tag’s antenna is unlikely
to maintain the same gain under different fE . For example, if fE is totally out of the
effective region of the tag’s antenna, e.g., fE = 10KHz, η(fE) decreases to 0. Different
tags may result in different η(fE), which can be obtained through the VSWR graph
2 of its
antenna. A crucial observation here is that, for most of the antennas, although optimized
for a particular frequency band, e.g., 902-928MHz, the gain degrades slowly if fE is not too
far away from this designed band, e.g., 860 ≤ fE ≤ 960MHz. Principally, if the tag has a
quadband UHF antenna, we could even actively eavesdrop it with fE = 1.8GHz. In the
rest, we say fE is effective iff η(fE) is comparable with η(f), f ∈ {f1, f2, ..., fK}.
After BCWAE(t) is intercepted, it is passed through two filters centered at f and fE
respectively as shown in Figure 4.1. The resulting baseband signals are then added up.
From the signal constellation’s point of view, the eavesdropper obtains a constellation of
two points (representing signals for bit “1” and bit “0” respectively), that are separated












4.2.3 Reliability of Active Eavesdropping











2VSWR stands for Voltage Standing Wave Ratio. It is the ratio of the maximum/minimum values of
standing wave pattern along a transmission line to which a load is connected. VSWR value ranges from 1
for a matched load to infinity for a short or an open load.
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which suggests that, for an effective fE , the eavesdropper is always able to tune E
′
T to
get a suitable pAE . Here an numeric example is plotted in Figure 4.2 for the purpose of
illustration, where ∆1 − ∆0 = 0.2, √η =
√
η(fE) = 10, ET /No = 1dB, E
′
T /No = 3dB
and DT ,AE varies. As shown, emitting a blank carrier with an SNR = 3dB is more than
enough to compensate for the loss of reliability when the eavesdropper stands additionally
5m away from the tag.
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Figure 4.2: An Numeric Example Comparing BER Performances of Passive and Active
Eavesdropping Attacks (note that ∆1 − ∆0 = 0.2, √η =
√
η(fE) = 10, ET /No = 1dB,
EAE/No = 3dB and DT ,AE varies from 5m to 20m)
4.3 Implementation and Testing of Active Eavesdrop-
ping Attack
In this section, we report on the design and implementation of our prototype system and
the testing results to validate our concept of unidirectional active eavesdropping.
4.3.1 System Design
We developed a prototype system, as shown in Figure 4.3, that encompasses four roles: one
legitimate reader, one legitimate tag, one RxE for the eavesdropper and one TxE for the
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eavesdropper. Note that our system evaluates two basic topologies as shown – in scenario
I, all components are located in a straight line; in scenario II, the reader and the tag reside
on the y-axis while TxE and RxE are located on the x-axis. In what follows, we detail the
implementation of each component of this system.
Gradients from Software Defined Radio: To enable the flexibility, the concept of
Software-Defined Radio (SDR) is employed to build up programmable transmitters/re-
ceivers working at UHF band on an inexpensive-but-flexible platform, namely, the Univer-
sal Software Radio Peripheral (USRP). Roughly speaking, the USRP, in conjunction with
the daughterboard RFX9003 it carries on, constitutes a low-cost RF transceiver working at
800−1000MHz with freely available schematics and drivers. To be specific, in the receiving
path, RFX900 receives raw UHF signals and converts them to the intermediate frequency
(IF) band and passes them to the USRP board, which further samples and converts them
to baseband signals by an analog-to-digital converter (ADC) and a digital-down-converter
(DDC). The baseband digital signals out of USRP are sent via USB 2.0 (for USRP-1 [76])
or ethernet cable (for USRP-2 [77]) to our laptop running GNU Radio [92], a free software
toolkit that provides the signal processing runtime and processing blocks for digital com-
munications. Similarly, when transmitting, discrete signals are produced by GNU Radio
and delivered to the USRP. The later up-converts them to the IF and UHF band and prop-
agates them via RFX900 and its antenna. In our implementations, two models of USRP
were employed, i.e., USRP-1 and USRP-N210.
RFID Reader: We used an USRP-N210, in conjunction with one RFX900 carrying two
VERT900 dipole antennas [211], to play the role of the legitimate reader. We developed a
simple Python script to create and control a signal flow graph to enable this reader: (1)
querying a tag by propagating a constant sine wave working at 915MHz with maximum
possible power that does not result in RF clipping, i.e., 23dBm, through one dipole antenna;
and (2) collecting the reflected signal through another dipole antennas. The script runs on
a MacBook MC516LL with OS X 10.4 and communicates with the USRP-N210 using the
Universal Software Radio Peripheral hardware driver [210] (UHD v003.20110217015719)
provided by Ettus4. Note that, we intentionally keep this reader as functionally simple as
possible, since, in this work, we do not care much about how the reader interacts with a
tag at the logic layer.
Eavesdropper’s Transmitter: This transmitting part is realized by another USRP-N210
3We replaced the ISM band filter on RFX900 by a capacitor of 100pF to get an extra 2dB transmission
power.
4UHD is designed to provide a host driver and API for Ettus products. Users are able to use the UHD


























Figure 4.3: Our Prototyping System to Evaluate Active/passive Eavesdropping Attacks.
in conjunction with one RFX900, where the later carries a circular polarity panel antenna
[42]. Similarly, in our Python script, we enable this TxE propagating a sine wave with a
tunable center frequency fE and a tunable amplitude amp. Furthermore, TxE is connected
to a Thinkpad T410 laptop using the UHD driver. Note that USRPs use scale factors
to represent the amplitude of a signal without unit. The actual measures of the output
voltages at port TX/RX of RFX900 (without antenna) with respect to this scale factor is
provided shown in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1: Actual Measures of Output Voltages at Port TX/RX of RFX900 w.r.t. Scale
Factor







Eavesdropper’s Receiver: To build a powerful RxE , we make use of an USRP-1 together
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with one RFX900 carrying a dual polarization horn antenna effective from 700MHz-6GHz.
A Python script is created to parse and process the received signals according to the two-
branch receiver as shown in Figure 4.1. For each branch, the gain of the receiver’s antenna
is set to 20dB, and the received signal is decimated by the USRP-1 with a factor of 32. In
addition, the decimated signals are again filtered by an 8-th order low-pass filter with gain
2 and cutoff frequency 400KHz, respectively. Finally, the two baseband signal are added
and stored for the later analysis. Note that, to enable the collaboration between TxE and
RxE , we connect RxE to the same Thinkpad T410.
Passive RFID Tag: The unique properties owned by a passive tag are the key points
for our experiments. To this end, we made use of WISP v4.1 tag [214] from Intel Seat-
tle Research – a full-fledged passive tag not only supports energy harvesting, ephemeral
energy storage and backscatter communication, but also provides programmability. Each
WISP is operated by a 16-bit general purpose microcontroller, MSP430F2132, the pro-
grams for which were written in embedded C and compiled, debugged and profiled using
IAR Embedded Workbench 5.10.4, in conjunction with TI FET430UIF debugger. As an
additional benefit, WISP is shipped with the firmware, hw41 D41.c-r65, which implements
a significant portion of EPC Gen2 commands. For our purpose, we tweaked this firmware
and let the tag transmit a random binary sequence (further encoded by Miller-4 code) at
64kbps as long as there is available power. Again, this automatic-replay policy helps us
to remove the unnecessary reader-tag interaction in EPC Gen2 and lead us to be more
concentrated on the backscattered signal.
Environment: In reality, multi-path effects and interferences from other RF transmitters
nearby is an enemy for our proof-of-concept experiments. We primarily conducted the
experiments in a microwave anechoic chamber of size 2.7m(L) × 1.5m(W) × 1.9m(H),
which is a shielded room insulated from exterior sources of noise, and whose walls have been
covered with a material that scatters or absorbs so much of the incident energy to simulate
free space. In addition, we placed the devices on a horizontal surface in the chamber and
let D1 = 65cm, D2 = 83cm, D3 = 48cm for scenario I; D1 = 89cm, D2 = 107cm, D3 = 48cm
for scenario II.
4.3.2 Testing Results
In our testings, we varied the center frequency fE of TxE and RxE around 915MHz and
tuned the transmitting power of TxE , e.g., by setting the scale factor from 0.1 to 0.5.
The results for scenario I are recorded in Figure 4.5, while the results for scenario II are
recorded in Figure 4.6. Note that, to enable clear analysis, we independently plot the
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signals go through the two branches in our receiver: (1) the signals go through the upper
branch (that mixing cos 2πf(t) and filtering at f) are exhibited in Figure 4.4, which can
be seen as the results of a conventional passive eavesdropping; (2) the signals go through
the bottom branch are exhibited in Figure 4.5 and Figure 4.6, which are the results of
eavesdropping using the blank carrier only. Note that the results obtained by the attacker
should be the addition of signals in both branches. Moreover, each short column represents
a backscattered signal from the WISP tag that contains a random binary sequence of 16
bits.
As can be seen in these figures, active eavesdropping is surprisingly effective as, for
example, in scenario I, the eavesdropper could get a view of the tag’s response at fE =
875MHz with amp = 0.5 as clear as the ones he gets by passively eavesdropping at fE =
915MHz, which implies, when adding up these two signals, the minimum distance in his
signal constellation regarding the tag’s responses is doubled, which results in a significant
decrease (increase resp.) in his BER (reliability resp.). A similar phenomenon happens in
scenario II, which further confirms our theoretic analysis in the previous section.





























































































































































Figure 4.4: Testing Results of Passive Eavesdropping (Scenario I/II) in an Anechoic Cham-
ber
By a vertical comparison of these plots, we can see clearly that the antenna of the WISP
performs best when fE = 875MHz, 900MHz and 915MHz, and it can work at fE = 960MHz
if a strong stimuli is given. This observation ensures our previous definition and discussion
about the effective region of UHF tags. By a horizontal comparison of these plots, we
can see clearly that the amplitude of the backscattered signals do not have a simple linear
relation with respect to the amplitude of the blank carrier. For example, the second row
in Figure 4.5 indicates that, when amp = 0.5, 0.2, 0.1, the amplitude of the backscattered
signals are almost the same, albeit the amplitude of the blank carrier as received by RxE
show significant difference. In addition, if the signal emitted by TxE is to weak, e.g.,
amp ≤ 0.1, it gets lost during the propagating and hardly results in meaningful responses
in RxE . By scenario-wise comparison, we found, although it is intuitive that attacker
in scenario I could achieve better benchmarks, there is essentially no much difference in
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Figure 4.5: Testing Results of Active Eavesdropping (Scenario I) in an Anechoic Chamber
terms of the amplitude of the backscattered signal that the attacker obtains from these
two scenarios. A possible explanation is that: we can consider the reader and the tag as
one unit – an active tag, which is interrogated by TxE and RxE . Because TxE and RxE are
always placed in one line and both of them use directional antennas, thus two scenarios
can be essentially reduced to one more basic scenario.
Moreover, most catching plots among many are the third rows of Figure 4.5 and Figure
4.6, in which, when fE = 915MHz, the received backscatter signal contains not only the
tag’s responses but also a low-frequency sine wave. After careful examination, we found
this phenomenon is generated by using different USRPs (e.g., the TxE and RxE), i.e., even
both of them are set to work at the same 915MHz, a slight different in their carrier and
mixer, e.g., introduced by manufacturing deviations in the oscillators, produces this sine
curve. Furthermore, we also noticed that this sine curve prevents the legitimate reader from
87











































































































































































Figure 4.6: Testing Results of Active Eavesdropping (Scenario II) in an Anechoic Chamber
reading the tag’s responses, which is possible because it could pass through the low-pass
filter and could cause distortion at the receiver’s decision logic.
4.3.3 Discussion
Active eavesdropping is a powerful tool for the attacker not only because it offers extra
reliability to the eavesdropper’s the channel, but also because the attacker has a rich choice
of strategies which either further enhance this attack or lead this attack undetectable as
in the case of passive eavesdropping. We classify these strategies as below. Note that, the
strategies in different categories can work together in a composed way.
Strategies in Frequency Domain: It is suffice that the choice of fE entirely depends
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on the effective region of the tag’s antenna. The attacker may desire to select fE out of
902 − 928MHz to avoid the jamming of ongoing communications and also to avoid been
detected. Fortunately, as we noticed, almost all the passive tags nowadays are designed
and manufactured for global use, which are operational between 860-960MHz, e.g., Squiggle
from Alien, Frog 3D from UPM, Cargo from Motorola, etc.. Therefore, it seems easy to pick
up fE in 800-1000MHz to launch the attack. In addition, since all the attacking devices are
centrally coordinated, the attacker could periodically or aperiodically change fE for both
TxE and RxE following the idea of the frequency hopping, which renders him even harder
to be detected.
Another vision we have is that since there are many devices working at 800-1000MHz,
e.g., cell phones (902-928MHz), pagers (929-932MHz), two-way radios (935-941MHz) and
so on. The attacker could emit a camouflage signal – a blank carrier according to the signal
format of these devices. Moreover, he could even treat nearby active radio devices (working
within this band) as TxE and only launches RxE to listen. By employing this “camouflage”
strategy, the attacker could remain undetected and decrease the budget needed to launch
the attack.
Strategies in Time Domain: There are two strategies in the time domain, namely
proactive eavesdropping and reactive eavesdropping. The former refers that both TxE and
RxE keep working all the time, whereas, in the latter case, TxE works only if necessary,
e.g., TxE starts to transmit when RxE is informed by a query command from the legitimate
reader, and stops to work at the beginning of the next command from the legitimate reader.
After applying the reactive eavesdropping strategy, together with a frequency hopping,
the detection of the active eavesdropper can be understood as the spectrum sensing problem
in cognitive radio, which is generally considered as a hard problem. As pointed out in
[111], the only reliable detectors exploit the known structure of signals, which may not be
available in this scenario.
Strategy in Space Domain: In our proof-of-concept experiments, only one TxE and one
RxE are deployed. In fact, the attacker could launch distributed active eavesdropping in
the sense that multiple TxEs and multiple RxEs located around the target reader and the
tag and work collaboratively. Under this strategy, the attacker is able to collect multiple
observations of the tag’s response to make a decision about the bit actually transmitted
by the tag. The signal detection theory tells us that, in a centralized detection scenario,
to obtain the optimal performance, the attacker can simply perform maximum likelihood
test based on the multiple observations.
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4.4 Low-cost Detection of Greedy Proactive Eaves-
droppers
The active eavesdropping attack, as formalized and demonstrated, is not trivial to be
prohibited in general as it arises from the nature of backscatter communication. The
degree of success that the attacker will achieve depends on the strategy he selects and
resources he has, e.g., an attacker with a clever strategy and an expensive, specialized RF
measurement equipment is almost certain to launch this attack without being detected.
In this section, we investigate one possible countermeasure to prevent a particular type
of greedy eavesdropper, who uses the proactive eavesdropping strategy. By “a greedy
proactive eavesdropper”, we mean that the attacker keeps emitting a strong blank carrier
using an effective frequency.
As one may expect, a straightforward solution for this problem is to equip the reader
with a spectrum sensor that could detect existence of nearby RF sources. However, this will
increase the system complexity dramatically because: (1) the spectrum sensor itself may
be expensive; (2) the reader has to monitor effective regions of tags of different models or
from different manufactures, which may be different and may not be known by the reader
in prior.
In what follows, we introduce a simple but effective mechanism built on the tag, which
leverages the greediness of the proactive eavesdropper – the attacker is always charging a
victim tag even when the legitimate reader stops to work. Hence, in our scheme, the reader
stops emitting for a short while, call it voluntary pause, and expects the tag to be discharged
and go to sleep mode if there is no presence of such an eavesdropper. On the contrary,
if the tag always stays awake, the reader may suspect the existence of a greedy proactive
eavesdropper nearby. Note that this scheme is ineffective for passive eavesdropping, reactive
eavesdropping, and even proactive eavesdropping with well-controlled blank carriers (by
a non-greedy attacker). Additionally, the essential function of this simple scheme is to
complicate the adversaries’s transmitter (and henceforth to increase his attacking budget),
which has to carefully control the emitted power or shipped with advance strategies.
4.4.1 Discharging of Passive Tags
It is widely known that passive tags can neither work nor retain its current status (without
writing the data to non-volatile memory) without the power supply from the reader. To be
more specific, passive tags always harvest energy when possible and store it in a capacitor,
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which can be modeled by charging a capacitor in an RLC circuit. Similarly, without the
continuous supply of energy, the capacitor discharges.
The RLC circuit theory tells us that
V (tdchg) = V0(1− e
−tdchg
τ0 ),
where e = 2.71828, τ0 is the time constant decided by the RLC circuit and tdchg is the






Figure 4.7: Charging and Discharging of Passive Tag’s Capacitor
The formula above shows that before the capacitor reaches equilibrium, the voltage
across the resistor (and actually the current through the entire circuit) decays exponentially.
When tdchg = τ0, 67% of the stored energy is dispensed. For example, assume τ0 = 2ms
and the normalized minimum voltage under which the tag works is 0.9, we have tdchg =
0.11τ0 ≈ 220µs, which implies that, as long as the reader stops working for around 220µs,
a passive tag uses up all its power and losses all its current status. Nevertheless, if other
power source is available, the voltage of the capacitor is unlikely to decay or to decay as
fast as in the current case. For example, with the RF energy from the eavesdropper, we can
safely assume τ0 = 20ms, which results in a discharge time tdchg ≈ 2200µs. Unsurprisingly,
if the reader is switched off for tµs, 220 < t ≤ 2200, the tag: (1) is powered off when there
is no RF source nearby; (2) stays awakes otherwise.
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4.4.2 Counter-based Interaction
Based on this phenomenon and the observation that the tag is out of the control for the
attacker, we designed the following counter-based interaction between the reader and the
tag, which could easily be integrated into other RFID protocols. The basic idea is that
the tag marks each reply with a counter number, which starts from 0 and keep increasing
every round until it has been reset. Our scheme is shown in Table 4.2.
Table 4.2: Counter-based Interaction to Detect Greedy Proactive Eavesdroppers
Reader R Tag
carrier on −−→ wake up and Communication
initialize cnt = 0
command −−→ compute responses R
(R,cnt)←−−−− cnt = cnt+ 1
... ... ...
carrier off −−→ may turn to sleep Detection
carrier on −−→ wake up and
initialize cnt = 0
command −−→ compute responses R
if cnt 6= 0, alarm! (R,cnt)←−−−− cnt = cnt+ 1
This detection scheme can be launched by the reader at variable times, under which a
greedy proactive eavesdropper will be exposed with a zero false negative and a non-zero
false positive. This is because any other proper RF sources nearby, e.g., cell phones, two-
way radios, may result in the charging of the tags during the reader’s voluntary pause.
In addition, this simple scheme is helpful in the sense that, to avoid been detected, the
adversary would either: (1) carefully control emitted power to be weak enough, which
would introduce reliability penalty as indicated by Eq. (4.2); or (2) adopt other strategies,
e.g., reactive eavesdropping, which are more expensive; or (3) switch back to be passive
eavesdropping, and lose all the gains in the active eavesdropping.
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4.4.3 Proof-of-concept Implementation
We successfully implemented this interaction on a WISP tag and an USRP-1 (serving as the
reader). The tag-side implementation is extremely simple, e.g., by adding a self-increasing
variable to the current firmware, which is returned with each of the tag’s responses. This
modification results no changes in its resource consumption. For the reader-side imple-
mentation, a key parameter to be determined is the length of the voluntary pause.
To choose a proper voluntary pause for a WISP v4.1 tag, which operates at 1.8V while
the capacitor can be charged at most to 5.5V, we carried out the following test: we used a
regular carrier to query a WISP tag 20cm away from the USRP’s antenna using a regular
carrier of 915MHz with maximum power5 for 2 second to ensure the WISP’s capacitor is
fully charged. We then switched off the USRP and measured the unregulated and regulated
voltage (relative to GRN) of the capacitor by connecting probes to CAP CHARGE as well
as VOLTAGE SV PIN on the WISP tag, and observing the output through the DPO-7104
oscilloscope. The actual measurements are presented in Figure 4.8. The time that the
unregulated voltage drops from 5.5V to 1.8V is 280ms. Therefore, we set voluntary pause
to be 280ms in our implementation. In reality, the commercial EPC Gen2 tags have smaller
capacitors relative to that of the WISP tag, which may present much shorter discharging
times and the choose of voluntary pause should be followed.






























Figure 4.8: Unregulated (top) and Regulated (down) Voltage of WISP’s Capacitor (note
that raw data is obtained by DPO-7104 oscilloscope, sampled per 1ms)
5The distance between the reader and the tag and the power level from the reader do not affect the
discharging process. They do have impact on the charging process.
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4.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we introduce, formalize, analyze and demonstrate a novel family of attack
called unidirectional active eavesdropping, which takes advantage of the unique character-
istics of the passive RFID systems and brings the eavesdropper to his full potential. As an
additional effort, we propose a simple mechanism to thwart a particular type of the active
eavesdropping attack, namely a greedy proactive eavesdropper, although a bullet-silver
countermeasure in general may not exist.
Although, we did not observed the tag’s response when actively eavesdropping on a
WISP with fE = 1.8GHz, 2.2GHz and 2.4GHz, the dipole antenna is able to pick up odd-
numbered multiples of the base frequency in principle. We will continue to investigate
on this point. Moreover, we plan to get more quantitative results based on our current
settings and investigate the possibility to actively eavesdrop NFC systems as well.
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Chapter 5
Differential Sequence Attack on
HummingBird-2
Hummingbird-2 is a novel lightweight cryptographic algorithm designed for passive RFID
tags and other resource-constrained devices, which not only enables a compact hardware
implementation and ultra-low power consumption but also meets the stringent response
time as specified in ISO18000-6C. In this chapter, we present an innovative cryptanalytic
method called Differential Sequence Attack (DSA), in conjunction with guessing and de-
termining the internal states of the cipher, that successfully breaks the full HB-2 using two
related keys, thereby giving the first cryptanalytic result on this cipher. To be specific, we
exhibit the following results:
1. By attacking the encryption of HB-2, DSA recovers 36-bit out of 128-bit key with
236 × 216 × 216 = 268 time complexity and negligible memory complexity, if one
particular condition regarding HB-2’s internal states holds.
2. By attacking the decryption of HB-2, DSA recovers another 28-bit out of 128-bit
key with 228 × 216 × 216 = 260 time complexity and negligible memory complexity, if
another particular condition regarding HB-2’s internal states holds.
3. The rest 64-bit of the key can be exhaustively searched. The overall time complexity
for these steps is approximately 268.
4. To realize the two particular conditions needed by step 1 and step 2 respectively:
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• The attacker could mount side-channel attack, e.g., to inject the difference to
the victim register any time before the execution of the last round of encryp-
tion/decryption, without time/memory penalty, i.e., the overall time/memory
complexity of the attack is dominated by 268.
• Without bothering side-channel models, the attacker could also makes use of
guess-and-determine strategy – in each trial, the attacker produces two instances
of HB-2 with random internal states and determines the occasion of the desired
condition using a proposed algorithm with 217 time complexity. In order to
succeed with 0.5 probability, 264 such trials have to be made, which results in
an overall time complexity of 264× 217 = 281. This probability can be increased
if the attacker is willing to pay more on computation and vice versa.
The chapter is organized as follows. In Section 5.1, the brief history of HB-2 and its
specification are presented. Section 5.2 describes, at a high level, the principle of our
attack. In Section 5.3, we devise our tool, discuss its properties and how to use it to attack
the last round of HB-2. In Section 5.4, we show how to achieve the desired conditions.
We conclude this chapter in Section 5.5. Throughout this chapter, we use the following
notation for illustration:
• “+” denotes addition in F2, which can also be vector-wise, e.g., (a, b) + (c, d) =
(a+ c, b+ d), where a, b, c, d ∈ Fm2 .
• An hexadecimal number is indicated by a prefix “0x”, e.g., 0x10 = 16.
•  operator denotes addition modulo 216 and  operator denotes subtraction modulo
216.
• The high-bit XOR differential is defined as H =0x8000, a nice property of which is,
given x, x′, y ∈ F 162 and x+ x′ = H, the following holds
(x y) + (x′  y) = H; (x y) + (x′  y) = H; (y  x) + (y  x′) = H.
That is to say, as also pointed out in [189], the differential H behaves the same under
+ and /.
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5.1 The Hummingbird-2 Cryptographic Algorithm
5.1.1 A Brief History of Hummingbird Family
Motivated by the design of the well-known Enigma machine, the first generation of Hum-
mingbird (call it HB-1) was proposed by the engineers in Revere Security and was further
analyzed and published in [83] as an ultra-lightweight cryptographic algorithm targeted
for low-cost RFID tags, smart cards, and wireless sensor nodes to meet the stringent re-
sponse time and power consumption requirements. Although HB-1, with an innovative
hybrid structure of block cipher and stream cipher, was designed to provide 256-bit secu-
rity, Saarinen, in FSE’11, showed a chosen-IV and chosen-message attack in [189] that can
recover the full secret key with at most 264 off-line computational effort under two related
IVs. Recently, Reverse Security published the second generation of Hummingbird (call it
Hummingbird-2 or HB-2 ) in [84], which inherits the design philosophy from HB-1, e.g., it
has a small block size of 16-bit to adapt the needs of encrypting short messages in RFID
applications and it retains the hybrid structure as a security compensation for the small
block size. High level differences between HB-1 and HB-2 are:
• Key size has been reduced to 128 bits to satisfy the actual need for constrained
devices.
• Size of the internal state has been increased from 80 bits to 128 bits.
• The nonlinear keyed transformation in HB-2 has four invocations of the S-boxes,
compared to five in HB-1, to further increase the throughput.
In addition, it is claimed by the designers that HB-2 can withstand differential, linear
and algebraic attacks and the four 4-bit S-Boxes in HB-2 belong to the optimal classes
discussed in [157]. Its resistance to the side-channel cube attack is recently investigated
in [86], where the author applied cube attack [74] to recover 48 bits of the secret key
providing the attacker could access the internal states of HB-2 during an early stage in
the initialization. However, this attack is marginal and does not jeopardize the security of
HB-2, since: (1) it only threats HB-2 before the finishing of its initialization; (2) obtaining
particular intermediate values in a cipher is less-universally accepted as a valid attack
model.
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5.1.2 Specification of Hummingbird-2
Hummingbird-2 is a 16-bit block cipher with a 128-bit secret key K = (K1, ..., K8) ∈
(F162 , ...,F162 ) = F1282 and a 64-bit public initialization vector IV = (IV1, ..., IV4) ∈ (F162 , ...,
F162 ) = F642 . As opposed to conventional block ciphers, it has an 128-bit internal state
R = (R1, ..., R8) ∈ (F162 , ...,F162 ) = F1282 , which participates in each encryption/decryption
and is updated after that.
Building Block: WD16 : {0, 1}16 7→ {0, 1}16 is the fundamental block of HB-2 encryp-
tion, i.e.,
WD16(x,Ka, Kb, Kc, Kd) = f(f(f(f(x+Ka) +Kb) +Kc) +Kd),
where x is the varying input, e.g., plaintext, intermediate state, Ka, Kb, Kc, Kd are four
16-bit secret keys and the nonlinear function f is
S(x) = S1(x1)||S2(x2)||S3(x3)||S4(x4), x = (x1, x2, x3, x4)
L(x) = x+ (x <<< 6) + (x <<< 10)
f(x) = L(S(x)).
Note that the four S-boxes, i.e., S1(xi) to S4(xi), are given in Table 5.1.
Table 5.1: S-boxes in HummingBird-2
xi ∈ F42 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
S1(xi) 7 12 14 9 2 1 5 15 11 6 13 0 4 8 10 3
S2(xi) 4 10 1 6 8 15 7 12 3 0 14 13 5 9 11 2
S3(xi) 2 15 12 1 5 6 10 13 14 8 3 4 0 11 9 7
S4(xi) 15 4 5 8 9 7 2 1 10 3 0 14 6 12 13 1
S−11 (xi) 11 5 4 15 12 6 9 0 13 3 14 8 1 10 2 7
S−12 (xi) 9 2 15 8 0 12 3 6 4 13 1 14 7 11 10 5
S−13 (xi) 12 3 0 10 11 4 5 15 9 14 6 13 2 7 8 1
S−14 (xi) 10 7 6 9 1 2 12 5 3 4 8 15 13 14 11 0
Besides, the inverse of WD16 is employed in the decryption, which is defined as
WD16−1(y,Kd, Kc, Kb, Ka) = f
−1(f−1(f−1(f−1(y) +Kd) +Kc) +Kb) +Ka,
where y = WD16(x,Ka, Kb, Kc, Kd) and f
−1 is the inverse of f . The four S-boxes used in
f−1 are also listed in Table 5.1.
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8 ) ∈ {0, 1}128 de-
note the internal state at the rth iteration in the initialization. The initialization can thus
be formulated as, for r = 0, 1, 2, 3,
t1 = WD16(R
(r)
1  r,K1, K2, K3, K4) (5.1)
t2 = WD16(R
(r)
2  t1, K5, K6, K7, K8) (5.2)
t3 = WD16(R
(r)
3  t2, K1, K2, K3, K4) (5.3)
t4 = WD16(R
(r)




















































1 , ..., R
(0)
8 ) = (IV1, IV2, IV3, IV4, IV1, IV2, IV3, IV4).
Note that R5, R6, R7, R8 do not participate in the randomization, i.e., Eq. (5.1)-(5.4),
but simply XOR the historical statuses of R1, R2, R3, R4 respectively (behaving like an
XOR-MAC). This fact may nullify their contribution to the overall cryptanalytic strength
of HB-2 under a side-channel attack – following steps allow a side-channel attacker, who
is able to inject “1” to a certain bit of the register storing Rj, 5 ≤ j ≤ 8, to recover
(R5, R6, R7, R8):
1. The attacker encrypts with a known IV and the target key to get a plaintext/cipher
pair (P,C), where P ∈ F162 , C ∈ F162 .
2. He resets HB-2 and initializes HB-2 with the same IV and key. At any time during
this initialization, he injects “1” to the qth bit, 0 ≤ q ≤ 15, of the register which
stores R5. He then encrypts P and gets C
′. If C = C ′ (which implies the injection
does not change the internal states of HB-2), the attacker in fact learns that the qth
bit of R5 is 1; otherwise it is 0. He repeats this step for every q in {0, 1, ..., 15} to
recover R5.
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3. Step 2 can be repeated to recover R6, R7 and R8.
This injection attack to recover (R5, R6, R7, R8) only requires 64 injections and 64
invocations of HB-2 encryption. In addition, since the attacker has a large time window
to perform the injection to the qth bit of Rj (any time during the rth iteration of the
initialization), this side-channel attack seems quite possible.
Encryption: After the initialization, each round of encryption transforms a single plain-
text word Pi ∈ F162 , i = 1, 2, ..., to a corresponding ciphertext word Ci, i.e.,
t1 = WD16(R
(i)
1  Pi, K1, K2, K3, K4) (5.13)
t2 = WD16(R
(i)
2  t1, K5 +R
(i)
5 , K6 +R
(i)
6 , K7 +R
(i)





3  t2, K1 +R
(i)
5 , K2 +R
(i)
6 , K3 +R
(i)










1 , ..., R
(i)
8 ) ∈ F1282 is the internal state at round i and it is updated, at the end of



















































A shorthand of Eq. (5.13)-(5.24) is Ci = E(Pi, K) = E(Pi, (K1, ..., K8)).









4  u3, K4 +R
(i)
8 , K3 +R
(i)
7 , K2 +R
(i)






3  u2, K8 +R
(i)
8 , K7 +R
(i)
7 , K6 +R
(i)








2  u1, K4, K3, K2, K1). (5.28)
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After this, the internal states are updated as in the encryption, i.e., using Eq. (5.17)-(5.24),
where t3 = R
(i)
4  u3, t2 = R
(i)
3  u2 and t1 = R
(i)
2  u1.
5.2 Overview of Our New Attack on the Full HB-2
Adversary Model: We consider a scenario that two paralleled-and-independent execu-









internal states are (R
(i)
1 , ..., R
(i)
8 ) and (R
′(i′)
1 , ..., R
′(i′)
8 ) respectively and whose intermediate






3) respectively. (Notations for the decryptions are treated
similarly). The attacker follows a conventional chosen plaintext/ciphertext model – he is
free to choose plaintext Pi ∈ F162 and P ′i′ ∈ F162 , launch encryption without knowing the
key, and observe the corresponding Ci ∈ F162 and C ′i′ ∈ F162 ; or he chooses Ci ∈ F162 and
C ′i′ ∈ F162 , launches decryption without knowing the key, and observes the corresponding
Pi ∈ F162 and P ′i′ ∈ F 162 .
Our Attack in a Nutshell: Block ciphers are usually based on iterating a cryptograph-
ically weak function sufficient number of times without disturbing, e.g., modifying, the
outputs of intermediate rounds except whitening them with round-keys. Our new attack
on the full HB-2 exploits the fact that R4 in the encryption (R2 in the decryption resp.) is
modulo added to t3 (modulo subtracts u1, resp.), which, instead of enhancing the overall
cryptanalytic strength, gives the attacker an opportunity to create an input differential
for the last round and to retrieve the corresponding output differentials caused by the last
round. Note that we consider the collection of all such output differentials and call it a
differential sequence, which is defined in the next section, and which are information-rich
in the keys (K5, ..., K8) ((K4, ..., K1) resp.). Our full attack can be divided into two phases:
preparation phase as described in Section 5.4 and key recovery phase as described in
Section 5.3.
Key Recovery Phase: In the key recovery phase, to remove the undesired interference
introduced by the varied internal states when consecutive words of input is encrypted/de-
crypted, our attack here targets only the encryption/decryption at a particular round after
the preparation, i.e., ith round for one HB-2 instance and i′th round for the other one. This
is because given the key, IV, and the plaintext chain fed are fixed, the internal states at
the ith and i′th round are fixed as well, although they are unknown to the attacker. Note
that since only ith round and i′th round are considered, we omit the superscript/subscript
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i and i′ of HB-2 variables for convenience when describing operations in the key recovery
phase.
In the key recovery phase, we make use of the divide-and-conquer strategy to make
our attack substantially faster than exhaustive search. During this phase, the attacker
accomplishes the following:
• Step 1. 36 bits of (K5, ..., K8) ∈ F642 are recovered using the differential sequence
obtained from the last round of HB-2 encryption if a particular condition meets.
• Step 2. 28 bits of (K4, ..., K1) ∈ F642 are recovered using the differential sequence
obtained from the last round of HB-2 decryption if another particular condition
meets.
• Step 3. the rest 64-bit key are exhaustively searched using either encryption or
decryption.















The condition needed to launch Step 2 in key recovery phase is:
Condition (B):
f−1(R2  u1) + f−1(R′2  u
′












Preparation Phase: As one may expected, preparation phase of our attack copes with
the realization of the above conditions one at a time. To create the difference between R4
and R′4 (or between f
−1(R2 u1) and f−1(R′2 u
′
1)), one obvious way is to start with two
instances initialized with the same IVs and keys and then mount side-channel injection
attack, where the attacker simply injects H to the victim register, e.g., R4 or f
−1(R2u1),
of one instance any time before the execution of the last round of encryption/decryption.
Note that the preparation through injection gives the attacker no time/memory penalty,
i.e., the overall time/memory complexity of the attack is dominated by that of the key
recovery phase.
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However, side-channel injection attack is not considered much in this work since the
possibility to be success totally depends on the dedicated implementations of the cipher,
which limits the use of our attack. To be away from this strong attacking model and to be
more practical, we make use of the guess-and-determine strategy to realize both conditions
in a probabilistic manner, i.e.,
• Guess: (R(i)1 , ..., R(i)8 ) and (R′(i
′)
1 , ..., R
′(i′)
8 ) can be “randomized” by feeding both HB-2
instances with either different IVs and/or chains of random plaintext words. Ac-
cording to the birthday paradox, there is at least 0.5 chance that the randomized
(R
(i)
1 , ..., R
(i)
8 ) ∈ F1282 and the randomized (R′(i
′)
1 , ..., R
′(i′)
8 ) ∈ F1282 satisfies condition
(A) (or condition (B)) providing 264 attempts are made.
• Determine: Note that, in the previous step, even if condition (A) (or condition (B))
happens, the attacker cannot be aware of that since he is ignorant of (R
(i)





1 , ..., R
′(i′)
8 ). To determine, we develop an algorithm in light of another character-
istic of HB-2, i.e., if one sufficient condition of condition (A) (or that of condition (B))
holds at the current round, it also holds for the next round. Hence, the differential
sequences produced at the current round by ((R
(i)




1 , ..., R
′(i′)
8 )) is exact-
ly the same as that produced at the next round by ((R
(i+1)







8 )). Two equivalent differential sequences produced by two consecutive rounds
inform the attacker of the occasion of the desired condition.
• If the above step succeeds, the attacker performs the steps in the key recovery phase
to attack.
In what follows, we detail each of the above phases and steps.
5.3 Differentials Sequence Attack (DSA)
In this section, we present the key recovery phase of our attack in detail by devising a tool
called differential sequence and exhibiting its properties and applications to attack the last
round of HB-2 encryption/decryption.
Differential cryptanalysis: Differential cryptanalysis is a method analyzing the effect of
particular differences in plaintext pairs on the differences of the resultant ciphertext pairs,
which is based on a crucial observation that for any particular input differential, not all the
103
output differential are possible, and the possible ones may not appear uniformly. In the
original version of differential cryptanalysis [193], a unique differential is exploited. The
basic procedure of a differential cryptanalysis attack on an r-round iterated cipher can be
summarized as follows:
1. Given the design of a cipher, find an (r− 1)-round differential (α, β) such that given
the input plaintext pairs have a difference α, the probability that the output pairs of
the (r − 1)th round have a difference β is maximum or nearly maximum.
2. Choose a plaintext P uniformly at random and compute P ′ = P + α. Submit P
and P ′ for encryption under the actual key. From the resultant ciphertext pairs, find
every possible value (if any) of the subkey used in the last round corresponding to
the anticipated difference β. Increase by one the counter of appearances of each such
value of the subkey of the last round.
3. The above step is repeated a couple of times and the most suggested value is taken
to be the subkey of the last round.
This idea has been extended in several ways: Biham and Shamir themselves further
considered in [193] to use a trail of differentials to attack; Lai in [146] connected differential
cryptanalysis with derivative of polynomials and presented a fine definition of higher order
differentials; Knudsen [130] considered to use part of the input and output that have
differential characteristics for the analysis; Biham, Biryukov and Shamir proposed in [16] to
use differentials that happens with probability 0 as distinguishers; and recently, Blondeau
and Gérard demonstrated the multiple differential cryptanalysis in [27], where a set of
input/output differentials are considered together.
(First-order) Differential Sequence: Assume we have a keyed permutation h(w,K)
mapping w ∈ Fm2 to h(w,K) ∈ Fm2 bijectively with respect to the secret key K ∈ F n2 ,
where m and n are positive integers. Given a fixed θ ∈ Fm2 , the first-order differential is
∆θ,K(w) = h(w,K) + h(w + θ,K). (5.29)
The differentials sequence of h at θ is basically one row in the differential distribution table
of h with respect to the input differential θ. To discuss its properties, we define it in a
more formal way.
Definition 1 The first-order differential sequence (DS) of h at θ is a sequence of 2m
entries, i.e.,
∆θ,K = [z0, z1, ..., z2m−1], (5.30)
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where zi denotes the multiplicity (that is, number of occurrences) of i in the set {w ∈
Fm2 |∆θ,K(w)}, i.e.,
zi = |{w ∈ Fm2 | ∆θ,K(w) = i}|.
For example, the differential sequence is {0, 0, 4, 0, 2, 0, 0, 2, 0, 0, 0, 4, 0, 2, 2, 0} providing
h(w,K) = S1(w) in HB-2, {w = 0, 1, ..., 24−1|∆θ,K(w)} = {E, 2, 2, E,D, 4, 4, D,B,B,B,B,
7, 2, 2, 7} and θ = 0x03. The length of the differential sequence is the sum of all its multi-
plicities (16 in this example).
Note that this definition can be extended to higher orders. In this attack, we constrained
ourselves to the first-order case.
5.3.1 Properties of Differential Sequence
A differential sequence of h at θ has the following properties.
Property 1 ∆θ,K is constructed by evaluating and counting (h(w,K) + h(w+ θ,K)) with
a fixed θ and every w in Fm2 , regardless of the order of w ∈ {0, 1, ..., 2m− 1} been accessed.
This property follows immediately from Definition 1 and is useful in the sense that even
it is impossible to directly control or know w in h(w,K), e.g., w is an intermediate value
in a cipher, we can still generate ∆θ,K given that θ can be fixed and w can exhaust the
whole space of Fm2 .




Knl = ∅ and
h(w, (a,Knl)) + h(w, (b,Knl)) = h(w, (a+ b,Knl)), a, b ∈ F |Kl|2
h(w, (Kl, d)) + h(w, (Kl, d)) 6= h(w, (Kl, c+ d)), c, d ∈ F |Knl|2 .
Thus, ∆θ,K is correlated with (a subset of) Knl.
This property can be visualized by viewing h(w,K) as a vector boolean function, i.e.,
similarly as in the scenario of the cube attack [74], of public boolean variables from w and
secret boolean variables from K. The first derivative at θ in fact filters out: (1) terms in
h(w,K) which have no certain public boolean variables; and (2) linear terms of the boolean
variables in Kl. The construction of ∆θ,K is actually computing the final column of the
truth table of the remaining polynomial and re-ordering it, which is information-rich in (at
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least a subset of) boolean variables from Knl. Here we omit the information-theoretical
derivation of the (bounds of) entropy of Knl in ∆θ,K , as we are more interested in its
implication on the security of HB-2.
It is worth to emphasize that this property in fact implies that the obtained differential
sequence of h at θ can be used to search for (a subset of) the key K nonlinearly associated.
However, if h is the entire cipher, using the obtained differential sequence to search for
the secret key is equivalent to using plaintext/ciphertext pairs to search for the secret key,
which seems not appealing. As opposed, the differential sequence for a particular part of
a cipher is useful as it reflects particular subkeys.
5.3.2 Differential Sequence Attack against Last Round of HB-2
In this subsection, we attack the last invocation of WD16 (or WD16−1) in the encryption
(or decryption) of HB-2 by exploiting the tool presented. Since the HB-2 has a 16-bit block
size, we have m = 16 for the rest.
Attacking WD16 in Encryption: To show our idea in a concise way, we assume for
the time being that R1 and R
′
1 are known. In addition, let h in Definition 1 be the last
invocation of WD16 in the encryption, and recall the condition (A) is R4 +R
′
4 = H while










8). We thus have the following theorems
for our attack.
Theorem 1 With condition (A), the differential sequence of
h(t3, K) = WD16(R4  t3, K5, K6, K7, K8)
at θ = H can be computed without knowing the key K from the following
∆H,(K5,...,K8) = [z0, z1, ..., z216−1], where
zi = |{t3 ∈ F162 | (WD16(R4  t3, K5, K6, K7, K8)











= |{t3 ∈ F162 | (WD16(R4  t3, K5, K6, K7, K8)
+ WD16((R4 +H) t3, K5, K6, K7, K8)) = i}|
= |{P ∈ F162 | (C R1) + (C ′ R′1) = i}|.
106
Proof: Recall that the internal states and the key are fixed and condition (A) is imposed as
shown in Figure 5.1. From Eq. (5.13) to Eq. (5.16), it is clear that {R4t3|P ∈ F162 } ∈ F162 ,
e.g., (R4  t3) is a permutation t3, which is a permutation of t2, which is a permutation of






























(K ′1, ..., K
′
4)
(K ′5, ..., K
′
8)
(K ′1, ..., K
′
4)
(K ′5, ..., K
′
8)
P P ′ = P
C C ′
Figure 5.1: Constructing Differential Sequence from Encryption with Condition (A)
This theorem suggests that, after querying the encryption with every P = P ′ ∈ F162
and obtaining the resultant output differentials, the attacker has ∆H,(K5,K6,K7,K8), which
could be used to search for (part of) (K5, K6, K7, K8). The next theorem discloses the
correspondence of ∆H,(K5,K6,K7,K8) and (K5, K6, K7, K8).
Theorem 2 Let ∆H,(K5,K6,K7,K8) be obtained from Theorem 1. For κ6 ∈ F42 and (K7, K8) ∈
F322 , we have
∆H,(K5,K6,K7,K8) = ∆H,(κ6,K7,K8),
where, let K6[i] represent the ith (0 ≤ i < 16) bit of K6,
κ6 = ( K6[10] +K6[12],
K6[11] +K6[13],
K6[0] +K6[2] +K6[8] +K6[10] +K6[14],
K6[1] +K6[3] +K6[9] +K6[11] +K6[15] ).
Proof: Here we provide an experimental verification of this theorem.
• In our first experiment, we make use of Eq. (5.16) to generate differential sequences
at θ = H (thus we could control the input of Eq. (5.16) easily without bothering
the entire encryption). Each of the following tests are repeated reasonable times to
avoid loss of generality.
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K ′8) = (K5, K6, K7, K8) respectively to generate a differential sequence. Let us
call the above process DSGen(K5, K6, K7, K8) hereafter. Thus, DSGen(K5, K6,
K7, K8) was launched 2
32 times with different chooses of (K5, K6, K7, K8) to pro-
duce differential sequences, each of which was either inserted into a hash table if
it did not exist; or triggered a collision (here “collision” refers to the phenomena
that two executions of DSGen with different (K5, K6, K7, K8) produces exactly
the same ∆H,(K5,K6,K7,K8)), which was reported. In all the collisions we found,
(K7, K8) are the same while (K5, K6) varies. Partial results are tabulated in
Table 5.2.
– Test 2: We first use DSGen(K5, K6, K7, K8) to generate a template differential
sequence with the secret key (K5, K6, K7, K8) which is randomly selected. Next,
DSGen is called with a guessed key (K̂5, K̂6, K̂7, K̂8), i.e., DSGen(K̂5, K̂6, K̂7, K̂8).
Note that here we set (K̂6, K̂7, K̂8) = (K6, K7, K8), tried each K̂5 ∈ F162 and
recorded the produced ∆H,(K̂5,K̂6,K̂7,K̂8) if it matches our template sequence. As
a result, (216 − 1) collisions happens, which suggests
∀K̂5 ∈ F162 ,∆H,(K̂5,K6,K7,K8) = ∆H,(K5,K6,K7,K8).
Thus, we say that K5 is uncorrelated to the obtained template DS.
– Test 3: Similar as Test 2 except that we set (K̂5, K̂7, K̂8) = (K5, K7, K8), tried
each K̂6 ∈ F162 and recorded the produced ∆H,(K̂5,K̂6,K̂7,K̂8) if it equals to our
template sequence. As a result, (212−1) collisions happens, which suggests that
K6 is partially correlated to the obtained template DS.
To further investigate which part of K6 is correlated, we fixed parts K̂6 to
be correct and varied the rest to observe the collisions found. As a result,
we noticed that the second nibble is uncorrelated while the rests are partially
correlated. That is, by letting the first, third and the forth nibbles take every
possible value in F122 , (28 − 1) collisions were produced, which indicates that
only four bit in (K̂6[0], ..., K̂6[3], K̂6[8], ..., K̂6[15]) or the linear combination of
these boolean variables can be uniquely determined by the given DS. To verify,
we searched and found 15 such linear combinations and exact 4 out of them are
linear independent, i.e.,
K6[10] +K6[12], K6[0] +K6[2] +K6[8] +K6[10] +K6[14],
K6[11] +K6[13], K6[1] +K6[3] +K6[9] +K6[11] +K6[15]
– Test 4: Similar as Test 2 except that we fixed (K̂5, K̂6) = (K5, K6), tried each
(K̂7, K̂8) ∈ F322 and recorded the produced differential sequences if it equals to
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our template sequence. As a result, no collisions happen, which suggests that
there is a bijective mapping between (K7, K8) and the template sequence.
• In our second experiment, we generated the template sequence using the entire HB-2
encryption where we manually set R4 +R
′
4 = H and R1 = R
′
1 = 0 after initialization
and repeated Test 2, Test 3 and Test 4 above, in which the same results were obtained.

Table 5.2: Some Collisions Found in Test 1 (note that each two lines in one cell produce
the same differential sequence with θ = H)
K5 K6 K7 K8 K5 K6 K7 K8 K5 K6 K7 K8
56196 25591 31776 28608 5259 58450 1453 4613 11931 63343 42578 25131
14891 33718 31776 28608 54154 82 1453 4613 33166 10093 42578 25131
51427 52439 10383 5331 5258 3316 4909 32243 53472 43303 49735 58385
23521 58583 10383 5331 48136 5207 4909 32243 33527 55605 49735 58385
10513 23720 56266 56842 21555 37335 23804 39219 49708 46282 3833 21975
6945 18616 56266 56842 24209 32835 23804 39219 46153 46298 3833 21975
1947 12346 8764 37884 49115 38176 16609 58858 48786 4037 39048 46879
22460 37114 8764 37884 52169 13584 16609 58858 47248 56834 39048 46879
30286 45969 7858 39360 18687 51858 1745 62104 13278 564 27789 61251
55846 12209 7858 39360 25518 20129 1745 62104 16682 564 27789 61251
27611 21643 30999 59904 2273 52313 24422 24654 62681 20745 30138 18495
28496 17679 30999 59904 31137 58553 24422 24654 45269 12714 30138 18495
7789 33156 61918 11461 12411 58171 61105 32750 48030 19892 18970 2504
29301 6012 61918 11461 14459 35088 61105 32750 11738 34197 18970 2504
27117 24491 13908 1472 7520 3834 64704 42225 14156 38680 26568 47195
8623 32649 13908 1472 3552 3706 64704 42225 62750 38680 26568 47195
52790 32165 7784 55526 21946 63491 64374 57055 63324 9832 3806 11746
56139 14124 7784 55526 19353 21616 64374 57055 41204 1381 3806 11746
57427 56037 36359 7924 37371 25813 58822 38579 53894 55496 48025 29509
48306 58289 36359 7924 6120 5960 58822 38579 56300 49825 48025 29509
It is worth mentioning that the construction of the template differential sequence begins
with the assumption that R1 and R
′
1 are known, which may be realized by guessing during
the attacking. Therefore, to confirm that whether the differential sequence produced with
wrong guesses of R1 and R
′
1 suggests candidate keys is a necessary task.
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Table 5.3: Correlations Between the Key and the Differential Sequence
Set to be correct Try every of Collisions Result
Test 2 K̂6, K̂7, K̂8 K̂5 2
16 − 1 K̂5 is uncorrelated
Test 3 K̂5, K̂7, K̂8 K̂6 2
12 − 1 part of K̂6 is correlated
rest of K̂6 K̂6[0], ..., K̂6[3] 0
rest of K̂6 K̂6[4], ..., K̂6[7] 2
4 − 1 (K̂6[4], ..., K̂6[7]) is uncorrelated
rest of K̂6 K̂6[8], ..., K̂6[11] 0
rest of K̂6 K̂6[12], ..., K̂6[15] 2
2 − 1
K̂6[4], ..., K̂6[7] rest of K̂6 2
8 − 1 (K̂6[0], ..., K̂6[3], K̂6[8], ..., K̂6[15])
is partially correlated
Test 4 K̂5, K̂6 K̂7, K̂8 0 (K̂7, K̂8) is correlated
Observation 1 Given ∆H,(K5,...,K8) = [z0, z1, ..., z216−1], where zi = |{P ∈ F162 | (C R1) +
(C ′  R′1) = i}| and ∆̂H,(K5,...,K8) = [z0, z1, ..., z216−1], where zi = |{P ∈ F162 | (C  R̂1) +
(C ′  R̂′1) = i}|, we have, if R1 6= R̂1 and R′1 6= R̂′1, or, if R1 6= R̂1 +H and R′1 6= R̂′1 +H,
∆H,(K5,...,K8) 6= ∆̂H,(K5,...,K8).
This indicates that the wrong guess of R1 and R
′
1 actually randomize ∆H,(K5,...,K8). For
example, let C = 0x2174 and C ′ = 0x2176, whose XOR difference is 0x2 while R1 = 0
and R′1 = 0. However, when R1 = 0x3245 and R
′
1 = 0x3245, we have C  R1 = 0xef2f
and C ′  R′1 = 0xef31, whose XOR difference is 0x1e. Another example is C = 0x9e7c
and C ′ = 0x9e7e, whose XOR difference is 0x2 while R1 = 0 and R
′
1 = 0. However,
when R1 = 0x3245 and R
′
1 = 0x3245, C  R1 = 0x6c37 and C
′  R′1 = 0x6c39, whose




∆H,(K5,...,K8) = |{P ∈ F162 | (C R1) + (C ′ R′1) = i}|
= |{P ∈ F162 | (C R1 +H) + (C ′ R′1 +H) = i}|
= |{P ∈ F162 | (C  R̂1) + (C ′  R̂′1) = i}|
= ∆̂H,(K5,...,K8).
Attacking WD16−1 in Decryption: Similar attack can be mounted to the decryption:
we still assume that R1 and R
′
1 are known. In addition, let h in Definition 1 be the last
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invocation of WD16−1, i.e., Eq. (5.28), in the decryption, and recall that the condition
(B) is f−1(R2  u1) + f−1(R′2  u
′






3) and (K1, ..., K4) =
(K ′1, ..., K
′
4). We thus have the following theorems for our attack.
Theorem 3 With the condition (B), the differential sequence of h(w,K) = WD16−1(R2
u1, K4, K3, K2, K1) can be computed without knowing the key K, as shown in Figure 5.2,
by the following
∆H,(K4,...,K1) = [z0, z1, ..., z216−1], where
zi = |{u1 ∈ F162 | (WD16−1(R2  u1, K4, K3, K2, K1)











= |{u1 ∈ F162 | (WD16−1(R2  u1, K4, K3, K2, K1)
+ WD16−1(R′2  u
′
1, K4, K3, K2, K1)) = i}|
= |{u1 ∈ F162 | (f−1(f−1(f−1(f−1(R2  u1) +K4) +K3) +K2) +K1
+ f−1(f−1(f−1(f−1(R2  u1) +H +K4) +K3) +K2) +K1) = i}|
= |{C ∈ F162 | (R1  P ) + (R′1  P ′) = i}|.





























(K ′5, ..., K
′
8)
(K ′1, ..., K
′
4)
(K ′5, ..., K
′
8)




C C ′ = C
P P ′
Figure 5.2: Constructing Differential Sequence from Decryption with Condition (B)
A similar theorem describes the correspondence between ∆H,(K4,K3,K2,K1) and (K4, K3, K2, K1).
Theorem 4 Let ∆H,(K4,K3,K2,K1) be obtained from Theorem 3. For K2 ∈ F162 and κ3 ∈ F122 ,
∆H,(K4,K3,K2,K1) = ∆H,(κ3,K2),
where κ3 = (K3[0], ..., K3[3], K3[8], ..., K3[15]).
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This is also experimentally verified similarly as Theorem 2.
Visualization of Differential Sequences From HB-2: Here we provide several exam-
ples of the differential sequences used in our experiments. Figure 5.3 to Figure 5.7 are the
ones obtained from the last invocation of WD16 in the encryption with IV = (0, 0, 0, 0)
and different keys randomly selected. Figure 5.8 to Figure 5.12 are the ones obtained from
the last invocation of WD16−1 in the decryption with IV = (0, 0, 0, 0) and different keys
randomly selected. All of the sequences looks substantially different from each other, which
exhibits their correlations to the underlying keys in an intuitive way.
5.3.3 Key Recovery Phase
After exhibiting the properties of differential sequence in HB-2, we are ready to show the
steps to be performed by the attacker during the key recovery phase, which compromise
the entire 128-bit key.
1. When condition (A) holds, for every R1 ∈ F162 , the attacker uses (CR1)+(C ′R′1)
to construct one template differential sequence ∆H,(K5,K6,K7,K8), where C and C
′ can
be obtained by querying the encryption with P and P ′ = P . After this, the attacker
has 216 template sequences1.
2. For each candidate key (κ̂6, K̂7, K̂8) ∈ F362 , the attacker computes, in an off-line
environment, ∆H,(κ̂6,K̂7,K̂8) using WD16(w,K5, K6, K7, K8), w ∈ F162 , and check if it
matches one of the template sequences. If so, a key candidate is found due to Theorem
2 and Observation 1. At the end, the attacker would have the correct (κ6, K7, K8).
3. Similarly, utilizing the decryption, when condition (B) holds, for every R1 ∈ F162 ,
the attacker uses (R1  P ) + (R′1  P
′) to construct another template sequence
∆H,(K4,K3,K2,K1), and guesses to determine (K2, κ3) using WD16
−1 in an off-line en-
vironment.
4. After that, the attacker searches for the rest of the key using 264 trial encryptions.
1Note that R1 = R
′
1 is implicitly assumed in the condition (A) and achieved during the preparation
phase.
112
Figure 5.3: DS from Enc. using (K5, K6, K7, K8) = (0xf1e3, 0x524a, 0xb28a, 0xc987)
Figure 5.4: DS from Enc. using (K5, K6, K7, K8) = (0x7c9f, 0x0784, 0x1c96, 0xbcb4)
Figure 5.5: DS from Enc. using (K5, K6, K7, K8) = (0x6b03, 0xcf0c, 0x1ba2, 0xdc27)
Figure 5.6: DS from Enc. using (K5, K6, K7, K8) = (0x2602, 0xcb5a, 0xab7c, 0xf56b)
Figure 5.7: DS from Enc. using (K5, K6, K7, K8) = (0xf4c7, 0x920f, 0x1fbf, 0x0c38)
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Figure 5.8: DS from Dec. using (K1, K2, K3, K4) = (0x5d67, 0xd0ef, 0x8cec, 0xa33a)
Figure 5.9: DS from Dec. using (K1, K2, K3, K4) = (0x6601, 0x0bd8, 0xa6fa, 0xcede)
Figure 5.10: DS from Dec. using (K1, K2, K3, K4) = (0x28dc, 0xbde1, 0x6e3d, 0xa56d)
Figure 5.11: DS from Dec. using (K1, K2, K3, K4) = (0x1927, 0x8f7d, 0xa928, 0x27e3)
Figure 5.12: DS from Dec. using (K1, K2, K3, K4) = (0xc30e, 0xaa4f, 0x5f89, 0xeb9f)
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Complexity Analysis: The overall complexity of the above process is
236 × 216 × 216︸ ︷︷ ︸
determine κ6, K7, K8





where negligible memory is required by each of the steps.
5.4 Preparation: Guess and Determine of the Condi-
tions
The attack shown in the last section is based on condition (A) and condition (B), which
sounds unpractical at the first glance as the initialization of HB-2 leads the internal states
to be unpredictable. In this section, we realize these two conditions through a probabilistic
approach – when the internal states of two HB-2 instances are respectively random, there
is a certain chance that the attacker could get the desired differentials in the internal
states. To this end, we study: (1) how to randomize the internal states of HB-2; (2) how
to transfer condition (A) and condition (B) to be necessary to another two conditions; (3)
how to determine whether those sufficient conditions happen in the two instances of HB-2.
The reason that we study (2) is that we want to develop a better algorithm for (3).
5.4.1 Randomize the Internal States
There are two ways for the adversary to affect the internal states of HB-2:
• Providing the key is fixed, it is suffice, from Eq. (5.1)-(5.12), that (IV1, ..., IV4) 7→
(R1, ..., R4) is a one-to-one mapping as well as (IV1, ..., IV4) 7→ (R5, ..., R8). There-
fore, the attacker could easily generate 264 (out of 2128) different internal states by
choosing different IVs and launching the initialization.
• For a fixed key and a particular IV, the attacker could choose plaintext P1 to feed HB-2
at the first round. As verified by our testing, 216 different internal states are generated
by inputting each P1 ∈ F162 . If a state transition graph is drawn, we can see that the
starting state, i.e., R(1) (there could be 264 such a starting state by choosing IVs),
transits to 216 neighboring states equally likely. Next, if another round of encryption
is performed, e.g., encrypting P2, each of these “neighboring states” again transits to
another 216 states providing P2 takes every value in F162 . By continuing this process,
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we would have all 2128 states covered in this graph. Therefore, to produce a set
of random internal states, i.e., {R(1), R(2), ...}, we could, as shown in Figure 5.13,
feed the encryptions with a plaintext chain where Pi is selected uniformly at random
in F162 for i = 1, 2, .... Similarly, a ciphertext chain could be fed to the decryption
oracle to generate a set of random internal states as well. Note that feeding HB-2
encryption with a chain of N random inputs is equivalent to perform an N -step 216-
dimensional random walk in its state transition graph, and |{R(1), R(2), ...}| ≈ N ,
given that N  2128; otherwise, when N approaches infinity, (|{R(1), R(2), ...}|/N)
converges in measure to a small constant due to [66] since the random walk here is
transient.
IV EK EK EK EK ...
Internal states R(1) R(2) R(3) R(4) ...
Plaintext chain P1 P2 P3 P4 ...
Figure 5.13: Feeding HB-2 Encryption with a Plaintext Chain
Furthermore, let ∆R ∈ F1282 be a given difference in the internal states, and let R(i) ⇐
E(Pi, K) represent that the internal state after encrypting the plaintext chain (P1, ..., Pi)
is R(i), it thus follows from the birthday paradox that:
Property 3 Given the following algorithm, a certain ∆R happens with 0.5 probability
when N = 264.
1: Randomly choose IV ′ and P ′1, R
′(1) ⇐ E(P ′1, K)
2: Randomly choose IV
3: for i from 1 to N do
4: Randomly choose Pi, R
(i) ⇐ E(Pi, K)
5: if R′(1) +R(i) = ∆R then
6: return “∆R happens”
7: end if
8: end for
The above algorithm provides, to the later process, the randomized differences in the
internal states of two running HB-2 instances through an effort-saving way – one instance
116
initializes a random IV and encrypts one plaintext, while the other one, besides initializes a
random IV, encrypts N plaintexts in a chain. Since {R(1), R(2), ..., R(N)} is a set of random
variables as analyzed, {R(1)+R′(1), R(2)+R′(1), ..., R(N)+R′(1)} must also be a set of random
variables.
5.4.2 Transferring of the Conditions
At the first glance, the above algorithm will automatically lead to the occasion of condition
(A) or condition (B). Unfortunately, the adversary in fact is unable to make the decision
whether R′(1) + R(i) = ∆R is true. Therefore, we need to find the sufficient conditions for
condition (A) and condition (B) respectively, which are, by taking advantage of another
design flaw of HB-2, detectable by the adversary.
Theorem 5 Condition (A) is satisfied if the following meets,
Condition (A+) : ∆K = (K ′1, ..., K
′
8) + (K1, ..., K8) = (H, 0, 0, 0, H, 0, 0, 0)
∆P = P ′1′ + Pi = H
∆R = (R
′(1)
1 , ..., R
′(1)
8 ) + (R
(i)
1 , ..., R
(i)
8 ) = (0, 0, 0, 0, H, 0, 0, 0).
Condition (B) is satisfied if the following meets,
Condition (B+) : ∆K = (K ′1, ..., K
′
8) + (K1, ..., K8) = (0, 0, 0, H, 0, 0, 0, H)
∆C = C ′1 + Ci = H
∆R = (R
′(1)
1 , ..., R
′(1)
8 ) + (R
(i)
1 , ..., R
(i)
8 ) = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, H).
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The above theorem states that as long as condition (A+) in the encryption (condition
(B+) in the decryption resp.) is realized, condition (A) (condition (B) resp.) is essentially
achieved. Note that the sufficient conditions above introduce the need of related-keys to
our attack.
5.4.3 Determining while Guessing
To inform the attacker during the attempting, as long as condition (A+) or condition
(B+) happens, we use one special differential characteristics in the encryption first pointed
out by HB-2’s designers, as shown in the last row of Table 5.4. The specialty of this
differential is its time-invariance, by which we mean that the differential in the internal
states/keys/inputs can be maintained and entered into the next round. In addition, we
found similar differential characteristics during decryption as listed in Table 5.5, where the
last one is also time-invariant. A nice observation here is that our condition (A+) (condition
(B+) resp.) is exactly the last row of Table 5.4 (Table 5.5 resp.), which is time-invariant.
Therefore, we have the following theorem.






resp.) be the differential sequence pro-
duced by the two encryption instances (two decryption instances resp.) with internal states
(R′11 , ..., R
′1
8 ) and (R
(i)
1 , ..., R
(i)






resp.) be the dif-
ferential sequence produced by the two encryption instances (two decryption instances resp.)
with internal states (R′21 , ..., R
′2
8 ) and (R
(i+1)




Table 5.4: Differentials in Encryption (pointed out in [84])
Current Round Next Round Time-invariant
∆K ∆P ∆R ∆R
0 0 (0, 0, 0, H, 0, 0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0, H, 0, 0, 0, H) No
0 H (H, 0, 0, H, 0, 0, 0, 0) (H, 0, 0, 0, H, 0, 0, 0) No
0 H (H,H,H,H,H, 0, 0, 0) (H,H,H, 0, 0, H,H, 0) No
(H, 0, 0, 0, H, 0, 0, 0) H (0, 0, 0, 0, H, 0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0, 0, H, 0, 0, 0) Yes
Table 5.5: Differentials in Decryption
Current Round Next Round Time-invariant
∆K ∆C ∆R ∆R
0 0 (0, H, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) (0, H, 0, 0, 0, H, 0, 0) No
0 H (H,H, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) (H,H, 0, H,H,H, 0, H) No
0 H (H, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) (H, 0, 0, H, 0, 0, 0, H) No
(0, 0, 0, H, 0, 0, 0, H) H (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, H) (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, H) Yes








otherwise, the above equation holds with negligible probability.








otherwise, the above equation hold with negligible probability.
Proof: It follows from Property 1 and Theorem 7. 
Therefore, the above theorem can be served as an algorithm to determine the occasion
of condition (A+) or condition (B+). Each call of this algorithm requires 216 + 216 = 217
efforts, e.g., to produce two differential sequences using two consecutive rounds, and returns
a boolean result.
5.4.4 Preparation Phase
We recap the whole process in the preparation phase for the encryption as shown below,
which is an algorithm inherited from the one goes with Property 3, where the determination
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of the occasion of R′(1) +R(i) = ∆R is replaced by our new technology. Note that a similar
preparation for the decryption is omitted here.
1: Randomly choose IV ′ and P ′1, R
′(1) ⇐ E(P ′1, K)
2: Randomly choose IV
3: for i from 1 to N = 264 do
4: Randomly choose Pi, R
(i) ⇐ E(Pi, K)
5: Generate ∆(i) using R′(1) and R(i)
6: Randomly choose P ′2, R
′(2) ⇐ E(P ′2, K)
7: Randomly choose Pi+1, R
(i+1) ⇐ E(Pi+1, K)
8: Generate ∆(i+1) using R′(2) and R(i+1)
9: if ∆(i) = ∆(i+1) then
10: return “condition (A) happens”, keep current states and enter the key recovery
phase
11: end if
12: Decrypt using C ′2 and Ci+1 to roll back HB-2’s states to R
′(1) and R(i)
13: end for
Complexity Analysis: Using the encryption only, the attacker has at least 0.5 probability
to prepare condition (A) for the DSA with 264×217 = 281 time complexity. Similarly, using
the decryption only, the attacker has 0.5 probability to prepare condition (B) for the DSA
with 264 × 217 = 281 time complexity as well. This probability can be increased if the
attacker is willing to pay more on computation and vice versa.
The complexity comparison of our technique and exhaustive search with and without
time/memory tradeoff are listed in Table 5.6. Since one encryption F162 7→ F162 only provides
16-bit entropy of the key, 2128 × 8 calls of encryption could uniquely determine the key
with probability 1. Once time/memory tradeoff is introduced, the attacker pre-computes
a table of 264 entries using a fixed chain of plaintexts and 264 keys selected randomly in an
offline environment, and, tries to check the given plaintext/ciphertext pair corresponds to
one of the keys in the table. However, in the worst case, the attacker still has to investigate
264 × 8 in time to success.
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Table 5.6: Complexity Comparison
Type Time complexity Data complexity Success probability
[encryption] [bit]
Exhaustive search 2128 × 8 1 1
Time/memory tradeoff 264 × 8 264 × 128 1
Time/memory tradeoff 1 2127 × 128 0.5
Our Attack 264 × 217 1 0.5
5.5 Conclusion
We have present a novel attack against the lightweight block cipher Hummingbird-2 and
demonstrate its validity. This attack encompasses two phases: preparation and key recov-
ery, where the first phase, using a probabilistic algorithm, creates the conditions needed by
the second phase, and has 0.5 chance to be success with 281 effort. Next, the 128-bit key
is recovered in the second phase using a deterministic algorithm with 268 time complexity.
The proposed cryptanalytic results re-emphasize the following design principles of iterative
block ciphers:
• Block size should be large enough to mitigate the saturation of the inputs, e.g., AES
has 128-bit block size, which means the effort to saturate the plaintext and launch
DSA is equal to search for the key exhaustively.
• Do not disturb, e.g., modify, the intermediate output of round functions with other
variables that can be controlled/known by the attacker.
The attack presented against HB-2 is a special case of the general DSA, to build the
theoretic framework of which is part of our future work. In addition, it should be evaluated:
(1) whether the generalized DSA provides even better results against HB-2 and other
potentially vulnerable ciphers, especially the ones with small block size; (2) the possibility
that the generalized DSA can work with other cryptanalysis technologies, e.g., meet-in-
the-middle. Last but not least, the proposed attacking techniques seem transplantable to
attack HB-1 that has almost the same structure, the possibility of which will be investigated




An Ultra-Efficient Key Recovery
Attack on the Lightweight Stream
Cipher A2U2
As shown in Table 2.1 in Chapter 2, PRESENT, GOST and KATAN are the most promising
candidate in the family of lightweight ciphers because of their compact hardware implemen-
tation, satisfactory throughput and widely-accepted security after extensive cryptanalysis.
More recently, David et al. [73] proposed a stream cipher called A2U2, which achieves, in
terms of its hardware footprint of 284 GE, amazing lightweightness so far. Surprisingly, the
throughput of A2U2 is approximately five times greater than that of PRESENT, KTANTAN-
32 and PRINTCipher. The security analysis performed by the designers of A2U2 shows: (1)
the output sequence of the A2U2 can pass the NIST’s statistical tests for pseudorandom
number generators; (2) the period of the output sequence is around 270; and (3) particular
attacks are thwarted since variable number of clock cycles used for the initialization ensures
that the cipher outputs different ciphertexts for identical plaintexts.
In this chapter, we investigate the security of the lightweight stream cipher A2U2. Our
cryptanalytic results show that the A2U2 is completely broken and is insecure under a
simple chosen-plaintext attack, which enables the full key recovery of the A2U2 through
two encryptions with particular plaintexts of 653 bits and solving 32 sparse systems of linear
equations (where each system has 56 unknowns and, among them, around 28 unknowns
can be directly obtained without computation) with around 0.16 second on a Thinkpad
T410 laptop.
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6.1 A2U2: A Lightweight Stream Cipher
As illustrated in Figure 6.1, the stream cipher A2U2 is composed of four building blocks: a
7-stage LFSR, a combination of two NFLRs, a key schedule module, and a filter function.
As always, we use + to denote an XOR operation,  an NAND operation, and · an AND
operation.
6 5 4 3 2 1 0
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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Figure 6.1: Architecture of the Stream Cipher A2U2
After a 61-bit secret key (k0, ..., k60) is burnt into an RFID tag, the tag is capable
of encrypting plaintext bits (pδ, . . . , pn) to the corresponding ciphertext bits (cδ, . . . , cn),
where δ is the number of clock cycles required to initialize the internal state of the A2U2
and is determined by the following steps:
• Step 1. The RFID reader and the tag generate and exchange two 32-bit random
numbers RNDR = (a0, . . . , a31) ∈ F322 and RNDT = (b0, . . . , b31) ∈ F322 , respectively.
• Step 2. The value (RNDR +RNDT ) is then loaded into the LFSR and two NFSRs
of the A2U2 cipher.
• Step 3. The LFSR and two NFSRs run δ clock cycles for initialization without any
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output until the state of the LFSR reaches all ones. From the next clock cycle, the
stream cipher A2U2 outputs the ciphertext bits.
The building blocks of the stream cipher A2U2 are further detailed as below.
One LFSR: The LFSR has seven stages denoted by a binary vector (ti+6, . . . , ti) ∈ F72, i =
0, . . . , n. Moreover, the following recursive relation holds:
ti+7 = ti + ti+4, for i = 0, . . . , n.
Note that the generated sequence is an m-sequence [95] with the maximum period 27−1 =
127. In the step 2 above, ((a0, . . . , a4)+(b0, . . . , b4)+(k56, . . . , k60)) is loaded into (t4, . . . , t0)
of the LFSR, while leaving t5 to be a constant one and t6 to be a constant zero.
Two NFSRs: This block borrows part of the design from KATAN/KTANTAN [64]. For
i = 0, . . . , n, the feedback functions can be represented as follows:
si+8 = li + li+2  li+3 + li+5 + li+7  ti+6
+li+10  li+11  li+12 + li+13  li+15,
li+16 = si + si+1  si+2 + si+3 + si+6 + ski, (6.1)
where ski is the subkey bit generated by the key schedule.
Key Schedule: This module derives a sequence of subkeys (sk0, . . . , skn) from a portion
of the secret key (k0, ..., k55), where ski is used by the NFSR during the ith clock cycle and
is computed as follows:
ski = mux(kmod(5i,56), kmod(5i+1,56), ti+1)mux(kmod(5i+4,56), li+14, ti+5) +
mux(kmod(5i+2,56), kmod(5i+3,56), ti+3), (6.2)
where mod(x, y) returns x modulo y provided that x, y are non-negative integers and
mux() is a multiplexer such that, given x, y, z ∈ {0, 1}, mux(x, y, z) = x iff z = 0 or
mux(x, y, z) = y iff z = 1.
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Filter Function: The filter function is essentially a variant of the shrinking generator
[54], which replaces the XOR operation of keystream bits and plaintext bits in a classical
stream cipher. Regardless of its multiplexer-based implementation, the filter function can
be simply written as (see Eq. (6) in [73]):
Case I: ci =
{
si+8 + ti, if li+16 = 0,
si+8 + pi, if li+16 = 1,
for i = δ, . . . , n, (6.3)
where pi is the plaintext bit fed into the A2U2 cipher during the ith clock cycle, and ci is
the corresponding ciphertext bit. Let us denote the above expression of ci as “Case I of
ci”.
It is worth to point out that we were recently informed by Mohamed Ahmed Abdel-
raheem, Julia Borghoff and Erik Zenner that the initial intention of the authors of [73] is
in fact to construct a multiplexer (as shown below) behaving like a stop-and-go sequence
generator [36], which is different from the descriptions of A2U2 in [73]. Let us call the
below expression of ci as “Case II of ci”. Nevertheless, as shown later, our attack is
applicable to both designs.
Case II: ci =
{
si+8 + ti, if li+16 = 0,
si+8 + pf(i), if li+16 = 1,
for i = δ, . . . , n̂ (6.4)
where f(i) = δ+
∑i+16
j=δ+16 lj, δ ≤ i ≤ n, f(δ) = δ and n̂ equals the sum of n and the number
of inserted bits from the m-sequence.
6.2 An Ultra-Efficient Key Recover Attack
6.2.1 Adversary Model
We consider the classical chosen-plaintext attack against the stream cipher A2U2 that is
implemented on an RFID tag with a fixed and high-entropy 61-bit secret key burnt inside.
An attacker, equipped with a programmable RFID reader, queries the victim tag with a
particular random number RNDR and plaintext bits pδ, ..., pn. The attacker’s goal is to
recover the secret key (k0, ..., k60). Note that in our attack, the reader, manipulated by the
attacker, can always adaptively choose RNDR to make (RNDR+RNDT ) a constant, e.g.,
RNDR +RNDT = 0.
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6.2.2 Step 1: Recover Sequences of si+8 and li+16
A cryptographic primitive is only as strong as its weakest module, which is the general
principle to break a cryptosystem. We noticed that the filter function in the A2U2 is quite
weak, which enables an attacker to easily recover the internal state of the NFSRs by the
following steps.
1. At the δth clock cycle1, the LFSR reaches the all-one state and the A2U2 starts
the ciphertext output. As a result, the attacker knows the sequence (tδ, tδ+1, ..., tn),
which is just a repetition of the m-sequence with period 127 as shown in Table 6.1.
Table 6.1: One Period of (tδ, tδ+1, ..., tn)
1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0,
0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0,
1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0,
1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0,
1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0.
2. Case I of ci: The attacker first chooses the plaintext bits
(pδ, . . . , pn) = (tδ, tδ+1, . . . , tn),
and sends them to the tag for encryption. Since pi and ti are equal for i = δ, . . . , n,
Eq. (6.3) now becomes
ci = si+8 + ti, for i = δ, . . . , n.
Consequently, the variable li that controls the multiplexer is nullified and si+8 can be
recovered (i.e., both ci and ti are known to the attacker). Next, the attacker chooses
a new set of plaintext bits
(pδ, . . . , pn) = (1 + tδ, 1 + tδ+1, . . . , 1 + tn),




si+8 + ti, if li+16 = 0
si+8 + ti + 1, if li+16 = 1
for i = δ, . . . , n.
1As one may expected, this cipher may also suffer from the timing attack due to the obvious relation,
during the initialization, between the time used to transit to the all one state in the LFSR and δ.
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Given ti, si+8 and ci, the attacker easily distinguishes li = 0 from li = 1.
Case II of ci: The above procedure could be easily transferred to attack ci in the
second case, based on the observation that the output ci of the multiplexer is a linear
function, i.e., either (si+8 + ti) or (si+8 + pf(i)). To launch the attack, the attacker
chooses two complimentary plaintexts (pδ, . . . , pn) and (p
′
δ, . . . , p
′
n) for encryption,
i.e., pi + p
′
i = 1, δ ≤ i ≤ n. Let the corresponding ciphertexts be (cδ, . . . , cn̂) and







0, if li+16 = 0,
1, if li+16 = 1,
for i = δ, . . . , n̂,
which reveals the sequence {lδ+16, . . . , ln̂+16}. Consequently, the sequence {sδ+8, . . . , sn̂+8}
can be simply recovered from Eq. (6.4) once each li+16 is known.
6.2.3 Step 2: Recover Internal States of NFSRs and Subkey ski
Given si+8 and li+16 (i ≥ δ) obtained from the Step 1, the internal states of the two NFSRs
are completely exposed to the attacker after max(δ+9, δ+17) = δ+17 clock cycles. Next,
the attacker employs the following relation derived from Eq. (6.1) to recover the subkey
bits ski for i = δ + 17, . . . , n,
ski = si + si+1  si+2 + si+3 + si+6 + li+16.
As one may expect, the attacker is already capable of decrypting any ciphertext with the
obtained subkeys (skδ+17, . . . , skn). However, the attacker could do even better by fully
recovering the secret key as described below.
6.2.4 Step 3: Fully Recover Secret Key
Without loss of generality, we fix δ to be a specific integer by guessing, e.g., assume δ = 88
hereafter, and first recover the partial secret key bits k0, ..., k55. To this end, the attacker
generates (n− δ − 16) equations (see below) from Eq. (6.2) as well as the internal state li
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of the NFSRs, and derives the subkeys ski, when i ≥ δ + 17.
k22 · l119 + k23 = sk105 + 1 k26 · k30 + k29 = sk106 + 1
k31 · l121 + k34 = sk107 + 1 k37 · k40 + k38 = sk108 + 1
k42 · k45 + k44 = sk109 + 1 k46 · l124 + k48 = sk110 + 1
k52 · l125 + k53 = sk111 + 1 k0 · l126 + k3 = sk112 + 1
k5 · l127 + k8 = sk113 + 1 k11 · k14 + k13 = sk114 + 1
. . . . . .
Among these equations, approximately half of them are of the type
kx · ly + kz = skw + 1, (6.5)
where x, y, z and w are integers. Since ly is known to the attacker, he can select 56 such
equations to form a sparse linear system with full rank and solve it to get (k0, ..., k55).
Through extensive experiments, we found that when n = 512 + δ, the attacker can obtain
56 linear independent equations out of 249 Eq. (6.5)-alike equations with probability 1,
which implies that in a practical attack scenario the attacker should query the RFID tag
with plaintexts of n = 512 + δ = 638 bits (recall that δ ≤ 126).
To recover the rest key bits k56, . . . , k60, we make use of the fact that δ is indeed
the number of clock cycles required to transit the LFSR’s state from (k60, . . . , k56, 1, 0)
to (1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1) or the reverse direction (here we assume RNDR + RNDT = 0 for
simplicity). In our example, transiting the state (1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1) reversely for δ = 88 clock
cycles gives us (k56, ..., k60) = (1, 0, 1, 0, 0). Due to the uncertainty of δ, the attacker could
have 32 possible keys such that the recovered (k0, ..., k55) is a δ-bit shifted version of the
right key and (k56, ..., k60) is the state determined by δ as listed in Table 6.2. The attacker
then utilizes the obtained one plaintext/ciphertext pair to test all 32 key candidates locally
for retrieving the correct one.
6.2.5 Complexity Analysis of the Attack
Our attack is an ultra-efficient chosen-plaintext attack in terms of the computational over-
head. Table 6.3 summarizes the computational complexity of the proposed attack.
Generally speaking, solving a system of linear equations with m variables requires
O(m3) steps by the Gaussian elimination. However, as observed in our experiment, the
linear system in question is quite special such that approximately 28 equations are of type
kz = skw + 1,
129
Table 6.2: Deterministic Relation Between δ and (k56, . . . , k60)
(k56, . . . , k60) δ (k56, . . . , k60) δ (k56, . . . , k60) δ
(0, 0, 0, 0, 0) 29 (0, 0, 0, 0, 1) 91 (0, 0, 0, 1, 0) 36
(0, 0, 0, 1, 1) 113 (0, 0, 1, 0, 0) 26 (0, 0, 1, 0, 1) 108
(0, 0, 1, 1, 0) 40 (0, 0, 1, 1, 1) 75 (0, 1, 0, 0, 0) 111
(0, 1, 0, 0, 1) 73 (0, 1, 0, 1, 0) 96 (0, 1, 0, 1, 1) 98
(0, 1, 1, 0, 0) 20 (0, 1, 1, 0, 1) 54 (0, 1, 1, 1, 0) 48
(0, 1, 1, 1, 1) 100 (1, 0, 0, 0, 0) 59 (1, 0, 0, 0, 1) 43
(1, 0, 0, 1, 0) 22 (1, 0, 0, 1, 1) 66 (1, 0, 1, 0, 0) 88
(1, 0, 1, 0, 1) 70 (1, 0, 1, 1, 0) 56 (1, 0, 1, 1, 1) 117
(1, 1, 0, 0, 0) 120 (1, 1, 0, 0, 1) 78 (1, 1, 0, 1, 0) 50
(1, 1, 0, 1, 1) 10 (1, 1, 1, 0, 0) 14 (1, 1, 1, 0, 1) 83
(1, 1, 1, 1, 0) 102 (1, 1, 1, 1, 1) 126
Table 6.3: Computational Complexity of the Proposed Attack
Recovery Bits Computation Cost
si i = δ + 9, . . . , n one encryption of n bits
li i = δ + 17, . . . , n one encryption of n bits
ski i = δ + 17, . . . , n negligible
ki i = 0, . . . , 60 solve 32 sparse systems of linear equations
≈ 0.16 second on a Thinkpad T410
which immediately return the key bits. Moreover, the rest equations can be solved with
around 0.005 second on a Thinkpad T410 laptop in our testing. In the worst case, the
attacker has to solve 32 such systems of linear equations using around 0.16 second, which
is negligible effort for the attacker.
6.3 Conclusion
In this chapter, we identified the security vulnerabilities of the A2U2 lightweight stream
cipher and developed an ultra-efficient chosen-plaintext attack to fully recover the secret
key of A2U2 through querying the encryption function twice on the victim tag and solving
32 sparse systems of linear equations with around 0.16 second. Our cryptanalysis implies
that A2U2 has been completely broken and is not eligible to provide confidentiality and
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authenticity for RFID communications, which settled the concerns that are made in the
conclusion of [73].
Additionally, the breaking of A2U2 manifests (again) that the lower bound of the hard-
ware footprint (in terms of GE) of a cipher that provides enough security margin, given
today’s manufacturing process, is around 400 − 500 GE. This is because the designs of
lightweight cryptography must cope with the trade-offs between security, cost, and per-
formance. It’s generally easy to optimize any two of the three design goals, while it is




Conclusions and Future Research
This chapter summarizes the contributions of the thesis and provides directions for future
work.
7.1 Summary of Contributions
• Survey of Existing Solutions: We review various aspects of existed design and
analysis for security and privacy issues. We introduce the recent advances in the
lightweight symmetric ciphers, and we categorize and survey the design of lightweight
authentication protocols. Moreover, solutions leveraging the physical layer resources
are scrutinized as well. Finally, solutions along a nontechnical way are exhibited.
• Physical Layer Enhancement of Passive RFID Communication: We inves-
tigate how to solve the eavesdropping, modification and one particular type of relay
attacks toward the tag-to-reader communication in passive RFID systems without
requiring lightweight ciphers or secret credentials shared by legitimate parties using
a physical layer approach. To this end, we propose a novel physical layer scheme,
known as BUPLE. Besides, we also exploit coding in the physical layer to further
improve the eavesdropping resistance. Three WCCs with ultra-lightweight construc-
tions are exhibited. The security and usability of BUPLE in conjunction with WCCs
are further confirmed by our proof-of-concept implementation and testing.
• Active Eavesdropping Attacks against Passive RFID Systems: We identify
active eavesdropping as a brand-new and quite powerful family of attacks against
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passive RFID systems. In this attack, the adversary transmits an un-modulated
carrier at a certain frequency, while a valid reader and a tag interacts at another
frequency. By carefully examining the amplitude of the backscattered version of
both blank carrier and reader’s carrier, the eavesdropper is able to recognize tag’s
responses more reliably. Besides the formalization and the theoretic analysis of this
attack, we demonstrated and empirically evaluated this new attack towards an EPC
Gen2 system, through software-defined radio devices working at 860-960MHz and a
WISP tag. Our experimental results show that the active eavesdropping achieves a
significant improvement in the bit error rate of the intercepted communication. In
addition, for a greedy proactive eavesdropper, we propose a simple countermeasure
without introducing any computation/storage overhead to the current system. The
experimentally grounded evaluation of this countermeasure is also presented.
• Differential Sequence Attack on HummingBird-2: We identify a novel cryptan-
alytic method, known as differential sequence attack, to attack the lightweight cipher
HummingBird-2. We disclose that the differential sequences for the last round of this
cipher can be computed by the full cipher and the search space for the keys in the
last round can be reduced because the property of the differential sequences. Based
on these observations, our full attack can be divided into two phases: (1) in the key
recovery phase, we exploit the fact that in HB-2 the attacker can create an input dif-
ferential for the last round and retrieve the corresponding output differentials. Thus
by attacking the encryption (decryption resp.) of HB-2, our DSA algorithm recovers
36-bit (another 28-bit resp.) out of 128-bit key with 268 (260 resp.) time complexity
and negligible memory complexity if particular differentials of the internal states and
of the keys at one round can be maintained to the next round of encryption/de-
cryption. Furthermore, the rest 64-bit of the key can be exhaustively searched and
the overall time complexity is dominated by 268; (2) in the preparation phase, by
investing 281 effort in time, the attacker is able to create the conditions desired with
at least 0.5 probability.
• An Ultra-Efficient Key Recovery Attack on A2U2: We report an ultra-efficient
key recovery attack under the chosen-plaintext-attack model against the stream ci-
pher A2U2, which is the most lightweight cryptographic primitive proposed so far for
low-cost RFID tags. Our attack can fully recover the secret key of the A2U2 cipher
by only querying the A2U2 encryption twice on the victim tag and solving 32 sparse
systems of linear equations in the worst case. Our cryptanalysis implies that A2U2
has been completely broken.
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7.2 Future Work
Recently, RFID technology is gaining an explosion of development in both industry and
academia. It is broadly believed that, in the near future, the price of RFID will fall below
a critical threshold and these tags will become commonplace – attached to almost every
manufactured item. Therefore, research for security and privacy for low-cost RFID systems
will become even more crucial than it is today. To this end, the following directions deserve
further study.
7.2.1 Design Principle of Computation-efficient Cryptographic
Primitives
Design a cryptanalytic strong and hardware efficient cryptographic primitive is presently
more art than science. For the future design of computation-efficient ciphers, there is a clear
need for more scientific formulation of the principles on which the security of such ciphers
rests. For example, designers of the Hummingbird-2 suggests to use an 128-bit internal
state in a block cipher to enable the use of smaller block size to benefit the quick response
of a tag as well as the encryption/decryption of short messages in RFID protocols, while
designers of KATAN suggests to use NFSRs iteratively to construct a secure block cipher.
To explore and identify design principles for lightweight primitives, which are obscure at
the current stage, is part of our future work.
7.2.2 Physical Layer Encryption of RFID Communication
Furthermore, the combination of the cryptographic approach and the physical-layer ap-
proach seems promising in providing low-cost security for RFID tags. To be specific, we
are currently working on the physical layer encryption of RFID communication to further
solve the eavesdropping problem – messages from a tag are first coded to longer sequence
which are then encrypted using a lightweight stream cipher, e.g., WG-7. Although this
approach requires longer encryption sequences, the natural randomness of the noisy tag-
to-reader communication channel can be used effectively for confidentiality purpose. Our
design is in light of the truth that an eavesdropper can either stay close to a victim tag for
only a short time period or stay away from it in a long run. The former gives the attacker
limited number of pairs of plaintext/ciphertext containing less noise, while the latter pro-
vides the attacker more pairs of noisy plaintext/ciphertext. The analysis of the security of
this scheme represents a marked departure from conventional cryptanalysis of symmetric
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ciphers, which roots in the assumption that error-free copies of plaintext/ciphertext pairs
are always available to the attacker. We plan to introduce and study the concept of noisy
cryptanalysis, which may bring in more insights on the theoretic and practical security for
low-cost RFID systems.
7.2.3 Confidentiality-preserving Bidirectional Communication
though Collaboration of Multiple Readers
We are also developing a novel scheme to enable confidentiality-preserving bidirectional
communication without relying on lightweight cryptographic primitives. In our scheme,
multiple readers are employed to interact with a single tag as opposed to the convention
that one reader interacts with multiple tags.
This research is initiated from our work in Chapter 3, where we notice that if a reader
broadcasts WCC-encoded signals at a certain power level, only tags located in a certain
region (call it confidentiality-preserving region or C-region hereafter), e.g., usually a circle if
the reader is using a dipole antenna, is able to listen and decode the message transmitted.
Moreover, the size of the C-region can be controlled by adjusting the power level of the
reader’s transmitter. In a multiple reader scenario, each reader creates a C-region on
its own. Thus, a super C-region, i.e., the joint region of all individual C-regions, could
be of any geometric shape, e.g., a point, if the readers adjust their respect C-region in a
collaborative way. As long as a tag is placed within this region, a confidentiality-preserving
reader-tag communication is enabled. In addition to the experimental verification of this
idea we are currently working on, we will enhance this scheme to fight against distributed
attackers with strategies such as space/time/frequency hopping for the readers.
7.2.4 Security and Privacy in Internet of Things (IoT)
The IoT is a vision of connectivity for anything, anytime and anywhere, which may have
impact on our daily life dramatically as the Internet has done in the past 20 years. The
RFID tag with sensing and positioning capabilities has been recognized as a promising
enabler towards IoT. A typical configuration of IoT is that once the reader creates an
electromagnetic field, all passive tags attached to physical objects in the operating range
start to work and communicate indirectly with each other. One noteworthy phenomenon
is the indirectness of the communication such that: without transceiver parts, tag A talks
to tag B by first backscattering the message to the reader. The reader then decodes and
broadcasts it to tag B. In such an interconnected world of miniaturized systems, security
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and privacy is even more challenging, i.e., possible threats could be: (1) communication
among tags in IoT can be traffic-analyzed; (2) tags with positioning capability are more
susceptible to be tracked; (3) tags with sensing capability, if unauthorized accessed, leak the
information regarding the physical environment where they are placed, etc.. Our long term
goal is to study the security and privacy problems in IoT, e.g., how to design multi-party







Matlab Codes for Computation
Security Properties of Proposed
(16, 8)-WCC
The following snippet of code calculates the information rate, the equivocation rate of the
proposed (16, 8)-WCC.
n = 16; m = 8; p = 0.2; pc = 1 - p;
prob_sum = zeros(1,2^m); counter = zeros(1,2^m);
for i=0:1:2^n-1















f(1)= mod(Ci(9) +(Ci(1) + Ci(2) + Ci(4) + Ci(7) + Ci(8) + (Ci(1)+Ci(5))*
(Ci(2)+Ci(3)+Ci(4)+Ci(6)) + (Ci(2)+Ci(3))*(Ci(4)+Ci(6))),2);
f(2) = mod(Ci(10)+(Ci(2) + Ci(3) + Ci(5) + Ci(1) + Ci(8) + (Ci(2)+Ci(6))*
(Ci(3)+Ci(4)+Ci(5)+Ci(7)) + (Ci(3)+Ci(4))*(Ci(5)+Ci(7))),2);
f(3) = mod(Ci(11)+(Ci(3) + Ci(4) + Ci(6) + Ci(2) + Ci(8) + (Ci(3)+Ci(7))*
(Ci(4)+Ci(5)+Ci(6)+Ci(1)) + (Ci(4)+Ci(5))*(Ci(6)+Ci(1))),2);
f(4) = mod(Ci(12)+(Ci(4) + Ci(5) + Ci(7) + Ci(3) + Ci(8) + (Ci(4)+Ci(1))*
(Ci(5)+Ci(6)+Ci(7)+Ci(2)) + (Ci(5)+Ci(6))*(Ci(7)+Ci(2))),2);
f(5) = mod(Ci(13)+(Ci(5) + Ci(6) + Ci(1) + Ci(4) + Ci(8) + (Ci(5)+Ci(2))*
(Ci(6)+Ci(7)+Ci(1)+Ci(3)) + (Ci(6)+Ci(7))*(Ci(1)+Ci(3))),2);
f(6) = mod(Ci(14)+(Ci(6) + Ci(7) + Ci(2) + Ci(5) + Ci(8) + (Ci(6)+Ci(3))*
(Ci(7)+Ci(1)+Ci(2)+Ci(4)) + (Ci(7)+Ci(1))*(Ci(2)+Ci(4))),2);
f(7) = mod(Ci(15)+(Ci(7) + Ci(1) + Ci(3) + Ci(6) + Ci(8) + (Ci(7)+Ci(4))*
(Ci(1)+Ci(2)+Ci(3)+Ci(5)) + (Ci(1)+Ci(2))*(Ci(3)+Ci(5))),2);
f(8) = mod(Ci(1) + Ci(2) + Ci(3) + Ci(4) + Ci(5) + Ci(6) + Ci(7) + Ci(8)+









if A(j) == 1
weight_ctr = weight_ctr + 1;
end
end
prob_sum(index) = prob_sum(index) + p^weight_ctr*pc^(n-weight_ctr);






entropy = entropy - prob_sum(i)*log(prob_sum(i))/log(2);
end
end
disp([’A [’ num2str(n) ’, ’ num2str(m) ’] code’]);
disp([’When error prob.: ’ num2str(p)])
disp([’equivocation rate: ’ num2str(entropy/m, 15)])
disp([’R*d: ’ num2str(entropy/n,15)])
disp([’secrecy capacity: ’ num2str(-(1-p)*log(1-p)/log(2)-p*log(p)/log(2),15)])
function prob_sum = prob_cal(n,m,H,S,p)
pc = 1 - p;
prob_sum = 0;
for i=0:1:2^n-1















if A(j) == 1
weight_ctr = weight_ctr + 1;
end
end
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RFID tag, In Proceedings of the 17th conference on USENIX Security Symposium,
USENIX’08, pp. 185–193, 2008.
[172] Y. Nawaz and G. Gong, WG: A family of stream ciphers with designed randomness
properties, Information Science, vol. 178, no. 7, pp. 1903–1916, 2008.
[173] C. Ng, W. Susilo, Y. Mu, and R. Safavi-Naini, RFID privacy models revisited, In
European Symposium on Research in Computer Security, ESORICS’08, LNCS 5283,
pp. 251–266, 2008.
[174] L.M. Ni, D. Zhang and M.R. Souryal, RFID-based localization and tracking tech-
nologies, Wireless Communications, IEEE, vol. 18, no. 2, pp. 45–51, 2011.
[175] Y. Oren and M. Feldhofer, A low-resource public-key identification scheme for RFID
tags and sensor nodes, In Proceedings of the second ACM conference on Wireless
network Security, WiSec’09, pp. 59–68, 2009.
[176] K. Ouafi, R. Overbeck and S. Vaudenay, On the security of HB# against a Man-in-
the-Middle attack, Advances in Cryptology, AsiaCrypt’08, LNCS 5350, pp. 108–124,
2008.
[177] K. Ouafi and R.C.W. Phan, Privacy of recent RFID authentication protocols, Infor-
mation Security Practice and Experience, LNCS 4991, pp. 263–277, 2008.
[178] M. Ohkubo, K. Suzuki, S. Kinoshita and others, Cryptographic approach to privacy-
friendly tags, RFID Privacy Workshop, vol. 82, pp. 1–9, 2003.
[179] K. Ouafi and S. Vaudenay, Smashing SQUASH-0, Advances in Cryptology, EURO-
CRYPT’09, LNCS 5479, pp. 300–312, 2009.
[180] L.H. Ozarow and A.D. Wyner, Wire-tap channel II, Advances in Cryptology, EURO-
CRYPT’84, LNCS 209, pp. 33–50, 1985.
[181] S. Piramuthu, On existence proofs for multiple RFID tags, ACS/IEEE International
Conference on Pervasive Services, pp. 317–320, 2006.
[182] P. Peris-Lopez, J.C. Hernandez-Castro, J.M.E. Tapiador, E. Palomar and J.C.A. van
der Lubbe, Cryptographic puzzles and distance-bounding protocols: practical tools for
RFID security, IEEE International Conference on RFID, RFID’10, pp. 45–52, 2010.
160
[183] A. Poschmann, S. Ling and H. Wang, 256 bit standardized crypto for 650 GE–GOST
revisited, Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems, CHES’10, LNCS 6225, pp.
219–233, 2011.
[184] C. Pendl, M. Pelnar and M. Hutter, Elliptic curve cryptography on the WISP UHF
RFID tag, to appear In Proceedings of RFIDSec’11. pp. 1–16, 2011.
[185] K.B. Rasmussen and S. Capkun, Location privacy of distance bounding protocols, In
Proceedings of the 15th ACM conference on Computer and Communications Security,
CCS’08, pp. 149–160, 2008.
[186] K.B. Rasmussen and S. Capkun, Realization of RF distance bounding, In Proceedings
of the USENIX Security Symposium, USENIX’10, pp. 1–13, 2010.
[187] M. Rieback, B. Crispo and A. Tanenbaum, RFID guardian: A battery-powered
mobile device for RFID privacy management, Australasian Conference on Information
Security and Privacy, ACISP’05, LNCS 3574, pp. 184–194, 2005.
[188] C. Rolfes, A. Poschmann, G. Leander and C. Paar, Ultra-lightweight implementa-
tions for smart devices–security for 1000 gate equivalents. In Proceedings of the 8th
IFIP WG 8.8/11.2 International Conference on Smart Card Research and Advanced
Applications, LNCS 5189, pp. 89–103, 2008.
[189] M.J.O. Saarinen, Cryptanalysis of Hummingbird-1, Fast Software Encryption,
FSE’11, LNCS 6733, pp. 328–341, 2011.
[190] A. Shamir, Memory efficient variants of public-key schemes for smart card applica-
tions, Advances in Cryptology, EUROCRYPT’94, LNCS 950, pp. 445–449, 1995.
[191] A. Shamir, SQUASH–a new MAC with provable security properties for highly con-
strained devices such as RFID tags, Fast Software Encryption, FSE’08, LNCS 5086,
pp. 144–157, 2008.
[192] M. Safkhani, N. Bagheri, S.K. Sanadhya and M. Naderi, Cryptanalysis of improved
Yeh et al. authentication Protocol: an EPC Class-1 Generation-2 standard compliant
protocol, Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2011/426, pp. 1–9, 2011.
[193] A. Shamir and E. Biham, Differential cryptanalysis of DES-like cryptosystems, Ad-
vances in Cryptology, CRYPTO’90, LNCS 537, pp. 2–21, 1990.
161
[194] K. Shibutani, T. Isobe, H. Hiwatari, A. Mitsuda, T. Akishita and T. Shirai, Picco-
lo: an ultra-lightweight blockcipher, Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems,
CHES’11, LNCS 6917, pp. 342–357, 2011.
[195] M. Strasser, S. Capkun, C. Popper and M. Cagalj, Jamming-resistant key establish-
ment using uncoordinated frequency hopping, 29th IEEE Symposium on Security and
Privacy, S&P’08, pp. 64–78, 2008.
[196] B. Song and C.J. Mitchell, RFID authentication protocol for low-cost tags, In Pro-
ceedings of the first ACM conference on Wireless network Security, WiSec’08, pp.
140–147, 2008.
[197] B. Song and C.J. Mitchell, Scalable RFID security protocols supporting tag owner-
ship transfer, Computer Communications, vol. 34, no. 4, pp. 556–566, 2011.
[198] D.R. Stinson and J.L. Massey, An infinite class of counterexamples to a conjecture
concerning nonlinear resilient functions, Journal of Cryptology, vol. 8, no. 3, pp. 167–
173, 1995.
[199] M.K. Simon, J.K. Omura, R.A. Scholtz and B.K. Levitt, Spread Spectrum Commu-
nications Handbook, McGraw-Hill Professional Publishing, 2001.
[200] O. Savry, F. Pebay-Peyroula, F. Dehmas, G. Robert and J. Reverdy, RFID noisy
reader: how to prevent from eavesdropping on the communication? Cryptographic
Hardware and Embedded Systems, CHES’07, LNCS 4727, pp. 334–345, 2007.
[201] J. Saito and K. Sakurai, Grouping proof for RFID tags, 19th International Conference
on Advanced Information Networking and Applications, AINA’05, vol. 2, pp. 621–624,
2005.
[202] H. Sun and W. Ting, A Gen2-based RFID authentication protocol for security and
privacy, Mobile Computing, IEEE Transactions on, vol. 8, no. 8, pp. 1052–1062, 2009.
[203] N. Saxena and J. Voris, We can remember it for you wholesale: implications of data
remanence on the use of RAM for true random number generation on RFID tags,
Workshop on RFID Security, RFIDSec’09, pp. 1–13, 2009.
[204] Tagent UWB reader and passive UWB tag, http://www.tagent.com/?PageID=110,
2011.
[205] Texus Instrument, MSP430F2132, 16-bit ultra low power microcontroller, http://
www.ti.com/product/msp430f2132, 2011.
162
[206] G. Tsudik, YA-TRAP: yet another trivial RFID authentication protocol, Internation-
al Conference on Pervasive Computing and Communications, Percom’06, pp. 640–643,
2006.
[207] A. Thangaraj, S. Dihidar, A.R. Calderbank, S.W. McLaughlin and J.M. Merolla, Ap-
plications of LDPC codes to the wiretap channel, Information Theory, IEEE Trans-
actions on, vol. 53, no. 8, pp. 2933–2945, 2007.
[208] R. Trujillo-Rasua, B. Martin and G. Avoine, The Poulidor distance-bounding proto-
col, Workshop on RFID Security, RFIDSec’10, LNCS 6370, pp. 239–257, 2010.
[209] J. Toonstra and W. Kinsner, Transient analysis and genetic algorithms for clas-
sification, Communications, Power, and Computing. Conference Proceedings. IEEE
WESCANEX’95, vol. 2, pp. 432–437, 1995.
[210] Universal Software Radio Peripheral, http://code.ettus.com/ redmine/ettus/project-
s/uhd/wiki, 2011.
[211] VERT900 Antenna, http://www.ettus.com/downloads/VERT900.pdf, 2011.
[212] S. Vaudenay, On privacy models for RFID, Advances in Cryptology, AsiaCrypt’07,
LNCS 4833, pp. 68–87, 2007.
[213] G. Vannucci, A. Bletsas and D. Leigh, A software-defined radio system for backscatter
sensor networks, Wireless Communications, IEEE Transactions on, vol. 7, no. 6, pp.
2170–2179, 2008.
[214] Wireless Identification and Sensing Platform (WISP), http://wisp.wikispaces.com,
2011.
[215] S.A. Weis, Security and privacy in radio-frequency identification devices, Master
Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, pp. 49–51, 2003.
[216] A.D. Wyner, The wire-tap channel, Bell Systems Technical Journal, vol. 54, pp.
1355–1387, 1975.
[217] H. Wu and B. Preneel, Resynchronization attacks on WG and LEX, Fast Software
Encryption, FSE’06, LNCS 4047, pp. 422–432, 2006.
[218] J. Wu and D.R. Stinson, How to improve security and reduce hardware demands of
the WIPR RFID protocol, IEEE International Conference on RFID, RFID’09, pp.
192–199, 2009.
163
[219] L. Xiao, L. Greenstein, N. Mandayam and W. Trappe, Using the physical layer
for wireless authentication in time-variant channels, Wireless Communications, IEEE
Transactions on, vol. 7, no. 7, pp. 2571–2579, 2008.
[220] W. Xu, W. Trappe and Y. Zhang, Anti-jamming timing channels for wireless net-
works, In Proceedings of the first ACM Conference on Wireless network Security,
WiSec’08, pp. 203–213, 2008.
[221] D.H. Yum, J.S. Kim, S.J. Hong and P.J. Lee, Distance bounding protocol for mutual
authentication, Wireless Communications, IEEE Transactions on, vol. 10, no. 2, pp.
592–601, 2011.
[222] D. Zanetti, B. Danev and S. Capkun, Physical-layer identification of UHF RFID tags,
In Proceedings of the sixteenth annual International Conference on Mobile Computing
and Networking, MobiCom’10, pp. 353–364, 2010.
[223] B. Zhu and G. Gong, Guess-then-meet-in-the-middle attacks on the KTANTAN fam-
ily of block ciphers, Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2011/619, pp. 1–14, 2011.
[224] J. Zhou and J. Shi, RFID localization algorithms and applications – a review, Journal
of Intelligent Manufacturing, vol. 20, no. 6, pp. 695–707, 2009.
[225] D. Zanetti, P. Sachs and S. Capkun, On the practicality of UHF RFID fingerprinting:
how real is the RFID tracking problem, Privacy Enhancing Technologies, PET’11,
LNCS 6794, pp. 97–116, 2011.
164
